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Abstract 
Mobile Health Teams, Decolonization, and the Eradication Era in Cameroon, 1945-1970 
Sarah Cook Runcie 
 
 This dissertation examines the intersecting changes of African decolonization and the 
post-World War II internationalization of public health by showing how Cameroonian and 
French health officials shaped global health programs on the ground in the 1950s and 60s. I 
approach this topic through the lens of two tightly interwoven developments in Cameroon: the 
history of colonial mobile health teams created by French military doctors and the advent of 
postwar global disease eradication campaigns. While colonial medicine and international health 
are typically treated as distinct historical subjects, I argue that global disease eradication 
programs in this period in Cameroon relied entirely on colonial mobile health teams and their 
reformulation after independence as a basis of infrastructure, personnel and knowledge. I 
specifically assert that Cameroonian and French health officials positioned mobile health teams 
as cornerstones of national health policy and regional health coordination in Central Africa and, 
in turn, as the basis for operations of attempted global disease eradication programs within 
Cameroon.  As Cameroonian, French and international health officials negotiated the work of 
the mobile health teams through decolonization and the first decade of the independence, they 
were moreover charting new structures of authority and control over medicine and public health 
between the global and the local, and forging an international politics of public health rooted in 
the particular tensions of decolonization in the country.  My project thus demonstrates how 
Africans charted new models for public health through decolonization, models that reflected 
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 In 1965, Dr. Jean Claude Happi, the Commissioner General of Public Health for 
Cameroon, welcomed Central African, French and international health officials to the first 
meeting of a new regional health organization based in the capital city of Yaoundé.  The 
Organization for Coordination in the Fight against Endemic Diseases in Central Africa 
(OCEAC) aimed to coordinate mobile health teams, which had originally been created by 
French military doctors under colonial rule, across its five member states.1  The mobile health 
team model remained the pride and joy of French military doctors, and its enshrinement in 
independent African health administrations marked the enduring impact of empire on public 
health.  Moreover, this new regional health organization formed three years after independence 
represented a new politics of health in independent Cameroon, rooted deeply in French colonial 
medicine but also charting a course for this system in the new nation. While a French military 
doctor with a long career of work in the mobile health service in the colonies held the 
organization’s top technical leadership post, Cameroonian and other Francophone Central 
African health ministers also advanced this organization as a progressive form of regional 
African integration.   
 This meeting moreover served as the forum for negotiations for the launch in the 
member states of the first major global health program after independence.  Representatives 
from the American Centers for Disease Control and from the World Health Organization came 
to the meeting of OCEAC to discuss plans for the launch of a global smallpox eradication 
program in Cameroon and member countries.2  At the exact time that this new regional 
                                                          
1 French name: Organisation de Coordination pour la lutte contre les Endémies en Afrique Centrale. Member 
states included Cameroon, The Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Central African Republic, and Chad.  
 
2 Rapport Final de la Première Conférence Technique de l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C., Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965.  
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organization took shape, planning for the smallpox program raised fundamental questions about 
how it would work within an evolving national and regional politics of public health, as well as 
in relation to the medical infrastructure and personnel developed through colonialism.   Five 
years after independence in French Cameroon, this meeting captured a vital crossroads in an 
ongoing negotiation of how Cameroonian health officials would develop the country’s own 
internal administration of public health, and how this in turn would be constituted by the 
relationship to France, other African countries, and international health organizations.   
The politics and paradoxes of this meeting in Yaoundé, with its mix of African, French 
and international health officials, to plan for the first major global disease eradication program 
after independence ultimately captures many of the questions that this dissertation seeks to 
explore.  This project poses an overarching question of how decolonization forged new 
relationships of colonial medicine, international health, and national and regional health 
administration in newly independent African nations.  I approach this question through the lens 
of two tightly interwoven developments in Cameroon: the history of French colonial mobile 
health teams and the advent of postwar global disease eradication campaigns. The convergence 
between the mobile health teams and postwar global disease eradication campaigns ultimately 
explains how frameworks of colonial, national, regional and international health came together 
from 1945-1970 in rural public health intervention in Cameroon.    
 The period after World War II was a transformative time for public health due in part to 
the creation of the World Health Organization and the increasing optimism about the possibility 
of entirely eradicating specific diseases from the globe.  International health efforts turned 
decisively to a focus on technological approaches to combatting disease and to the idea that 
these methods could be universally applied across different geographic and social contexts. The 
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dream of global disease eradication represented the height of this faith in universal 
technological solutions.3  In the postwar “eradication era”  international organizations, colonial 
and national governments poured immense resources into an ultimately failed attempt at 
eradicating malaria and a successful campaign to eradicate smallpox from the globe.4   By the 
end of the 1960s in Cameroon, the eradication era had likewise produced both notable success 
on smallpox and stunning failure on malaria.  
The story of postwar international health in Cameroon cannot be understood, however, 
without attention to French colonial medicine and its postcolonial manifestations.  Postwar 
reforms to the French colonial medical infrastructure deeply shaped the implementation of 
international disease campaigns both during the colonial period and after independence.  The 
period after WWII was also a transformative time for colonial rule in Africa, as European 
colonial governments implemented broad programs of economic and social reform.  The 
centerpiece of the French vision for postwar colonial medicine was the expansion of a mobile 
health team service meant to be the basis for biomedical intervention in rural Africa.  Originally 
created by French military doctor Eugène Jamot in the interwar period to combat sleeping 
sickness, the mobile health teams offered a new model for medical intervention to extend 
beyond the hospital or dispensary.  Through this model, teams overseen by a French military 
doctor and composed of African medical auxiliaries traveled directly to rural areas to assemble 
people for examination, vaccination and in some cases treatment. After World War II, French 
colonial officials expanded the mandate of the mobile health service to address a variety of 
                                                          
3 Nancy Stepan, Eradication: Ridding the World of Diseases Forever? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2011).  
 
4 Randall M. Packard, A History of Global Health: Interventions in the Lives of Other People (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2016), 133.  Packard refers to the ‘Era of Eradication.” He points out that the two major 
eradication programs “dominated the international-health landscape” for much of the 40s, 50s and 60s, 134.  
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diseases, such as smallpox, malaria, and leprosy.  The Service Général d’Hygiène Mobile et de 
Prophylaxie (SHMP) represented the central component of ‘preventive’ medicine and the most 
intensive form of biomedical intervention for the majority rural population in French colonial 
Africa.  As a primary site of the development of the mobile health team model and of postwar 
investment for France, Cameroon represented a central focus of French ambition for the mobile 
health team model as a modernizing reform.5  The teams left a history of coercive practice and 
instances of medical disaster in their wake in Cameroon, but they also became the pride and joy 
of French military doctors, and of many Cameroonian medical elites, due to their immense 
success in combatting sleeping sickness in the interwar period.6    
The triumphalist narrative of the teams among both French and Cameroonian medical 
personnel endured the political changes wrought by decolonization.  France maintained 
powerful economic and political influence in Cameroon after independence and the realm of 
medicine was no exception to this trend.  After independence, Cameroonian health officials 
largely upheld the model of the mobile health teams, including the role of French military 
doctors in their operations. The mobile health teams became a central component of the early 
postcolonial health system in Cameroon.    
The teams were also, I show, the vehicle for global disease eradication programs in 
Cameroon the 1950s and 60s.  The malaria and smallpox eradication programs of the 1950s and 
60s relied on the French colonial mobile health teams and their reformulation by French and 
                                                          
5 Guillaume Lachenal, Le médicament qui devait sauver l’Afrique : Un scandale pharmaceutique aux colonies 
(Paris : La Découverte, 2014), 78.  
 
6 The most infamous disaster of the teams happened in Jamot’s time, when a subordinate administered an overdose 
of the drug tryparsamide and blinded an estimated 700-900 people in Bafia, Cameroon. Jean-Paul Bado, Eugène 
Jamot, 1879-1937 : Le Médecin de la maladie du sommeil ou trypanosomiase (Paris : Éditions Karthala, 2011).In 
1954, the teams administered lomidine injections using contaminated water in Yokadouma, Cameroon. These 




Cameroonian health officials after independence as a basis of infrastructure, personnel and 
knowledge. Both Cameroonian and French health officials leveraged these international health 
programs as sources of material resources for the mobile teams, while also imposing their own 
parameters on how disease eradication programs could operate logistically and politically within 
Cameroon. Postwar international health programs and the French colonial mobile health teams 
each have a rich history on their own terms, but in this work I reframe their significance in 
Cameroon by considering how they came together and what this meant for public health and 
medical administration in the independent state.   
 I ultimately argue that the mobile health teams became the central site of negotiation for 
Cameroonian, French and international health officials over the relationship between colonial 
medicine, national health administration, and international health programs in rural health 
intervention through decolonization and the first decade of independence.  The work of the 
mobile health teams raised fundamental questions about public health in the Cameroonian state 
in the intertwining eras of decolonization and disease eradication.  In the context of a majority 
rural population, low numbers of biomedical personnel, and a sparse spread of medical 
facilities, the mobile health teams became central to visions of how the French colonial 
government sought to extend medical interventions and in turn how international health 
agencies and programs could do the same.  Over time, this overlapping work of models of 
international and colonial health would spawn new questions about what exactly rural health 
intervention should entail in the independent Cameroonian state.   
As the mobile teams performed the work of disease eradication programs and thus 
became implicated in both their success and failures, they became a central lens on how the 
ideals of international health worked through local contexts.   This work raised questions of 
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what constituted the scientific, cultural, and locally-rooted logistical expertise needed to execute 
such campaigns, and how this expertise worked between the scale of the Cameroonian village 
and a globalized vision of public health work.  These questions included the necessary 
conditions for medical teams to access people and places for public health intervention, with the 
stakes of this access immeasurably heightened through the absolutist goals of disease 
eradication. Global disease eradication programs in the postwar period, despite their one-size 
fits all ambitions, necessarily relied on ‘local’ medical operations, personnel and expertise. 
Decolonization, however, brought into question who and what would represent the 
‘local’ authority over health in engagement with international health institutions.  While this 
question certainly arose for other former French colonies in Africa (and other colonial 
territories), Cameroon offers a particularly rich case study of decolonization and international 
health due to how its political status-at the intersection of colonial and international 
administration, and of French and British imperialism-intersected with questions of authority 
over public health.  As a United Nations Trusteeship under joint French and British 
administration in the 1950s, the site of an anti-colonial movement that grew into military 
conflict, and then a bilingual Federal Republic joining together former French and British 
territories in the 1960s, Cameroon was a place where the political stakes of the ‘local’ hold on 
public health through decolonization were particularly charged.   
The new postwar period of public health in Cameroon developed in the political context 
created by the formation of the United Nations and Cameroon’s designation as a UN 
Trusteeship under joint British and French administration.7  With the Trusteeship status 
                                                          
7 Cameroon was first a German protectorate from 1884 to 1916. The territory was divided after WWI and made 
into League of Nations Mandates under British and French administration.  With the end of the League of Nations 




institutionalizing international oversight of colonial administration, this arrangement heightened 
the political stakes of public health programs in the territory.  Through required reports to the 
United Nations and during visits of a UN Trusteeship delegation to the territory, France sought 
to showcase the progressive nature of its administration.  One of the ways in which it did this 
was by showcasing modernizing postwar reform in Cameroon, particularly the work of the 
mobile health teams.8  In the 1950s, when the newly created UN agencies of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) began to fund a malaria eradication pilot program in French Cameroon run by the 
mobile health teams, the territory became a central site of research for malaria eradication in 
Africa.  Through this program, French military doctors and colonial officials carved out a space 
as local intermediaries of postwar international health in Cameroon, all while upholding this 
work as representative of the ideals of Trusteeship.  
While French military doctors assumed the mantle of local experts in the 1950s, after 
independence this position became more complicated.  Who controlled the medical 
administration in independent Cameroon and on what model would it be based?  9 Through 
decolonization, the mobile health teams ultimately became central to how both Cameroonian 
and French health officials forged the place of colonial models of medicine, and of French 
doctors, in the independent state. Multiple influences ultimately shaped this reorganization of 
the mobile health teams within Cameroon: the professional ties between French and 
                                                          
8 Lachenal (2014), 78. 
 
9 In 1961, the entire state medical corps in former French Cameroon included 54 French military doctors, 28 
Cameroonian doctors, and an additional 1313 Cameroonians working as nurses and medical auxiliaries.  Table 1 
provides additional detail.  
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Cameroonian medical personnel, the emerging affiliations between independent African states, 
and the internal fault lines of British and French colonialism within independent Cameroon.  
International health agendas in the eradication era also deeply shaped the status and the 
work of the mobile health teams after independence.  These agendas worked in two distinct and 
sometimes opposing directions on the teams.  On one hand, as international health institutions 
continued to prioritize campaign-style public health programs through the launch of a global 
smallpox eradication program, Cameroonian and French officials asserted the mobile health 
teams as central to engagement with international health resources, programs and personnel.   
How Cameroonian health officials positioned the mobile teams after independence was thus 
also a question of how to forge an international politics of health coordination.  At the same 
time, the World Health Organization began in the 1960s to propose reforms to rural health 
systems, and the embrace of these reforms by Cameroonian health officials created a conflict 
with French military doctors who jealously guarded the necessity of the mobile health team 
model.  In forging a new politics of international health after independence, Cameroonian health 
officials thus contended with both the influences of international health and the ongoing imprint 
of colonial medicine.  Some of the most important debates about rural health intervention in 
postcolonial Cameroon happened through the negotiation of how these two factors would come 
together.   
The negotiation by Cameroonian and French health officials of international health 
through decolonization reflects Jean-François Bayart’s concept of “strategies of extraversion” 
and Frederick Cooper’s characterization of the “gatekeeper state” established by the colonial 
state and adopted by postcolonial African states in which the ability to leverage external 
resources became a central, if not primary, source of state power. Cooper characterizes colonial 
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states as having “weak instruments for entering into the social and cultural realm over which 
they presided, but they stood astride the intersection of the colonial territory and the outside 
world.” 10  Thus while French military doctors saw the mobile health teams as a powerful tool 
for entering in the ‘social realm’ of Africans, this impact remained uneven in many ways.  I 
assert, however, that in the 1950s the authority over the mobile health teams became the 
primary point of interaction with ‘the outside world’ in the realm of international health due to 
the focus on disease eradication at the time.  This convergence between colonial medicine and 
international health established a certain dynamic of state administration with which 
Cameroonian health officials would contend.  Through the 1960s, the position of mobile health 
teams in the national administration thus became a central area of governance through which 
Cameroonians navigated international health initiatives in the state after independence.  
Part of this forging of an international politics of health happened through an internal 
process of creating a harmonized national medical administration.  In 1961, the question of the 
place of the mobile health team model in independent Cameroon became emblematic of a 
broader question about forming a national medical administration across the fault lines of 
French and British colonial medical infrastructure.  After French Cameroon gained 
independence in 1960, it joined with part of the former British Cameroons in 1961 to form an 
officially bilingual Federal Republic.11  After 1961, Cameroonian officials thus faced the unique 
                                                          
10 Frederick Cooper, African since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
5. Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly (New York, NY: Longman, 1993).  
 
11 The entirety of the British Cameroons United Nations Trusteeship included a Northern and a Southern Territory 
on the western border of French Cameroon, and the British essentially administered the territories as part of 
Nigeria.  The French-administered territory of Cameroon became independent on January 1, 1960.  In a February 
1961 UN-run plebiscite, people living in each of the British Cameroons voted separately on whether to become 
independent by joining with either Nigeria or the newly independent République du Cameroun to the east.  The 
British Northern Cameroons voted to become part of Nigeria and the Southern Cameroons voted to join with the 
République du Cameroun.  Delegates from the two territories of the new Cameroon met at the Foumban conference 
of July 1961 to create a constitution and framework for the state.  The resulting system for the Federal Republic of 
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regional circumstances of building a national health administration from former British and 
French territories.  Throughout the 1960s, Cameroonian medical elite and citizens debated the 
future of the mobile health teams across the former British and French territories and the role of 
French doctors in the newly constituted bilingual state.  Francophone Cameroonian health 
officials asserted the importance of the teams for the state and sought to solidify the model as a 
standardized national system.  Through this process, harmonizing the mobile health team model 
became part of Cameroon’s formation of an external politics on matters of health.  
These questions of external relations further developed at a regional level between 
Cameroon and neighboring African states through the formation of the regional health 
organization, OCEAC, in Yaoundé. In creating the organization, francophone Cameroonian and 
French health officials asserted the mobile health team model as a unifying inter-state 
framework for health coordination after independence.  In so doing, they both forged an 
international politics of health at a regional scale unto its own and created a new intermediary 
for the work of international health programs in this region.  French military doctors led 
OCEAC and thus also guarded a central role in the controlling the resources of international 
health in Cameroon.   
When the global smallpox eradication program began in the late 1960s, Cameroonian 
and French health officials used the existence of the mobile health teams and the framework of 
OCEAC to shape the functioning of this campaign in specific ways.  I assert that these three 
developments of the mobile health teams through national standardization, regional 
                                                          
Cameroon created two states: West Cameroon, the former British Southern Cameroons, and East Cameroon, the 
former French territory. The Federal Republic of Cameroon came into being on October 1, 1961 and comprised the 
territorial boundaries of Cameroon that are still in existence today.  The federal system was ultimately abolished in 




coordination and ongoing connection to the French thus in turn deeply shaped the operation of 
post-independence health international programs in Cameroon in the 1960s.  
The failures of malaria eradication efforts in Cameroon and across the world, however, 
also catalyzed new forms of direct collaboration between the World Health Organization and 
Cameroonian health officials that marked a departure from a strict adherence to the colonial 
mobile health team model.  In the wake of this failure, the WHO advised, and Cameroonian 
health officials began to adopt, modifications to the colonial model of mobile health teams in a 
way that provoked contention with French doctors involved with the state.  By the late 1960s, 
Cameroonian officials faced a crossroads on how to navigate the dual and interwoven 
trajectories of colonial medicine and international health.  While the changes of decolonization 
had pushed Cameroonian and French health officials to reposition the mobile health teams in a 
new political era, the failures of the eradication era led to a decisive step away from this model.   
By examining this history of colonial mobile health teams, decolonization, and 
international health, my dissertation thus shows how Cameroonians charted new models for 
public health in the state, models that reflected both the deeply enduring impact of empire and a 
new post-colonial politics.  My focus is therefore not just on how the mobile teams 
implemented global eradication programs in a local context, although that constitutes a key part 
of this story.  I am also interested in how the relationship between the mobile teams and global 
disease eradication programs shaped the conception of the interplay of colonial, national and 
international public health during a time of rapid political change.  Highlighting this relationship 
shows that controlling international health directives and resources became an important realm 
of negotiation of decolonization in Cameroon.  At the same time, the operation of ‘international 
health’ in Cameroon was not constituted solely by the relationship of the postcolonial state to 
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international health organizations.  International health in its local manifestation was also 
formed through the navigation of colonial models of medicine and French doctors in the state, 
the meaning of the borders of European imperialism for medicine, and the forging of ties across 
African states.  I thus demonstrate how the development of the mobile health team service along 
four key axes —within Cameroon, between Central African states, between Cameroon and 
France, and with international institutions—became central to the intertwined historical 
processes of the end of empire and the growth of global health programs.   
 
Histories of Decolonization, Colonial Medicine and International Health  
My dissertation makes its contributions at the intersection of histories of decolonization, 
colonial medicine and international or global health.  First, this work shows that the 
convergence of colonial medicine and international health were central to the functioning of 
public health through decolonization and early independence in Africa.  Second, this project 
shows that public health was a key arena of governance through which African doctors and 
political officials negotiated new post-independence relationships among African countries, 
with European powers, and with international institutions.  In this regard, it centers health and 
medicine as an important dimension of histories of internationalism and decolonization in 
Africa.   
 Before expanding on how these contributions relate to existing literature, I would like to 
draw attention to the implications of using the terms ‘international’ or ‘global’ health and 
explain how I have chosen to situate my project in relation to these terms.  The term 
“international health” gained traction in the late 19th and early 20th century in reference to “a 
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focus on the control of epidemics across the boundaries between nations.”12  Within the 
framework of “international health”, the term “global” was used in specific ways by the mid-
20th century, notably beginning in the 1950s with the “Global Malaria Eradication Program.”13  
Some scholars have noted the different implication of “global health” as implying 
“consideration of the health needs of the people of the whole planet above the concerns of 
particular nations.”14  Historians of public health have argued, moreover, that the World Health 
Organization drove the turn to the use of the term “global health” in the 1990s as it tried to 
position itself as a leader in a changing international context.15  The term “global health” today 
thus conjures specific arrangements of funding and influence often driven by nongovernmental 
organizations, and much of it shaped by the response to HIV/AIDS.16 
 More recently, however, historians have begun to use “international” and “global” in 
reference to postwar public health in sometimes interchangeable ways.17   In the edited volume 
Global Health in Africa: Perspectives on Disease Control, historians of Africa James Webb and 
                                                          
12 Theodore M. Brown, Marcos Cueto, and Elizabeth Fee, “The World Health Organization and the Transition from 
“International” to “Global” Public Health,” American Journal of Public Health 96 (2006): 62. 
 
13 Brown et al. (2006): 62.  
 
14 Brown et al. (2006): 62. 
 
15 Brown et al. (2006): 62.  The authors argue that the WHO began to face a crisis in the 1980s due to budgetary 
and leadership problems.  The World Bank meanwhile advanced its own agenda, pushing for massive reductions in 
public sector health services, and grew to be a leading force by the 1990s in international health. The authors argue 
that the WHO built off a new wave of literature in the 1990s about ‘global health threats’ in the form of infectious 
disease to reposition itself as an important leader in addressing these threats.  
 
16 Packard (2016), 273-304. Johanna Tayloe Crane, Scrambling for Africa: AIDS, Expertise, and the Rise of 
American Global Health Science (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2013).  
 
17 Erez Manela, for example, has argued that the Smallpox Eradication Program was the first truly global health 
program, due to the level of coordination mounted beyond the national level. Erez Manela, “Smallpox Eradication 
and the Rise of Global Governance,” in The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, ed. Ferguson et al. 




Tamara Giles-Vernick  “use the term ‘global health’ broadly to refer to the health initiatives 
launched within Africa by actors based outside the continent.  In our usage, global health in 
Africa has its roots in the colonial period and came into its modern forms in the post-WWII era.  
This framework accommodates the continuities in external resource flows and the changing 
groups of actors, institutional configurations, and biomedical, financial and political 
priorities.”18  While this framework presents a danger of anachronism of imposing the definition 
of global health, as used today, onto a time when this term was less common, it also 
productively emphasizes continuities, rather than ruptures, in external approaches to health in 
Africa since World War II.   
 Because this dissertation focuses in part on disease eradication programs that had 
explicit ambitions of a global scale, I refer frequently to “global health programs.”  I 
deliberately foreground the stated global scale of disease eradication programs in order to 
contrast this vision with other geographies of public health envisioned by Cameroonian, Central 
African and French health officials—at the scale of the colonial territory, of the nation or of a 
health region consisting of francophone African states.   Thus, the term “global health” in the 
period of this dissertation should be understood not in contemporary terms but in the terms of 
the concerns of the time, which framed the ambition of “borderlessness” in public health as 
primarily rooted in the goal of disease eradication. 
The first main contribution of this dissertation is the illumination of the tightly 
interwoven developments of colonial medicine and international health on the ground in 
                                                          
18 James L.A. Webb, Jr. and Tamara Giles-Vernick, “Introduction” in Global Health in Africa: Historical 
Perspectives on Disease Control, ed. Tamara Giles-Vernick and James L.A. Webb, Jr. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 




postwar Africa and the assertion that this relationship took on enduring and new forms in the 
first decade of independence.   As Randall Packard has noted in his most recent work, A History 
of Global Health: Interventions into the Lives of Other People, histories of colonial medicine 
and international health have often been treated as distinct subjects.19  He attributes this divide 
to an “academic division of labor” between those who study colonial medicine through the 
framework of a regional context and those who study international health through the lens of the 
history of medicine or of international organizations.20  Specifically pertaining to Africa, a rich 
body of literature has explored connections between biomedicine and colonial administration. 
This scholarship has shown, among other things, how European colonial administrations often 
used medicine as a tool of control but also how Africans regularly adopted this medicine to their 
own ends, subverted its influence, and maintained their own forms of healing.21  Works by 
Nancy Rose Hunt and Julie Livingston, for example, have focused on how Africans made 
meaning of illness, medicine and the body in changing social and political contexts, influenced 
both by biomedicine and “traditional” forms of medicine.22  This dissertation, by contrast, does 
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20 Packard (2016), 347.  
 
21 The work on colonialism and medicine in Africa is extensive.  Classic foundational texts in the field include:  
Steven Feierman, “Struggles for Control: The Social Roots of Health and Healing in Modern Africa,” African 
Studies Review 28 no.2/3 (1985): 73-147. Megan Vaughan, Curing their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).  J. Comaroff “The Diseased Heart of Africa: Medicine, Colonialism and the Black 
Body,” in Knowledge, Power and Practice, ed. Shirley Lindenbaum and Margaret Lock (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 305-329.  Shula Marks, “What is Colonial about Colonial Medicine? And What has 
Happened to Imperialism and Health?” Social History of Medicine 10, no. 2 (August 1, 1997): 205-219. Maryinez 
Lyons, The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900-1940 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). Frantz Fanon,“Medicine and Colonialism” in A Dying Colonialism (New 
York: Grove Press, 1967).  Randall M. Packard, White Plague, Black Labor: Tuberculosis and the Political 
Economy of Health and Disease in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).  
22 Nancy Rose Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization and Mobility in the Congo (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1999). Julie Livingston, Debility and the Moral Imagination (Bloomington: Indiana 




not focus on this broader scope of healing or individual experience of medicine, but rather 
examines the changing international context and institutional architecture of biomedicine 
through decolonization.   I thus examine how the distinctly modernist pursuit of global disease 
eradication intersected with visions of state biomedicine during a time of rapid political change.   
Alternatively, histories focused on international efforts against specific diseases or the 
work of international institutions tend to remain at a general level of engagement with specific 
African histories in order to achieve breadth.23   As Packard has noted, historians have often 
noted the “interplay” of colonial medicine and international health, but “they have failed to 
recognize the extent to which these two phenomena form a single history.” 24  He offers the 
language of “entanglements” to describe the relationship between colonial medicine and 
international health.25  Some recent works have begun to bring these two fields together in more 
                                                          
23 James L.A. Webb, Jr., The Long Struggle against Malaria in Tropical Africa (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). Webb offers a focused case study in “The First Large-Scale Use of Synthetic Insecticide 
for Malaria Control in Tropical Africa: Lessons from Liberia, 1945-62,” in Global Health in Africa: Historical 
Perspectives on Disease Control, ed. Tamara Giles-Vernick and James L.A. Webb, Jr. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 2013): 42-69. William H. Schneider, “The Long History of Smallpox Eradication: Lessons for 
Global Health,” in Global Health in Africa: Historical Perspectives on Disease Control, ed. Tamara Giles-Vernick 
and James L.A. Webb, Jr. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2013): 25-41. An important exception to this 
statement comes in Jennifer Tappan’s work on WHO and UNICEF-led efforts to address child malnutrition in 
Uganda. Jennifer Tappan, “The True Fiasco: The Treatment and Prevention of Severe Acute Malnutrition in 
Uganda, 1950-74,” in Global Health in Africa: Historical Perspectives on Disease Control, ed. Tamara Giles-
Vernick and James L.A. Webb, Jr. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2013): 92-113.  
 
24 Randall M. Packard, (2016), 14, 347.  Packard notes works by Helen Tilley, Deborah Neill, Sunil Amrith, and 
Nancy Stepan as exceptions that have begun to chart the relationships between colonial medicine and international 
health. Sunil Amrith, Decolonizing International health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006). Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development and the Problem of 
Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). Deborah Neill, Networks in 
Tropical Medicine: Internationalism, Colonialism, and the Rise of a Medical Specialty (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2012).  
 
 
25 Packard (2016), 13-14.  The idea of “entanglements” has a broader resonance in Africanist scholarship, 
particularly in relation to colonial and postcolonial history.  Achille Mbembe characterizes models of time in the 
African “postcolony” by entanglements, in contrast to linear models of time.  He argues that the “postcolony 
encloses multiple durées made up of discontinuities, reversals, inertias, and swings that overlay one another, 
interpenetrate one another, and envelope one another.” In the field of healing, medicine and the body, Lynn 
Thomas has emphasized “historical entanglement” as a framework for tracing negotiations over reproductive 
17 
 
significant ways.26  Works of Helen Tilley and Deborah Neill, for example, highlight 
connections between international scientific research and colonial medicine in the first half of 
the twentieth century.  Packard’s reframing of colonial medicine and international health invites 
new questions about how this relationship unfolded in different colonial spaces, evolved in the 
postwar period, and what the implications of this “entanglement” were for African health 
administrations after independence.   
Recent scholarship has, for example, highlighted significant postwar tensions between 
European colonial powers and international health organizations in Africa. Jessica Pearson 
argues that, in regards to health, France shifted its “civilizing mission” to the discourse of 
development, as part of an effort to guard its empire while being in line with postwar 
international norms.  She shows that French colonial health officials approached the UN health 
agencies with great skepticism, and they sought to reposition themselves as “international” 
experts in a new political landscape of public health.27  My dissertation examines similar 
questions of claims to medical expertise between the colonial and international, but I focus 
primarily on how claims to this expertise and authority evolved, and multiplied, after 
                                                          
concerns in Kenya between old and new, local and imperial.  Julie Livingston in turn drew on this framework in 
her work on debility in Botswana to trace “entanglements” between the domains of “public health, Tswana 
medicine (bongaka), biomedicine and lay nursing care.”  Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), 14-17. Lynn M. Thomas, Politics of the Womb: Women, Reproduction, and 
the State in Kenya (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 17-20. Julie Livingston (2005), 16.  
 
26 Packard (2016), 347.  
 
27 Jessica Pearson-Patel, “French Colonialism and the Battle against the WHO Regional Office for Africa,” Hygiea 
Internationals: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the History of Public Health, 13. 1 (2016): 65-80, accessed January 
25, 2017, doi: 10.3384/hygiea.1403-8668.1613165. Jessica Pearson-Patel, From the Civilizing Mission to 
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independence.  Historians of Africa have not explored in-depth how the relationship of the 
colonial to the international in health shaped postcolonial health administrations. 
There are multiple dimensions to that historical question, and it is also true that few 
works have dealt with what happened to colonial medical personnel and institutions after 
independence in Africa.  Notably for this project, a key body of research on this topic focuses 
on Cameroon.  Guillaume Lachenal’s work advances key claims about the development of the 
scientific and medical fields in Cameroon through decolonization.  His body of work shows 
how Cameroonian and French health officials used the celebration of colonial medicine, and 
specifically the celebration of mobile health team founder Eugène Jamot, to reframe 
decolonization in Cameroon as a peaceful transition, which would then support a post-colonial 
future of on-going close French-Cameroonian ties in the medical world.28   On a second and 
related point, he shows how a sense of shared medical culture, professional order, and ties of 
“familiarity” between Cameroonian and French medical personnel shaped the world of 
scientific research after independence.29  Lachenal’s development of the idea of “familiarity” 
offers a framework for understanding why some Cameroonian medical elite maintained the 
close working relationships with French doctors that they did.  My concern is not with 
intervening in this characterization of the French-Cameroonian medical relationship as such, but 
rather in reframing how it became constituted and in turn had implications in a wider 
                                                          
28 Guillaume Lachenal, “Célébrer le passé, construire le future: l’indépendance et le microcosme médical au 
Cameroun,” in Les Indépendances en Afrique: l’événement et ses mémoires: 1957/1960-2010, ed. Odile Goerg et 
al. (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013), 353-376. 
 
29 Guillaume Lachenal, “Franco-African Familiarities. A history of the Pasteur Institute of Cameroun, 1945-2000,” 
in Hospitals beyond the West: from Western Medicine to Global Medicine, edited by Mark Harrison and Belinda 
White (Orient-Longman: New Dehli, 2009), 411-444. Lachenal draws on Bayart’s uses of “familiarity” and 
“intimacy” to describe the ties between France and Africa: Jean-François Bayart, L’état en Afrique: la politique du 
ventre (Paris: Fayard, 1989).  See also: Jean-Pierre Dozon, Frères et sujets: la France et l’Afrique en perspective 




international frame.  Lachenal’s work thus invites essential questions about how this 
reformulation of colonial medical ties operated within, and also shaped, the internationalization 
of medicine and public health in the postwar period.   
I argue, therefore, that understanding the history of medicine and decolonization in 
Cameroon also requires attention to how French-Cameroonian medical ties became formulated 
through three related dynamics: through the relationship to international health organizations, to 
neighboring African states, and across the former British West Cameroon.  I hold that the 
mobile health teams were central to a reorganization of the French-Cameroonian medical world 
in part because they were so central to the formation of an international politics of health for 
Cameroon.   
 Despite this growing attention to questions of medicine and decolonization in Africa, 
historians have given little attention to the convergence of colonial medicine and international 
health through the major postwar international health campaigns. Details of how these 
campaigns actually worked through colonial health systems in Africa and in independent states 
remain largely unexamined.30  I assert that the precise relationship between international health 
programs and distinct arms of colonial medical administration, such as the military-influenced  
French mobile health teams, require more attention in order to illuminate exactly how such 
programs operated.  Moreover, I aim to show how this operational relationship created new 
arrangements of international and colonial expertise on the ground in Cameroon, how it 
translated into the operation of public health campaigns, and how this arrangement unfolded 
after independence.   
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The richest regionally-focused work on the functioning of international health 
campaigns in colonial and post-colonial states that deal with this period focus on areas other 
than Africa.   Works by Sunil Amrith and Sanjoy Bhattacharya on India, for example, invite a 
rich basis for comparison.31   As Amrith shows, Indian leaders in the 1950s adopted WHO 
campaigns as part of “narratives of progressive national development” and these campaigns 
became part of national policy.32 Likewise, Amrith emphasizes that WHO officials “envisaged 
their task in opposition to the epidemiological and epistemological legacies of colonial 
medicine.”33 This case presents an important question of periodization in comparative work on 
international health; WHO funding helped support a malaria eradication program in the 1950s in 
independent India, while a related malaria eradication pilot program in Cameroon operated 
through a colonial government.  Moreover, the much less heavy-handed role of the British in 
medicine in India versus that of France in Cameroon after independence presents significantly 
different contexts.  As I discuss, Cameroon itself presents a microcosm of some of the fault 
lines of differences of post-independence British and French involvement in medicine.  Thus, 
beyond the danger of letting a history of international health in India stand in for histories of 
African countries, the case of India presents crucial differences in its interaction with the WHO 
due to the time of its independence and the nature of its decolonization.   
Turning finally to histories of international health campaigns focused at the level of 
international institutions, the global malaria and smallpox eradication programs have been 
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Macmillan, 2006).  Sanjoy Bhattacharya, Expunging Variola: the Control and Eradication of Smallpox in India, 
1947-1977 (New Delhi: Oreint Longman, 2006).  
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closely treated by historians of medicine and yet, relatively little work has been done on these 
topics by African historians in showing how these campaigns operated at specific local, national 
or regional levels.34  This is particularly true in the case of smallpox eradication, on which very 
little work has done by historians of Africa. This project adds to the history of these global 
campaigns through examining new local dynamics, but it also reframes the significance of the 
programs in Cameroon beyond the stated imperatives of international health institutions. I show 
that these programs were both part of a longer negotiation about the role of mobile health teams 
in Cameroon, and about the relationship between colonial, international and national models of 
rural health intervention.   
 The second main contribution of this project is that it shows that public health was a key 
arena of governance through which Africans negotiated new post-independence relationships 
among African countries, with European powers, and with international institutions.  I assert 
that the focus of international health organizations on disease eradication, and the centrality of 
colonial mobile health teams and their post-independence reorganization to this agenda, show 
that health was a vital realm of international negotiation through decolonization and after 
independence.  This claim relates to a broader literature that has highlighted the international 
dimensions of decolonization and early independence in Africa.   
   Works on decolonization in Africa have shown that postwar politics in colonial Africa 
operated on an international stage.  Matthew Connelly and Elizabeth Schmidt, for example, 
have shown in different contexts how the Cold War context served as both a resource and a 
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barrier for new African leaders in the pursuit of their own agendas for independence.35  Some 
scholars have begun to center health in the international politics of the end of empire in Africa.  
Jessica Pearson highlights, for example, how France sought to limit the incursion of UN health 
agencies in Africa in the 1940s and 50s.36   Jennifer Johnson meanwhile shows that claims on 
the ability to provide for the health of the Algerian people became central to struggles over 
sovereignty between nationalists and French during the Algerian war.  Algerian nationalists, 
moreover, leveraged international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, in this pursuit.37  Matthew Heaton reveals how Nigerian psychiatrists at independence 
sought to “transform colonial psychiatric institutions and theories” as part of a broader concern 
over shaping postcolonial “modernity.”  He argues that this pursuit happened through 
international, cross-cultural avenues.38  These works show that international politics and 
international institutions, sometimes through the specific lens of health, were formative of the 
politics of decolonization in Africa.   
 In addition to this broader literature, scholars of Cameroon have recently built a body of 
scholarship that emphasizes the distinctly international politics of decolonization created both 
through the existence of the UN Trusteeship and the existence and aftermath of dual colonial 
                                                          
35 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold 
War Era (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).  Elizabeth Schmidt, Cold War and Decolonization 
in Guinea, 1946-1958 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007).  
 
36 Jessica Pearson-Patel, “French Colonialism and the Battle against the WHO Regional Office for Africa,” Hygiea 
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37 Jennifer Johnson, The Battle for Algeria: Sovereignty, Health Care and Humanitarianism (Philadelphia: 
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administration.  This scholarship holds that moving beyond the metropole-colony relationship is 
essential for understanding decolonization in Cameroon.39  Meredith Terretta, for example, 
frames the trajectory of the anti-colonial nationalist party in Cameroon, the Union des 
populations du Cameroun (UPC) as both “particularly local and expansively global” in its 
mobilization of human rights discourse before the UN and of Pan-Africanism, as well as of 
local political idioms of sovereignty.40  From another angle, Mélanie Torrent has focused on 
Cameroon as a place that uniquely illuminates “transnational, transregional and multilateral 
histories of decolonisation,” in part because of the joint Trusteeship status that led the French 
and British into a “conversation that did not occur elsewhere.”41  These works argue, for 
different reasons, that Cameroon’s decolonization was inherently and distinctly international.  
 With regards to health, some scholars have argued that public health can be a way into a 
“broader conception of international society,” in the Cold War and postwar period, by 
integrating “attention to state actors with recognition of the role played by international 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, and 
transnational “epistemic communities” that produce, circulate, and deploy expert knowledge.”  
Erez Manela, in writing specifically about the role of the Smallpox Eradication Program, calls 
for historians to look not just “beyond the state” at non-state actors, but also “into the state” at 
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40 Terretta (2014), 3.  See also: Meredith Terretta, “We Had Been Fooled in Thinking that the UN Watches over the 
Entire World”: Human Rights, UN Trust Territories, and Africa’s Decolonization.” Human Rights Quarterly 34.2 
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less commonly studied actors.42 Calls of looking both “beyond the state” and “into the state” in 
international history have often focused on American and European states and organizations.   
 What happens to this view of international history if, instead, we turn our attention to 
less commonly discussed actors both within and beyond the African state? In this project, I hold 
that looking at institutions such as the mobile health service in independent Cameroon, and 
OCEAC, the regional health organization created in Cameroon, can broaden our understanding 
both of international health and of the international history of decolonization.  Moreover, 
centering health and medicine in international histories of decolonization and independence 
opens avenues for new perspectives on broader political questions.   Medicine and health in 
Cameroon, for example, became an arena through which other political questions were explored 
such as new affiliations between independent African states and the navigation of differences in 
institutions created through the boundaries of European imperialism.  The expanse and the 
boundaries of the French colonial mobile health teams became a way that French and 
Cameroonian health officials demarcated new parameters of health coordination.  I thus 
approach the demarcation and conceptualization of Cameroon as a national space for medical 
intervention as something forged in an inherently international way.   
                                                          
42 Erez Manela, “A Pox on Your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War History,” Diplomatic History 
34. 2 (2010): 299-323.  Manela argues that writing the history of the Smallpox Eradication Program into Cold War 
history requires attention to non-state actors, and thus responds to recent turns in writing about such actors in 
international history.  He also argues, however, that the program requires attention to less commonly discussed 
state actors such as the American Centers for Disease Control.  On the turn to non-state actors in international 
history, Manela cites: Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of 
the Contemporary World (Berkeley, CA, 2002); Amy L. S. Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World 
Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, And World Health Organization Have Changed the World 1945-1965 
(Kent, Ohio, 2006).  The call to “see beyond the state” in international history comes from Matthew Connelly, 
Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge, MA, 2008).  Manela notes that “the 
phrase ‘seeing beyond the state’ echoes James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT, 1998).  
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 Finally, this project engages with another body of work that has raised questions about 
relationships between new-found sovereignties of the postcolonial state in Africa and new forms 
of international involvement in these states.  Gregory Mann, for example, has pointed to the first 
two decades of independence in the West African Sahel as a time that created “a fertile terrain 
for the production of new forms of governmental rationality realized through NGOs.”43 
Focusing only on the first decade of independence in Cameroon, this dissertation highlights a 
distinct historical moment of state-centered development, one that sharply contrasts with a later 
period of disinvestment in the medical administration of the state.  Thus, while it underscores a 
rising complexity of health actors, the ones examined here are exclusively governmental and 
intergovernmental organizations.  If there is a connection to be drawn between a later 
burgeoning of NGOS in the face of economic crisis, neoliberal reform, and defunding of state 
health administration in Cameroon, it is that in the 1960s, multiple governmental bodies—the 
World Health Organization, the French Ministry of Cooperation, and United States aid 
agencies--all staked claims in funding health programs and their ensuing agendas produced 
conflict.  Thus, while state medicine in 1960s Cameroon was distinct from later decades, we can 
see in the first decade of independence how the governance of medicine and public health by 
the state was inextricably marked by both the post-colonial relationship to France and by the 
forces of international health.  The formation of a state policy or infrastructure of health was 
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This project draws on research in thirteen archival collections in Cameroon, France, 
Switzerland and the United States.  Additionally, I conducted oral interviews with former 
Cameroonian medical personnel, including nurses and high-ranking government officials. I 
have thus drawn on a wide variety of sources—from government correspondence, reports of 
health institutions, Cameroonian newspapers, and oral histories— to bring together local, 
national and international perspectives.  
The sources available for this project and the structure of my research presented both 
opportunities and limitations.  For one, research in archival sites across four countries often 
created opportunities in unexpected places for glimpses into transnational and international 
exchange.  For example, the archives of the American CDC held important correspondence with 
OCEAC, the regional organization based in Cameroon, whereas an annex of the national 
archives in Buea, Cameroon housed bits of correspondence between Cameroonian medical 
personnel and CDC officials.  Each chapter draws from archives in multiple sites and thus no 
part of the project would have been possible without this multi-sited work.  This methodology 
in itself reflects the ‘global’ and ‘local’ tensions of this dissertation, of moving between the 
World Health Organization archives and those of Buea, for example.  It is a central claim of this 
dissertation that global health history told only at the scale of the ‘global,’ from both the 
perspective of framing and of methodology will inevitably obscure the specificities of local, 
national and regional histories.  While this claim is not in itself new, the logistical challenges for 
historians of Africa wishing to do this kind of archival work can be numerous.  I hope that this 
work thus suggests some of the ways that multi-sited research can be used to examine histories 
of global health after independence in Africa.  
27 
 
Cameroonian governmental archives on public health in the 1960s are extremely limited 
in the National Archives in Yaoundé.  I overcame this limitation, in part, through work in 
smaller archival collections in Cameroon and through looking at conference proceedings and 
reports of the regional organization, OCEAC.  The ability to capture additional layers of discord 
and negotiation behind closed doors is limited by sources such as conference proceedings.44  
However, these sources do lay bare very clear tensions that offer a new narrative of the post-
independence negotiation of international health in Cameroon.  Moreover, while I draw on 
select oral histories with former medical personnel, I do not focus primarily on the lived 
experience of Cameroonians who were the targets of these campaigns.  There are certainly a 
multitude of stories to be told in this regard.  My interest, however, is primarily in questions of 
authority, expertise and planning for medicine and health between colonial, national and 
international health officials.  
 
Chapter Outline  
 This project traces the negotiation between Cameroonian, French, and international 
health officials over mobile health teams as a basis for public health intervention through key 
political and public health developments between 1945 and 1970.  This timeframe marks a 
period of postwar public health reform that continued across the colonial/postcolonial divide, as 
well as the duration of the ‘eradication era’ in Cameroon.45  As the smallpox eradication 
                                                          
44 Sanjoy Bhattacharya recommends as one method for writing global histories of health and medicine of “going 
behind the scenes to study views expressed in private, and then assess how the resulting convictions, discussions, 
and debates impacted on the unfolding of policy.” Sanjoy Bhattacharya, “Global and Local Histories of Medicine: 
Interpretative Challenges and Future Possibilities,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Medicine, ed. Mark 
Jackson  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011),137.  
 
45 This periodization more broadly reflects the “rise of the developmentalist state” in Africa, from 1940-1973, and 
the crisis of this state formation from 1973-90.  Frederick Cooper has argued that this periodization captures 
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program in Cameroon concluded successfully at the end of the 1960s, this time also marked a 
point of departure as health officials in Cameroon began to re-envision the medical 
administration in light of the failures of malaria eradication.   
 Chapter 1 shows how global malaria eradication efforts in the 1950s in Cameroon 
worked through and relied on French colonial mobile health teams.  Moreover, it was through 
the engagement of the mobile health teams with international organizations that French officials 
created and safeguarded roles as local implementers of international health programming.   
 Chapter 2 examines how Cameroonian and French health officials used the mobile 
health team service as the basis for the creation of a new regional health organization after 
independence, bringing together Cameroon and the four states of former French Equatorial 
Africa as members.  I argue that Cameroonian and French health officials ultimately used 
mobile health teams to pursue a political vision for cross-border public health after 
independence that was rooted in the geography of French empire and sought to assert an 
alternative forum for health coordination to that advanced by the World Health Organization 
Regional Office for Africa.  
 Chapter 3 focuses on how Cameroonian doctors and political officials negotiated the 
dual legacy of colonial medicine in light of the unification of the former British and former 
French territories to form the independent state.  I argue that, while French models of medical 
administration ultimately dominated national health policy, medical officials and patients in 
West Cameroon pushed back against this development. Work by francophone Cameroonian 
officials to extend the French mobile health system to West Cameroon serves as a central case 
study of these broader debates over boundaries of medical administration and influence.  
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 Chapter 4 analyzes the first major global health campaign after independence: the global 
smallpox eradication program.  Cameroonian and French health officials insisted that the 
program operate within the framework of the new regional health organization in Cameroon and 
through the existing mobile health team structure. This arrangement demonstrated how the 
mobile health teams continued to provide infrastructure for global disease eradication programs, 
but also worked through reformulated politics on a regional scale between African states and 
with French medical officials. 
 Chapter 5 shows how Cameroonian health officials began to work in the 1960s with the 
World Health Organization to develop a new model for public health administration that 
integrated the mobile health team system into a more comprehensive plan for rural health. This 
chapter reveals how broader debates of international health—rooted in the ultimate failure of 
malaria eradication and the prioritization of a turn towards basic health services—became 
grounded in debates about the role of the mobile health teams and ultimately, the preservation 















Chapter 1:  Medical mobility and the Politics of Malaria Eradication in Colonial 
Cameroon 
 
 In 1952, Italian Dr. Emilio Pampana, director of the World Health Organization’s 
malaria unit, traveled to the French colonial territories of Haute Volta and Cameroon to observe 
the work of the colonial mobile health team service, known in Cameroon as the Service Général 
d’Hygiène Mobile et de Prophylaxie (SHMP).46  Pampana spent half a day observing a SHMP 
team work in Mbalmayo, Cameroon a town thirty miles south of the capital, Yaoundé. He 
reported:  
At seven o’clock am, the personnel of the team performs mass 
immunizations (smallpox and yellow fever, a mixed vaccine, by 
scarification)… Later in the day, i.e. about eight o’clock, when the higher 
temperature might interfere with the maintenance of the vaccines emulsion, 
immunizations are interrupted for the day and the people are directed to the 
Prospecting team tents.  Men on a queue, women on another, each leading 
to, and progressing towards, a census table, where blood specimens are 
taken, numbered with the number that the individual had on the census list.  
Hence every individual passes into a cubicle where he, or she, undresses 
entirely and is carefully examined, not only for enlarged lymph glands, 
leprosy lesions or cutaneous lesions of any nature, but also…as regards 
venereal diseases.  This examination includes inspection of the genitalia and 
the making of slides wherever discharge is seen.  Female nurses attend the 
women.   
Every subject suspected of trypanosomiasis, leprosy, yaws or VD is marked 
with chalk and on his or her leaving the examination cubicle, is asked to 
wait in the microscopists’ tent.  There are some ten ‘Infirmiers’ who 
puncture the enlarged lymph gland of the subjects marked for that purpose 
and examine the fluid and the blood; they also examine urethral discharges 
of the others and inform the doctors of the results.47 
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Pampana continued with admiration for the efficiency of this invasive work: 
 It is surprising to see how smoothly the machine is working, how silently, 
orderly and regularly the rural population flows through the prospecting 
teams, how docile it looks, without protesting against the long queues, or 
objecting to the various medical technicalities, some of which are certainly 
not very pleasant, like the puncture of the cervical lymph-glands or the 
lumber puncture….there is probably no better example of an organization 
of control of the major communicable disease in underdeveloped countries 
in Africa.   
He noted that, although the mobile team service, both in Cameroon and in French West Africa, 
had done ‘practically nothing’ so far to combat malaria, colonial officials were ready to focus 
efforts of the mobile service on malaria control.  Reflecting on how this colonial health service 
would play a role in the World Health Organization’s malaria eradication efforts, he concluded, 
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“It is a good coincidence that the pilot projects in the Haute Volta and the Senegal will be 
carried out by the SGHMP and in the Cameroons, by the SHMP.”48 
  Pampana’s visit to the French colonial mobile health teams as a World Health 
Organization observer illustrated formative changes to public health work in Africa after World 
War II.  On the one hand, as France emerged from World War II, it laid out a series of political 
and social reforms for its empire in Africa, including investments in and expansion of its 
medical administration.  This reformist vision included the goal of expanding the mission and 
the capacity of the mobile health team service, which had drastically lowered sleeping sickness 
rates in Cameroon and Equatorial Africa in the interwar period.  On the other hand, the postwar 
period brought the creation of the United Nations and its specialized health agency, the World 
Health Organization (WHO), which would play an increasing role in defining health agendas in 
colonial Africa.  In the 1950s, the WHO would notably spearhead the global malaria eradication 
program, the first program to strive for eradication of a disease on a global scale.  In the context 
of this ‘global’ campaign, however, the WHO took a tentative approach to combatting malaria 
in Africa and began with only a series of pilot projects across the continent.  
  Cameroon became a central site in the development of these intersecting changes to 
international organizations, public health, and empire in Africa.  First, Cameroon occupied a 
key place in the creation and development of the French mobile health team service, which this 
chapter will discuss further.  After World War II, with the creation of the United Nations and 
designation of French Cameroon as a Trusteeship under French administration, Cameroon 
moreover became a place politically defined simultaneously by European colonial rule and the 
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new postwar international order. In the 1950s, Pampana, the WHO malariologist, also advised 
that Cameroon become a specialized site for research into the use of residual insecticides for 
combatting malaria in Africa.49 With support from the WHO and UNICEF, French Cameroon 
launched pilot programs for malaria eradication in both the north and south, and established a  
specialized site of research, an ‘international pilot zone’ near Yaoundé, to test methods that 
could be scaled up in other areas of Africa. 
The malaria program in Cameroon brought only a handful of World Health Organization 
technical personnel to the territory over the course of the 1950s, and it relied on the ground on 
the French colonial mobile health service.   French military doctors ran this mobile health 
service, while Cameroonians constituted the vast majority of its work force.  This chapter 
examines the relationship of the mobile health service to the malaria program in the 1950s, 
asserting that this program reveals the creation of new postwar relationships of colonial 
medicine and international health.  While the malaria program in Cameroon existed as part of an 
international health agenda and the research conducted there had broader implications, on the 
ground it was an extension of the work of the colonial mobile health teams.  I argue that this 
arrangement had implications for the practice of colonial mobile health teams, for the work of 
international health, and for the Cameroonians who were the targets of these interventions.  
First, French doctors and officials asserted the mobile health team service as providing a 
structure as well as a form of local expertise of particular value to the pursuit of disease 
eradication programs. In turn, international health officials conducting research in Cameroon on 
malaria relied in key ways on knowledge and practices generated by the mobile health teams—
                                                          





about the Cameroonian people, about the environment, and about the way to gain access to both 
for scientific study or medical intervention.  Thus while the WHO and UNICEF provided some 
of the resources for the program, they also relied deeply on the existing capacity of the colonial 
medical service. Lastly, because the malaria program worked through the mobile teams, 
Cameroonians thereby experienced this first major postwar international health program as part 
of the mobile health service, which carried with it the weight of complex localized histories of 
medical success in combatting sleeping sickness, but also coercion and violence. The malaria 
eradication program—both those programmatic components run directly by mobile health teams 
and those that involved international health personnel— therefore developed within the existing 
parameters of colonial medicine. 
The merger of this international health agenda and the colonial mobile health teams 
came together through an aspiration of medical mobility, represented by the goal of accessing 
the rural Cameroonian population as targets of public health intervention.  In the study of 
medicine and health in Africa, scholars have pointed to the centrality of “mobility as an effect of 
power,” and as a concept that helps to account for the importance of the movement of African 
healers, of international experts, of patients, medications and technologies.50  In this chapter, I 
focus on this investment in the goal of medical mobility as a particular postwar convergence of 
operational philosophy between colonial medical officials and the newly created institutions of 
international health.  
This convergence on one hand reflected the broader post-war turn of colonial 
governments and new international institutions towards ‘development’ as a framework for 
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action.51  The new postwar international institutions of the United Nations, including the WHO, 
championed the idea of intervening in Africa, Asia and Latin America through foreign aid, 
economic planning and transfers of technology, all in the name of bringing the economies of 
these places in closer alignment with those of wealthier ‘developed’ countries.52   French and 
British colonial governments likewise undertook major development initiatives with the hope 
that they would create stronger colonial economies as well as help to secure colonial rule in the 
face of political pressures being exerted by Africans in the postwar period.53 
In the postwar period, international health institutions meanwhile began to champion the 
idea of disease eradication as the central paradigm for their work.  Disease eradication as a 
public health strategy reflected the central premise of postwar development in that it relied on 
“techno-scientific solutions to social problems.”54  The wartime production of DDT, an 
insecticide proven to have powerful effects in protecting troops against malaria, spurred new 
hope in the possibilities for its widespread application as a tool of malaria eradication.  Cold 
War rivalry, and the dominance of the United States in the WHO, and the UN at large, 
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moreover greatly influenced this turn towards technical approaches to health and the investment 
in the eradication idea.55 
After World War II, French colonial officials likewise formulated visions for disease 
eradication within colonies, targeting sleeping sickness, which had been a major scourge and 
focus of concern in the African colonies, particularly in Cameroon.56  French colonial officials 
pursued sleeping sickness campaigns most aggressively within Cameroon, in part due to its 
status as a historic site for the development of the mobile health teams and to its status as an 
‘international colony.”57  Many scholars and public health professionals have criticized global 
disease eradication programs for being ‘vertical’ health programs, meaning that they focused 
singularly on one disease and did not help build sustainable health systems.  Scholars of French 
colonial medicine have meanwhile noted that the mobile health service was already 
implementing this kind of ‘vertical programming’ through its intensive sleeping sickness 
campaigns from the interwar period forward.58  Less understood is how the mobile health 
service became directly involved in the implementation of the campaigns of global disease 
eradication programs.   
                                                          
55 Stepan, 119-123. Randall Packard, “No other logical choice’: global malaria eradication and the politics of 
international health in the post-war era.” Parassitologia 40 (1998): 217-28. Socrates Litsios, “Malaria Control, the 
Cold War, and the Postwar Reorganization of International Assistance,” Medical Anthropology 17 (3) (1997): 255-
78.  Randall Packard, “Malaria Dreams: Postwar Visions of Health and Development in the Third World,” Medical 
Anthropology 17 (3) (1997): 279-96. 
 
56 Guillaume Lachenal, Le Medicament qui devait sauver l’Afrique : Un scandale pharmaceutique aux colonies 
(Paris : La Découverte, 2014), 57-101. 
 
57 Lachenal (2014), 78.  
 
58 Josiane Tantchou, Épidémie et politique en Afrique : Maladie du sommeil et tuberculose au Cameroun (Paris : 
L’Harmattan, 2007), 58.  Lachenal (2014), 82-83.  
37 
 
Although the French mobile health service and the WHO identified different targets for 
eradication in Africa, both visions depended on the premise of reaching and intervening in the 
lives of people living in rural areas. In Cameroon, and elsewhere in the French empire in Africa, 
the colonial mobile health service ultimately realized this international health goal on the 
ground in the 1950s.  This system of public health in rural Africa thus became the operational 
basis for malaria eradication programs in the 1950s. The mobile teams solidified a practice of 
rural public health intervention as an event for intended recipients, which would take place in 
discreet times and places, with these parameters established by people external to the 
communities in which they operated.  Mobile teams, usually led by a European doctor but 
constituted almost entirely of African workers, would appear in a village, perhaps once per year, 
to administer smallpox vaccinations or give lomidine injections.  Then they would leave.  The 
service moreover developed its own localized histories of coercive and punitive measures to try 
to ensure compliance. The model of the mobile health teams, already established in the interwar 
period in Cameroon, but expanded after World War II, thus greatly facilitated the new WHO 
goals of campaign-style eradication efforts. Those WHO personnel who worked in Cameroon 
turned to the mobile teams for ideas about the most efficient ways to travel to villages and 
operate within them.  They worked closely with the mobile health team service and the other 
colonial medical officials, and ultimately their work as ‘international health officials’ became 
indistinguishable on the ground from the broader colonial medical operation.  
This micro-study of the malaria program in Cameroon points to a broader negotiation 
between colonial powers and international organizations over health in the postwar period.  As 
recent scholarship has shown, French colonial officials often resisted the interference of the 
World Health Organization and other UN agencies in postwar Africa, while at the same time 
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welcoming the new resources made available through these channels to fund health 
administration in the colonies.59  While these works shows how metropolitan governments 
negotiated the creation of new international health institutions and programs and their potential 
threats to colonial medicine, I shift focus to how the convergence of international health 
agendas and colonial medical administration operated on the ground.   This relationship is 
critical for understanding how French colonial medicine in Africa became part of international 
health in the postwar period (and vice versa) and, in turn, how Africans experienced the first 
efforts of global disease eradication. 
Moreover, colonial officials in Cameroon drew important forms of political capital from 
the opportunities and resources created by international health organizations during a volatile 
political time.  Against the backdrop of a growing anti-colonial political uprising in the mid-
1950s and debate over Cameroon’s Trusteeship status, French officials used the malaria 
eradication program to argue that their work in Cameroon contributed to the pursuit of 
international health and thus to defend their ongoing control of this work.  The French doctors 
of the mobile health team service in turn created roles as local experts and implementers of 
international health programming, rooted in the particular moment of disease eradication.  As 
Cameroonians gained more political (and medical) authority in the late 1950s and through 
independence, these doctors effectively guarded this arena as one over which they claimed 
exclusive control.  The malaria program thus forged relationships of colonial and international 
health that became formative to the operations of international health in the state when 
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Cameroon first became independent. Subsequent chapters will examine how the reorganization 
of the mobile health team service after independence in turn continued to be central to the 
formation of international health in Cameroon.  
This chapter begins by explaining the origin of the French mobile health service in 
Cameroon, before examining how the mobile teams shaped the advent of malaria eradication 
programs in the 1950s.  During this time, health officials and personnel involved in these 
campaigns created new operational structures and a new politics of international health in a 
colonial space.   
French Mobile Health Teams in Cameroon 
The postwar mobile health teams that became so critical to disease eradication programs 
originated in the interwar period in French efforts to curb a sleeping sickness epidemic raging in 
Cameroon and French Equatorial Africa.  Postwar reforms transformed the mobile health 
service, from one focused exclusively on sleeping sickness, into a multipurpose service that 
continued to focus largely on sleeping sickness but to also include other endemic and epidemic 
diseases, such as smallpox and leprosy.  This section will sketch an overview of how the French 
military medical corps developed the mobile teams as a distinct medical service within 
Cameroon and across the French empire in Africa, as well as describing how these teams 
functioned on the ground.  Although writing on French colonial medicine has extensively 
examined the establishment of the mobile teams—both hagiographies and histories of creator 
Eugène Jamot’s work in Cameroon and beyond abound--this section will describe in some detail 
the way this work unfolded in rural settings in Cameroon.60  The dynamics developed within the 
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teams, between French colonial doctors and Cameroonian auxiliaries, and between the teams 
and rural populations would have far-reaching impact, beyond the strict confines of French-
funded medical endeavors, and beyond the colonial period.   
 The model for the French mobile health service developed in the interwar period in the 
context of efforts to address a growing sleeping sickness epidemic in Cameroon and in 
territories of French Equatorial Africa.  At this time, the French had only recently taken 
possession of part of the German territory of Cameroon, with the end of World War I.  The new 
League of Nations Mandate system established two new territories out of German Cameroon; 
both would be ‘Mandates’ under the League, one under British administration and the larger 
territory under French administration.   
 When the French took over Cameroon, medical administration in the territory developed 
through the implementation of the Corps de Santé Colonial, the medical arm of the French 
colonial military troops. Doctors in this service held positions that straddled the line between 
military and civilian service. They undertook specialized training at the École de Santé Navale 
de Bordeaux and L’École d’Application du Service de Santé des Troupes Coloniales in 
Marseille, and although officially part of the Troupes Coloniales, they served under a special 
designation marking their largely civilian function.61  That said, the military framework for the 
service deeply marked its professional ethos. 
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Dr. Eugène Jamot of the Corps de Santé Colonial played an immense role in shaping 
this ethos and the idea of a distinct French colonial medicine through his formation of the 
mobile health team model.  Jamot first created the mobile team model through his work in 
Oubangui Chari (present-day Central African Republic) in 1917 in addressing the growing 
epidemic of sleeping sickness.  In an effort to curb the further spread of the disease, Jamot 
worked within a designated ‘sector’ in central Oubangui Chari, and sought to examine as many 
as people as possible within that geographic space, giving atoxyl injections to eliminate the 
parasite within those diagnosed.62  In practice in Ubangui-Chari, the threshold for giving 
injections to only those with an identified parasite broke down, and medical personnel gave 
atoxyl injections to anyone ‘suspected’ of carrying the parasite, often based on visual features 
such as swollen neck glands.  Rather than focusing on the illness of the individual, Jamot 
insisted on the need to protect the ‘collectivity.’63 
In addition to this turn towards focus on the collective, the great novelty of Jamot’s 
approach within the French colonial medical service was the idea that, rather than colonial 
doctors waiting for sick patients to arrive to them, those doctors should travel directly to people.  
Jamot, and the other military doctors who formed the corps of this service, imbued this mobility 
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towards the sick with a distinctly militaristic tone.  One French colonial doctor summarized 
Jamot’s approach: 
First of all Jamot calls upon an essential military virtue: the offensive. You 
must not passively await the blows that the disease inflicts at random on the 
population, but must on the contrary carry the fight to the very heart of the 
epidemic.  The terminology of this resolutely offensive health strategy is 
transparently military: the country is divided into sectors, massive 
campaigns are launched with their successive phases of geographic 
reconnaissance, attack, consolidation, and surveillance…64 
 
After Jamot’s methods proved effective in lowering the number of sleeping sickness 
cases in French Equatorial Africa, he transported this model to French Cameroon, where people 
in the south were experiencing a major sleeping sickness outbreak.65 In 1926, Jamot’s work in 
Cameroon culminated in the creation of a distinct medical service: La Mission Permanente de 
Prophlyaxie de la Maladie du Sommeil (MPMS), comprised of 11 doctors, 20 European sanitary 
agents, and 150 Cameroonian nurses.66  By 1931, the service had increased to include 400 
Cameroonian medical auxiliaries.67  With Jamot as its director, the service functioned 
independently from the main branch of the colonial medical service, l’Assistance Médicale aux 
Indigènes (A.M.I.).68  The French investment in Jamot’s work in Cameroon reflected concerns 
about preserving an able African work force in the colonies, but it also reflected inter-imperial 
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rivalries growing out of World War I and the ensuing loss of control of Cameroon by Germany.  
Through facilitating the formation of this service and channeling increasing resources towards 
it, the French colonial government bolstered itself against political attacks by Germany, which 
claimed that the new mandate power of its previous colony was not performing well.69 
For Cameroonians, the creation of the first mobile health teams focused on sleeping 
sickness created new avenues of encounter with colonial medicine.  Expanding the work of 
colonial medicine beyond towns such as Douala and Yaoundé, the teams had the potential to be 
the dominant, if not the only, experience of colonial medical intervention for many 
Cameroonians, particularly in the earlier decades of French colonial rule.70  The formation, 
travel, and work of the teams moreover created new systems for how medical work occurred.  A 
typical mobile team would consist of one French military doctor, along with anywhere from 30-
40 Cameroonian personnel.  This included nurses tasked with a variety of specific tasks such as 
taking blood, giving injections, and doing administrative work.  Porters would carry equipment, 
baggage, and medication.  The team would travel 12-15 miles by foot per day, with the overall 
tour of a team lasting two to three months.  The medical work itself proceeded in an ‘assembly-
line,’ with sections devoted to medical examinations, screening for sleeping sickness and other 
diseases, and treatment, through which villagers would pass. Nurses would mark those 
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diagnosed with sleeping sickness on the chest with a mark of ‘T++” and would later administer 
them a series of injections of atoxyl.71 
With this new geographic reach of colonial medicine, Cameroonian traditional 
authorities became essential ‘intermediaries’ between the mobile teams and the populations they 
visited.72  After receiving notice in advance of the place and time when the mobile team would 
visit, village chiefs would be responsible for assembling people for the arrival of mobile teams, 
as well as helping to prepare the work site, housing and food for the teams.73  Those chiefs who 
did not comply, and who did not enforce the compliance of their people, were subject to arrest.  
Guards and police often accompanied mobile teams on their visits for this purpose.74 The 
mobile health teams thus employed broader colonial practices of coercion and enforcement, 
similar to those used for purposes such as labor recruitment and tax collection. 
The recruitment and training of Cameroonian medical auxiliaries to work on the teams 
meanwhile carved out a new social group.  From its beginning in the interwar period, the 
formation of a cadre of Cameroonian medical auxiliaries working for the French colonial 
medical administration created new divisions between those workers and the rest of the 
population. In 1921, French officials established a training center in Ayos, Cameroon 
specifically to train medical auxiliaries for work on the sleeping sickness teams. After following 
a three-month training course, the first auxiliaries graduated in June 1921.75  Beginning in 1932, 
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the Centre d’Instruction Médicale d’Ayos began to offer a longer and more comprehensive 
course of study leading to the title of “aide de santé” or “infirmier brévetés.”76 Medical 
auxiliaries were able to expect a regular salary, to use the French language for professional 
purposes, and to wear a uniform marking their status.  By entering in the medical corps, they 
thus began to live a life of different markings than the vast majority of Cameroonians living in 
rural areas.77  The work of the mobile teams brought these new social stratifications into stark 
relief in the setting of the village visit.   
The work of the teams in the villages frequently relied on practices of coercion and 
punishment. As agents of the colonial administration, medical auxiliaries enforced colonial law, 
sometimes violently, against those who fled or hid from the medical visit, as well as those 
working as indigenous healers.  The auxiliaries also took direct roles in punishing chiefs who 
did not facilitate their work.78  For these reasons, historian Jean Suret-Canale characterized the 
work of Jamot’s teams in Cameroon as “typically colonial.”  Suret-Canale compared the 
methods used to assemble people and undertake their medical interventions as closely aligned 
with “those used for civil or military recruitment; in other words, they were like “man-hunts.” 
Moreover, some teams exploited villages in “good colonial fashion…demanding food and 
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women.”79 Coercion, however, was not the only form of violence enacted by the mobile health 
teams. They also enacted invasive medical procedures, which sometimes resulted in disability 
or death.  In the most infamous, in Bafia, Cameroon, a subordinate of Jamot accidently 
administered an overdose of the new drug tryparsamide and blinded between 700-900 people.80   
 This brief review of the often-violent impact of the sleeping sickness teams should not 
obscure, however, the extremely powerful legacy that Jamot left in Cameroon.  The success of 
the mobile teams in drastically lowering the rates of sleeping sickness in southern Cameroon 
and the professional ethos forged through a distinct militaristic model of confronting epidemic 
disease in rural areas ultimately transformed the French colonial medical service.  Generations 
of French medical officers and Cameroonian medical personnel hailed Jamot as a hero.  In 
1951, a Cameroonian doctor, Dr. Marcel Bebey-Eyidi, wrote a tribute to this work entitled ‘The 
Conqueror of Sleeping Sickness.”81  In Cameroon, the term ‘Jamotain,’ designating people who 
worked on the mobile teams, became a badge of professional honor within medicine.82  In 1959, 
mere months before French Cameroon became independent, French and Cameroonian officials 
held a joint ceremony to place a statue of Jamot in front of the Ministry of Public Health in 
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Yaoundé.83   In 1987, French and Cameroonian medical officials and researchers gathered for a 
three-day conference in Yaoundé to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Jamot’s death.84 
To this day, the bust of Jamot sits in front of the Ministry of Public Health in Yaoundé. 
 
 
Statue of Jamot in Yaoundé.  
SHD 2013 ZK 005 614, L’Organisation de Coordination pour la Lutte 
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Jamot’s methods moreover left an indelible impact on the entire French colonial medical 
administration in Africa.  Following closely on the formation of the sleeping sickness service in 
Cameroon, Governor General of French Equatorial Africa Raphael Antonetti also established a 
separate sleeping sickness service for the federation, the Service de prophylaxie de la 
trypanosomiase.85  The government of French West Africa adopted the same model in 1939.86  
The original mobile health service created a professional culture unto its own and pride, among 
French colonial doctors and many Africans who worked and trained in this framework, in what 
they considered to be a distinctly French model of tropical medicine.   Jamot’s model for mobile 
health teams thus re-made colonial medical intervention in the French colonies of Africa.  
Jamot’s model also influenced the formation of mobile medical teams in other colonies in 
Africa. British territories in Africa and the Belgian Congo developed mobile services to address 
sleeping sickness, services that, like the French mobile teams, would evolve in the postwar 
period.87 
Postwar Reform 
After World War II, French colonial officials called for the expansion of the mobile 
health teams as part of the social and economic reforms of the African colonies laid out in the 
Brazzaville Conference in 1944.  Dr. Marcel Vaucel put forward recommendations to turn the 
service, focused exclusively on sleeping sickness to this date, to a service addressing endemic 
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and epidemic diseases, such as leprosy, tuberculosis and malaria.88  The legislation creating the 
service moreover mandated it to address these diseases by focusing on screening and preventive 
measures at the level of the ‘collectivity,’ as opposed to a focus on individual medicine.89 The 
legislation created a mobile health service for each of the federations of French West Africa and 
and French Equatorial Africa.  Cameroon would have its own administratively distinct mobile 
health service, reflecting its special status as a United Nations Trusteeship.   
The new service in Cameroon, now called the Service d’Hygiène Mobile et de 
prophylaxie (SHMP), began functioning as of January 1, 1945, although colonial officials 
would not finalize its legal attributes until 1947.90  French military doctor, Médecin-Lieutenant-
Colonel Raymond Beaudiment, became the first head of the SHMP in Cameroon. Beaudiment’s 
medical training followed the standard path through Bordeaux and Marseille of doctors in the 
Troupes Coloniales, and his first colonial posting was to Cameroon in 1929.  He completed a 
training course on site at the center in Ayos and then joined Jamot’s sleeping sickness service.91  
The broader professional ethos of the Troupes Coloniales and the specific medical culture 
forged by Jamot in Cameroon were thus formative to Beaudiment’s early career. Through the 
new postwar legislation and under Beaudiment’s direction, the newly expanded mission of the 
SHMP in Cameroon would take shape.  
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The broader turn by France towards colonial development initiatives meanwhile opened 
up new avenues of funding and equipment for the SHMP.  France’s postwar fund for colonial 
development, Fonds d’investissement économique et social (FIDES) opened up new 
possibilities for the SHMP, as more vehicles became available and new roads were built.92  The 
vision for modernization embodied in FIDES initiatives thereby bolstered the possibilities of the 
SHMP for pursuing the goal of medical mobility, thus for more quickly and efficaciously 
reaching rural populations.  
In 1945, the Public Health Service in Cameroon recruited roughly 200 new medical 
auxiliaries to meet the needs of the SHMP.  These recruits underwent three months of training 
between the Centre d’Instruction d’Ayos, in hospitals, and in mobile teams themselves before 
being assigned to full work on a mobile team.93  The SHMP corps of doctors necessarily grew 
at this time as well, but the involvement of the Corps de Santé Colonial in French Indochina at 
this time put the doctors in short supply for the rest of the French empire.  The SHMP thus 
began to employ contractual doctors from outside the corps, the majority of them foreigners.94  
Moreover, as the older French heads of the mobile teams of the Mission Jamot began to reach 
retirement age, these contractual doctors in many instances took over the leadership of the new 
mobile teams put into place. Thus while SHMP continued to espouse its roots in the French 
military culture and had Beaudiment as its leader, the on the ground staff of the teams included 
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SHMP at work. Rapport Annuel du Gouvernement Français a L’Assemblée 
Générale des Nations Unies sur l’Administration du Cameroun Placé sous la 
Tutelle de la France, Année 1954 
Leadership of the teams by “African doctors” (médecin-africain) a status designating 
training at the Dakar Medical School beyond that of a nurse but below that of a French 
physician, did occur in a limited fashion in the late 1940s.95  In 1949, two médecin africain 
worked in leading the teams.96  French officials, however, disparaged the work of the African 
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doctors in this realm, and the two were relieved of their duties in 1950.97  Therefore, even as the 
medical corps within Cameroon grew to include 61 médecin africain by 1950, these more 
highly-trained individuals by and large did not work in the SHMP.  Those Cameroonians in the 
1950s who eventually went on to further training in France to obtain the doctorate in medicine, 
the full training on par with that of a French physician, for the most part did not return to the 
country until the early 1960s.98 The mobile service thus maintained a particularly stark 
hierarchy between European doctors or sanitary agents and Cameroonian nurses and auxiliaries.  
This jealous guarding of leadership was but one of the ways that French military doctors of the 
SHMP made a claim on a unique form of expertise about the work of mobile medicine and 
vaccination within Cameroon.  
As the personnel and the stated mission of the SHMP grew, the service faced numerous 
challenges in realizing this mission.  Hampered by delays in receiving equipment, insufficiency 
of vehicles and personnel, and resistance of the Cameroonian population, the SHMP postwar 
project was often far from realized.99 With only six teams operating by 1948, the SHMP teams 
visited a limited number of areas within Cameroon in that year, recording seeing a total of 
322,200 people, as it primarily continued work focused on sleeping sickness.100  But for 
Beaudiment, one of the most regrettable factors hampering the mobile teams was the fact that 
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Cameroonians were increasingly not cooperating when called to assemble for the team visits.  
The SHMP began to quantify the percentage of population that attended its visits as a major 
measure of its work and to map where absenteeism happened most.101  As nationalist 
movements took root across southern Cameroon in the 1950s, this map of medical 
“indiscipline” became, moreover, imbued with ideas about ethnic groups and their ties to these 
political movements.102  These questions about absenteeism and cooperation would raise new 
issues as well in the context of the WHO malaria program.     
 Through the 1940s, the Public Health Service in Cameroon pursued only very limited 
anti-malaria work. In 1949, insecticide spraying was undertaken for the first time in the capital 
of Yaoundé, but these first efforts primarily lowered malaria rates among the European 
population.103 These anti-malaria efforts did not extend to the vast majority of rural populations 
through the 1940s, a limitation that French officials attributed to budget constraints.   The 
postwar creation of new international health organizations, however, would create new sources 
of funding for colonial medical administration.  A Cameroonian doctor, Etienne Bilounga, 
wrote his medical thesis on the 1950s malaria program in Cameroon and wrote that, while these 
colonial budget constraints around malaria work “condemned” the villager to this “sad state” 
that “at last manna fell from the sky with the creation of the World Health Organization.”104 
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International Organizations and Health in Postwar Cameroon 
 The postwar re-ordering of international politics, embodied in the creation of the United 
Nations, would carry significant changes for Cameroon’s broader political future, as well as for 
its colonial health administration.  The new United Nations established the Trusteeship system, 
meant to have a stronger power of supervision over colonial powers than that which had existed 
under the League of Nations, and ultimately to move colonies towards self-government.  France 
initially tried to block the placement of any of its territories under the Trusteeship system and 
only agreed in the face of significant international pressure.105  The British Cameroons and 
French Cameroon thus both became United Nations Trusteeships.  Through this arrangement, 
the United Nations required France and Britain to produce annual reports on their 
administrations of the territories, as well as to host visits by a UN visiting mission to observe 
this administration.  These requirements by the UN revealed the “implied critique of 
imperialism” that was central the UN trusteeship system.106 
 In light of this critique, France sought to defend its rule by advancing a positive portrait 
of colonial administration in Cameroon.  France’s investment in the medical services of 
Cameroon became one of the ways in which it sought to present its administration of Cameroon 
as a progressive, modernizing force.107  Médecin-Colonel Vaisseau, Director of Public Health in 
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Cameroon, for example, wrote to colonial doctors in 1949 to prepare for an upcoming visit by 
the UN Trusteeship council by asking them to “put in as good a state as possible existing 
premises: hospitals, dispensaries, and leprosarium” and to “accelerate the work of major repairs 
and maintenance underway.”108  Colonial officials thus sought to present the best possible 
portrait of an advanced and growing medical system to the UN council.   
The Trusteeship arrangement also made the role of the United Nations’ specialized 
technical agency, the World Health Organization, hold special import in Cameroon.  French 
officials used WHO support and programs to foster an image of Cameroon as an important site 
of international health research and training, simultaneously asserting that ongoing French 
governance would best facilitate this health internationalism.  The launch of the malaria 
eradication program in Cameroon would create new circumstances by which the French 
colonial government could at once use resources offered by the WHO and then report back 
positively to the UN on its engagement.  Thus while French colonial officials had objected to 
the Trusteeship arrangement, health officials on the ground not only benefited from new sources 
of technical and material support but also helped use these resources as new forms of political 
capital before the UN.  In the case of French West Africa, the French colonial government 
similarly sought to present itself as a modernizing force, in part through health and family 
welfare programs, before the UN Special Committee on Non Self-Governing Territories.109   
The greater degree of international oversight afforded to the Trusteeship Council in Cameroon, 
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however, created uniquely high political stakes for the presentation of colonial rule before the 
UN relative to other territories.  
 The founding of the World Health Organization, as one of the specialized technical 
agencies of the United Nations, marked a significant new framework for international health 
coordination and specifically for public health in Africa.  Founded in 1948, the World Health 
Organization mobilized the postwar vision of international development in the field of public 
health. The organization, like all of the new UN technical agencies, sought to work in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America, through the framework of international experts pursuing supposedly 
apolitical projects aimed at overall social and economic well-being.  Against the backdrop of the 
Cold War and American dominance in the agency, however, the WHO diverged in significant 
ways from this ideal of a ‘depoliticized’ health organization.110  Notably, the WHO also became 
quickly enmeshed in the politics of colonialism.  French colonial medical officials generally 
viewed the plans of the World Health Organization to pursue health programs in Africa with a 
great deal of suspicion, worried that this work might ultimately undermine French power in 
Africa.  At the same time, however, they saw in the WHO a source of new funding and 
resources.111  The WHO thus created a new international context for the colonial administration 
of public health, and the organization’s policies and programs would likewise both create new 
opportunities and narrow certain possibilities for health work.   
Whereas the WHO at first adopted a broad view of health, rooted in earlier conceptions 
of social medicine, it turned by the 1950s to a more narrow vision of improving health through 
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technical solutions, rather than through broader social reform.112  The WHO’s official decision 
to pursue a global malaria eradication program in 1955 signaled this change. Historians have 
well explored the impetuses and ultimate failure of this campaign at a global level.113  Spurred 
by the hope that technical solutions would drive development, international health officials 
sought to spread a universal method of combatting malaria with the insecticide, DDT.  This 
eradication campaign took on many dimensions in its various settings across the globe, but 
despite some initial successes in interrupting malaria transmission, international health officials 
failed to account for the inordinate ecological and social complexity of malaria transmission.  
International health officials moreover cast sub-Saharan Africa as a particular challenge 
for malaria eradication, and despite the name of the ‘global’ eradication program, the WHO did 
not include Africa on equal footing with other world regions in the eradication program.  
Instead of supporting full eradication programs in Africa, as was being done elsewhere across 
the globe, the WHO supported a series of pilot programs in Africa to test methods for malaria 
eradication that, once proven successful, could be scaled-up.114  A contentious debate among 
WHO and colonial health officials in the early 1950s about how insecticide-spraying campaigns 
might affect adult-acquired immunities to malaria among Africans drove the early hesitation to 
pursue full eradication programs.115  Although this concern subsided to a degree in the early 
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1950s, many concerns about the possibility of interrupting malaria transmission across Africa 
remained.  WHO officials designed the pilot projects as a way forward, to explore how malaria 
eradication could be pursued in cost-effective ways in different ecological contexts.116   
In addition to these pilot projects, the WHO and UNICEF began to support select 
malaria control programs run by colonial health services in the early 1950s.  The 1952 visit of 
WHO malariologist Dr. Pampana to Cameroon, described in the beginning of the chapter, 
occurred as part of a joint visit with French, WHO and UNICEF representatives to French West 
Africa and Cameroon to draft plans for these malaria programs. The WHO ultimately provided 
funding for malaria control in six zones across French West Africa, Togo and in Cameroon.117   
In Cameroon, agreements between the French government and the WHO and UNICEF created 
plans for insecticide-spraying programs in two large zones in southern and northern Cameroon.  
The SHMP would run these programs on the ground with material and technical support from 
the international organizations.  
Cameroon would additionally host a special WHO-supported ‘international pilot zone’, 
headquartered in Yaoundé; this site would be the only one of the malaria agreements with the 
French government to include WHO personnel on the ground in Africa.  According to the 
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agreement, a malaria specialist and an assistant would take up postings in Yaoundé.  The WHO 
would also provide “special laboratory supplies, and equipment and fellowships.” UNICEF 
would provide insecticide and spraying equipment, along with means of transportation for the 
campaign.  France agreed to provide “all local and medical auxiliary staff, buildings for offices 
and laboratories, etc.”  The pilot zone would focus on an area surrounding Yaoundé with a 
population of approximately 46,000 people.  The proposed purpose of the pilot zone near 
Yaoundé was ‘to find out whether residual house-spraying is an effective and economic means 
of controlling or stopping transmission in this forest area, hampered by poor 
communications.”118  The pilot zone would focus on field trials of different insecticides to test 
their applicability for other areas of equatorial Africa.119  As a site of WHO pilot projects and 
the Yaoundé pilot zone, Cameroon thus became a specialized site within Africa, meant to test 
the feasibility of larger-scale malaria eradication program.   WHO officials pointed to the 
importance of Cameroon as the “land of African experience,” chosen by its experts for research 
due to four principle physical geographies found in sub-Saharan Africa existing within the 
territory.120 
 The creation of the ‘international pilot zone’ moreover added a new dimension to 
Cameroon’s status as both a colony and an international Trusteeship. Through this arrangement, 
the French colonial medical service was able to operate as both a colonial administration and as 
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a participant in the new postwar internationalization of public health.  The existence of the pilot 
zone moreover brought WHO personnel to direct postings in Cameroon, prompting the creation 
of new on the ground arrangements of international and colonial expertise.   
International and Colonial Expertise in Yaoundé 
 The creation of the pilot zone in Yaoundé created arrangements between international 
health programs and colonial medical administration unlike others occurring in the French 
empire in Africa, in that two WHO technical personnel would take up postings there to oversee 
the international pilot zone.  The Yaoundé pilot zone created a new liminal space of 
international and colonial health.  In this new space, WHO personnel both relied on and at times 
sought to distinguish their approach and their methods from the SHMP.  Over time, however, 
they came to rely closely on the types of knowledge and the systems of rural health intervention 
generated by the SHMP.  A WHO malaria consultant (of whom there were 3 over the course of 
the 1950s) maintained an active hand in malaria research in Yaoundé in the 1950s, but the 
SHMP’s dominance over the operations of the overall program also increased during this time.  
The distinction between the ‘international’ status of the first WHO malaria consultant in 
the pilot zone and ‘French colonial’ personnel, was moreover, quite ambiguous, given common 
career backgrounds in the French military medical corps.  The first WHO head of the Cameroon 
pilot zone—malariologist Dr. Henry Morin—arrived in Yaoundé in April 1953.121  This lead 
‘international’ expert was French, and the primary institutions of the French military medical 
corps forged his education and career.  Morin trained at l’Ecole de médecine navale de 
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Bordeaux and the l’Ecole d’application du service de Santé des Armées du Pharo in Marseille, 
where he later became a clinical professor.  Morin thus came from the same professional milieu 
as the French doctors serving in the SHMP.  After leaving the colonial medical corps in 1922, 
Morin worked in Pasteur Institutes in French Indochina.  His full biography is a striking 
example of how medical officials moved between colonial and international health spaces in the 
early 20th century; in addition to his career within French institutions, he worked on the 
Commission of Experts on Malaria for the League of Nations and led international studies in the 
late 1940s on a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.122  His work in Yaoundé for the 
international pilot zone was the last posting before he retired in 1955.  The WHO’s second staff 
person, RJ Smith, was British.  Another French malariologist, trained in Paris, Mr. E. Sejor, 
arrived to join the team in October 1953.123  
 The pilot zone research staff also incorporated existing medical and scientific personnel 
in Cameroon.  An entomologist, J.P. Adam, simultaneously held postings with the pilot zone 
and in the laboratory of the French O.R.S.T.O.M (l’Office de la Recherche et Technique 
d’Outre-Mer) in Cameroon. The team of the pilot project grew in August 1953 to include 
personnel directly from the SHMP.  A European sanitary agent from the SHMP who had been 
working in Northern Cameroon joined to work with Smith, the WHO assistant.  A secretary 
from the mobile service trained in doing village surveys joined to assist a Cameroonian nurse, 
André Ateba, working on the establishment of epidemiological statistics.  Finally, Dominique 
Effa, a nurse recently graduated from L’Ecole d’Ayos, the school rooted in Jamot’s creation of 
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the mobile health teams, joined the pilot zone laboratory.124  The SHMP established the 
laboratory for the pilot zone in 1953 in an old administrative building in Yaoundé.125 Thus, 
while the WHO personnel led the research of the pilot zone, their work quickly became 
integrated with infrastructure and personnel of both the SHMP and the broader colonial medical 
and scientific landscape in Yaoundé.  
 In the early months of the pilot zone in 1953, the WHO staff set out with the objective to 
conduct ‘pre-operational’ surveys on malaria in the area before the launch of a house-spraying 
campaign.  They sought to identify and map out the exact varieties of mosquitos that were 
acting as vectors in malaria transmission, with the premise that this information would greatly 
aid in the efforts to interrupt malaria transmission.  Their research would also seek to 
understand how malaria transmission functioned within different ecological settings and within 
the context of different practices of people—including where and how they slept, if they 
engaged in agricultural cultivation, etc.126  Monthly reports from the WHO staff during these 
early months illuminate their efforts to acclimate themselves to a new terrain in Cameroon. 
They released their first monthly report in July 1953, sent to the High Commissioner of 
Cameroon, to the WHO and to UNICEF.  Morin and Smith sought to sketch out this 
understanding—demographic, geographic, epidemiological and entomological—of their new 
work site. Morin, for example wrote that ‘racial and tribal’ differences between Cameroonians 
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were not easily discernible to the newcomer, and he wondered if his investigations would 
ultimately yield fine grain differences of customs between the Ewondo and Eton.127  Morin and 
Smith painted themselves as scientific experts but also as novices in the broader circumstances 
of their new posting.  
 During this time, the WHO staff thus began to rely on the SHMP for creating an initial 
knowledge base about malaria and about the general terrain of Cameroon.   As part of his ‘pre-
operational’ information gathering, for example, Dr. Morin turned to a report on malaria in 
northern Cameroon that a French doctor had conducted under the direction of Beaudiment, the 
head of the SHMP.128  R.J. Smith’s preliminary work in the pilot zone focused on preparing 
topographical maps, and he began this work by using previous sketches from the SHMP, along 
with other government surveys.129  In August, Smith met with Beaudiment and used his records 
on house-spraying operations within Yaoundé to try to calculate how many houses per day 
teams could spray in the pilot program.130 
 At the same time, Morin and Smith expressed that they needed information beyond what 
the SHMP could provide in this pre-operational phase and they set out to pursue this work 
independently.  They were particularly concerned at this stage of planning with how they would 
organize travel and reach certain villages to conduct their research.  Smith sought to add to the 
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information he gained through Beaudiment and the SHMP through his own local travel, 
reporting: 
During the month an opportunity has been taken to explore some of the 
tracks leading to villages off the main routes.  Some of the tracks are only 
‘Jeepable’ and then with extreme difficulty, further obstacles being 
presented. (sic) By bridges that are either broken, or too weak to carry the 
weight of a vehicle, for those reasons it is envisaged that when the need 
comes to transport DDT, squads, etc to those areas we shall be presented 
with some difficulty.131  
The logistics of travel and rural access thus became an immediate concern. 
 For Morin, however, the question of how to organize travel touched a nerve over what 
he saw as the difference between the SHMP and the work he was trying to accomplish.  Morin 
grew impatient with some of the local adaptations of his planned operation, represented in part 
through his work with Beaudiment on securing means of transportation.  Beaudiment, for 
example gave the team use of a ‘personnel carrier’ vehicle, to facilitate more frequent 
prospecting trips and allow them to bring enough personnel to do both entomological and 
epidemiological surveys.  Morin, however, saw a need for bicycles to conduct surveys in 
locations in closer distance to the center, and he saw it as a waste to use a vehicle for every such 
trip.  Noting that bicycles “which had been of such great service in other initiatives, had bad 
press in Yaoundé,” Morin indicated that Beaudiment advised against their use.  Morin hoped to 
change his mind on the matter.132 
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 More than a minor matter of opinion to Morin, he saw this question of travel logistics as 
cutting to the heart of much broader questions about the difference between his task and that of 
the SHMP:  
Incidentally, we are experiencing here one of the major errors of organization 
committed in the creation of this team. Instead of taking inspiration from 
acquired experience that showed the necessity of putting at the Team Leader’s 
disposal equipment, of which the standard list was set after long discussions 
between experts as being likely the best, because it was the most practical, it 
seemed preferable according to the impressions of several of the organizers to 
modify the list and the distribution of equipment.  So that, except for the 
materials of the laboratory, often in short supply, the team in Cameroon having 
not benefited from any special distribution for the pilot zone, finds itself from 
the point of view of vehicles, insecticides, and spraying apparatuses, completely 
dependent on the SHMP.  But, by definition, the task ahead is new, if not, it 
would have already been long accomplished. It therefore requires techniques 
and organization that are by definition different than that which has been 
previously implemented and of course special equipment.  If it were enough in 
Africa in general and in Cameroon in particular to continue to do that that which 
had been previously accomplished, it would not have been useful to form 
malaria survey teams.133 
In the very infancy of the malaria program, the WHO official thus sought to place his work 
within the context of a more international framework of entomology and the science of malaria 
transmission.  He insisted upon the differences between his highly detailed and specialized work 
of mapping malaria vectors as opposed to the kind of mapping that the SHMP had already 
undertaken in Cameroon.  He asserted these claims with reference to his four previous years of 
experience in three other world regions and in roughly twenty malaria projects.  Morin thus 
asserted himself as an internationally grounded expert on malaria and contrasted this with 
local—in this case meaning colonial—forms of knowledge on how to execute campaigns.   
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 Within only a few months, however, Morin began to recognize some of the perspectives 
of Beaudiment on malaria as more valuable than he imagined.  Morin became to appreciate 
Beaudiment’s insight, for example, on having “insisted on the contrast between the situation in 
the region of Maroua and that of Evodoula,” thus pointing out the differences in malaria 
prevention in the sahelian north and the equatorial south.134  Morin noted that initial 
investigations were confirming some of the observations of Beaudiment; Morin pointed to 
Beaudiment’s long colonial experience and connection to the “services of this admirable 
institution of ‘Hygiène Mobile’ which remains the most fine memorial to the glory of Doctor 
Jamot.”135  Morin thus began to show his admiration for the system that marked his own French 
training, as well as the position of Beaudiment as a colonial intermediary.  Morin noted with 
satisfaction, moreover, that the vehicles supplied by Beaudiment to the pilot zone team turned 
out to be “exactly adapted to local needs.”136 
Following these pre-operational surveys, the first round of house spraying with 
insecticides began in the pilot zone area in February 1954 and continued through May.  Teams 
sprayed 10,000 homes spread over 200 villages during this time.137 This spraying sought to test 
the relative effectiveness of three different types of insecticides.138 The pilot zone staff oversaw 
the creation of two specialized teams to conduct the insecticide spraying.  Each team would 
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consist of one ‘European’ manager, one driver and three groups of workers.  Each group in turn 
included a person in charge of each task of surveying, mixing the insecticide and recording, and 
four people for spraying.  Outside of this ‘European’ head of the team, the rest of the workers 
would thus be Cameroonian.139  Mr. Muller, the SHMP sanitary agent who had joined the pilot 
zone staff, divided the pilot zone region into two parts for the work of the teams, each with 
further demarcated sub-divisions meant to correspond roughly to a ‘traditional administrative 
grouping.’140  The SHMP warehouse in Yaoundé meanwhile kept the teams equipped with 
necessary supplies such as oil, gas and the insecticides themselves.   
The early operations in the Yaoundé pilot zone thus forged new working relationships 
between the colonial medical service and WHO personnel.  While all supported the new goals 
of research that were meant to eventually advance the pursuit of malaria eradication, this work 
required an on the ground infrastructure that necessarily involved both French medical 
personnel and Cameroonian auxiliaries.  Because of the WHO’s design of the project, to both 
create new knowledge about malaria transmission and to pursue house spraying outside of urban 
areas, the international staff naturally came to rely on the SHMP, itself already working through 
these same avenues.   
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The SHMP and the Malaria Program.  
 While the SHMP officials confidently played the role of ‘local’ intermediaries for WHO 
officials in the early days of the pilot zone, they also oversaw the broader malaria programs in 
the north and south of Cameroon.141  For the SHMP, the spraying of homes with insecticide 
created new practices of rural health intervention and new discourses about what this work 
meant.  At the operational level, mobile teams required access to homes in order to do spraying 
and they generally asked that people remove belongings from the home in order to spray the 
walls with insecticide.  This type of intervention, focusing on the home rather than the body, 
thus created new kinds of language about what cooperation entailed.  Previously, people fleeing 
or not appearing at assembly lines for vaccination or medical screening had represented 
resistance to the mobile teams. Now the ‘closed door,’ or the absence from the home, became a 
sign of resistance or ‘passivity’ in the face of the power of DDT.  In different ways, both 
colonial and international health officials criticized Cameroonians posing these obstacles to 
access for spraying.  The advent of the spraying campaigns thus expanded the repertoire of the 
interventions of the SHMP from the African body to the geographic space of the home and the 
village. 
 The international context of the campaign, and the attention to the idea of a global 
eradication of malaria, added credence to this expanding intervention.  The launch of the 
spraying campaigns connected these SHMP tours to an internationalized framework for public 
health intervention.  In this framework, the mobile teams would physically deliver the 
                                                          
141 The southern campaign targeted an estimated population of 800,000 people and began with yearly spraying of 
the insecticide, Dieldrin.  This campaign focused on nine administrative regions: Sanaga Maritime, Kribi, Mbam, 
Nyong et Sanaga, Ntem, Dja et Lobo, Lom et Kadéï, Boumba-Ngoko. The northern campaign targeted a population 
of 390,000 people in the region of Diamaré. R. Chastang, “Quatre années de lutte antipaludique au Cameroun 
meridional,” Médecine Tropicale : Revue du Corps de Santé Colonial 19 (1959) : 51-86.  
69 
 
modernizing postwar technologies of health to rural areas.  A French colonial publication in 
postwar Cameroon completely devoted to the question of health, Hygiène et Alimentation au 
Cameroun, highlighted the new accords signed with international organizations for the malaria 
program. It reported in 1953 that “A very important new effort will be undertaken with the 
support of UNICEF and the WHO.  The government has decided to bring the benefits of DDT 
to the villages of the bush (villages de brousse).”142   The French term ‘brousse’ designated a 
starkly conceived colonial geography, with the ‘brousse’ being that which was beyond the easy 
reach of roads, themselves markers of a modernized mobility.  French colonial officials thus 
cast their role as delivering DDT to the ‘brousse” through their own infrastructure but with the 
markings of support of the new postwar international health organizations.    
The launch of the insecticide program in the north exemplified these new dynamics. 
Teams began spraying in the north in March 1953, leaving from Maroua and traveling to 
designated sectors in the surrounding area.  Seven teams led the spraying campaign in the north.  
Each team included a ‘european’ team manager, with thirteen Cameroonian workers including 
one driver, two people to mix the insecticide and ten sprayers.  Each team also had its own 
Renault 2t5 truck.143  Beaudiment followed the work of the spraying teams in the first few 
weeks to see how the program unfolded on the ground.  He expected a degree of difficulty 
based on his characterizations of the people in the area, calling on tropes about the Fulbé being 
“rather averse” due either to their Islamic religion or customs and about the “Kirdi,” a general 
term for non-Islamized ethnic groups in the north, as “primitive”.144  Beaudiment observed all 
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the same that the novelty of the house-spraying presented difficulties for both the workers and 
inhabitants.  One major structural issue arose with the necessity of water to mix the DDT for 
spraying.  In the district of Bougaye, for example, the SHMP doctor noted that villages lacked 
an easy water source; during the dry season people were obligated to travel 20 kilometers by 
foot to reach a water source.  The teams thus had to adjust their plans for villages to provide 
water for the spraying operation.145 Thus while the SHMP director accepted this adjustment in 
some locations, in others he lamented a “disheartening inertia” of the population.  He thus took 
it upon himself to strengthen the SHMP system of exerting pressure through traditional 
authorities.  The doctor met himself with Fulbe lamibé as well as reviewed the messages about 
the project that the spraying teams should also share with authorities during village visits.  
Beaudiment subsequently noted a marked change in the reception of house spraying and 
attributed it both the messaging and to the power of DDT.  While he doubted people’s 
understanding of the intended effect of DDT in stopping malaria transmission, inhabitants of 
sprayed homes also noted with satisfaction the impact of killing vermin and other pests.  With 
this concrete outcome of the work, people took “a more active role in the work of the teams, to 
much more willingly provide the water requested of them…and to direct the workers so that no 
hut was forgotten.”146  The doctor noted that this aid “notably accelerated” the work of the 
teams.  
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The SHMP doctor framed his role in overseeing the teams in fostering what he called 
these “factors of acceleration.” Thus in addition to the involvement of the population, he 
focused on how the teams needed to adapt to the different geographic and physical conditions of 
different locales.  Whereas in some areas, villages might be easily accessible and close together, 
others might be dispersed and require climbing mountains.   
Near Kalfous, by contrast, the extremely sandy terrain flies under 
the wheels, so you often have to go forward on foot on unstable 
ground where walking is very difficult: wells are very rare, water 
is in shortage nearly everywhere, even important villages split up 
into small hamlets or simple sarés, spread out on all sides, 
overlapping in such a way that it is hard to know which chief to 
address. 147 
The SHMP head saw his role as working with the teams to respond adequately to these 
different circumstances and he considered it a success when, “little by little lost time was 
reduced or eliminated…In two or three weeks, the yield was more than doubled.”148  Officials’ 
major gaps in understanding of local social and political organization and their concerns about 
their ultimate ability to reach populations, however, revealed the often severe limitations to 
their own ability to execute their work.  The limits of colonial knowledge would thus, in turn, 
limit the local implementation of the WHO’s grander program of disease eradication.  
At the local level, SHMP teams navigated the incorporation of this new technology of 
residual insecticides and new type of intervention through the familiar concerns over geographic 
mobility, speed of work, mediation through Cameroonian authorities, and cooperation by rural 
populations.  Colonial officials framed these new developments on one hand through the 
colonial geography of the cooperation or non-cooperation of different populations.  At the same 
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time, they produced new concerns about the “closed door,”149 about “fear” of insecticide 
spraying, 150 or about “inertia” in aiding the teams that hampered the operation.  
By contrast, in the arena of World Health Organization meetings, French colonial 
officials actually became defenders of the Cameroonian population’s varied facilitation of the 
DDT spraying.  There, they argued that any problems experienced in the WHO pilot zone were 
a result of lack of attention to local circumstances.   For example, the Director of the World 
Health Organization Africa Regional Office expressed concern over progress in the pilot zone 
due to Cameroonians’ reactions: 
Since the second year of operations, the campaign has been faced with a major 
psychological and social difficulty resulting from the specific characteristics 
of this African community.  Insecticide spraying calls for the observation of 
a very rigid quarterly or bi-annual spraying schedule.  The first enthusiasm 
wore off as the population discovered that the spraying procedure had to be 
repeated regularly, leading to a marked reticence and finally to complete 
refusal to collaborate: the visits of the spraying teams were greeted with an 
increasingly high percentage of ‘closed doors’.  In order to evaluate the 
importance of this new psychological problem, the WHO sanitary technician 
made a survey in 18 villages of the pilot zone and reported that only 42.4% 
of the houses had been treated according to plan.  As for the remainder, 41.7% 
were insufficiently treated, and 15.9% did not receive any treatment at all. 
Contrasting with the genuine enthusiasm of the inhabitants of treated areas at 
the onset of operations, this reaction probably is characteristic for certain 
groups and has to be taken into consideration when treatment is begun; the 
people resent the repeated visits of the spraying teams which in their minds 
cause unnecessary disturbance.151 
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 In a meeting of the WHO Regional Committee for Africa, Dr. Louis Paul Aujoulat152 
meanwhile defended against these comments and asserted that he did not share the same 
‘pessimism’ about the chances of success of the malaria campaign in Cameroon. Having 
himself been in charge of the negotiations for the project on behalf of the French government, 
he took a special interest in the project.  He argued that the ‘closed doors’ of the campaign did 
not represent a spirit of opposition but rather practical considerations which the teams had not 
sufficiently taken into account.  Noting that the principle activity of this region was cocoa 
cultivation, he observed that this required intensive work during certain seasons, causing men 
and women to leave their houses early in the morning and come home late at night.  He 
remarked, “If the teams charged with spraying go to villages during normal working hours, they 
won’t find anyone because, for Africans, cocoa comes before DDT.”153  The WHO’s 
observation of mobile team work thus created new dynamics in talking about their challenges 
and success, with colonial officials suggesting that the percentage of intervention was not only 
an index of cooperation by Cameroonians, but also one of success in adapting to local 
circumstances.  This stance was a self-serving one; it bolstered the claim by French officials that 
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1955: Malaria Eradication and the Politics of Trusteeship  
 With the international pilot zone and the broader house-spraying campaigns underway, 
1955 marked a turning point in which the French colonial government of Cameroon would 
create new opportunities to highlight the territory as an important site of international health 
work, as well as displaying its malaria eradication program as a marker of its progressive 
colonial rule.  At the same time, this year became a decisive turning point in the development of 
nationalist opposition politics. A nationalist political party, the Union des Populations du 
Cameroun (UPC), mounted violent protests in Douala in that year and the colonial government 
subsequently banned the party.  The UPC appealed to the UN in calling for immediate 
independence from France based on Cameroon’s special status as a Trusteeship.  In the context 
of these two different forms of lobbying of the United Nations, the French government of 
Cameroon used the malaria eradication program as one way to make a case about public health 
being an area in which it was on the right side of international cooperation.  The implementation 
of a global health program through the colonial medical system thus created an avenue through 
which the French government would ultimately defend the maintenance of its colonial 
governance during a contentious and violent time in Cameroon.  
 One of the primary ways that the French government highlighted international health 
work in Cameroon in 1955 was through the hosting of a training course on malaria. As was 
intended by its original creation, the pilot zone in 1955 became the host site for an international 
training course on malaria prevention in Africa co-organized by the WHO, the French 
government and the colonial medical service in Cameroon.  Colonial medical officials from 
across Africa traveled to Yaoundé with the support of WHO grants to participate in an intensive 
seven-week malaria-training course from mid-February to early April 1955.   Dr. Morin directed 
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the course and scientists from a variety of countries provided lectures on various topics on the 
science of malaria as well as techniques for combatting it; the pilot project near Yaoundé served 
as the site for field training.154  
 Colonial officials in Cameroon framed the significance of the course in two main ways.  
First, they upheld Cameroon as special site, politically emblematic of the spirit of international 
coordination and notable for the specialized research on malaria happening in the territory.  
George Spénale, director of the cabinet of the High Commissioner of Cameroon, gave a speech 
on the opening day of the course in which he thanked the Director of the Africa Office of the 
WHO for supporting holding the malaria course in Cameroon, arguing that it could not be a 
better choice, ‘symbolically or practically”: 
Symbolically, because this international French-language course 
could not have a more appropriate site than Cameroon, land of the 
French Union and of international charter.  Practically, because we 
have ongoing at this moment, on the initiative and with the support 
of the WHO, two large anti-malaria initiatives..” 
Second, officials emphasized the ‘universality’ of the pursuit of science and medicine that the 
course represented.   Dr. Vaisseau, Director of Public Health for Cameroon, opened the first 
session of the course focused on the significance of the gathering of international scientists and 
doctors:  
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..the international course that will bring together in Yaoundé technicians 
from seven different countries demonstrates once again that health is 
indivisible, that disease does not know borders; it is further evidence of this 
spirit of universality that inhabits and animates all those who belong to the 
great medical and scientific family.155   
 
Spénale reiterated this contextualization of the malaria course in the framework of universality, 
embodied in the idea of apolitical scientific pursuits, but he also contrasted this significance of 
the course with the political context of rising nationalist movements within Cameroon and 
across the continent, casting such politics as essentially parochial in nature:  
In such an age, where the old dogma of independence loses each day a bit 
of its mystical and murderous value, in favor of notions, at once restrictive 
and generous of cooperation, of solidarity, of interdependence, any 
meeting of men who, over the mesh of borders, across linguistic and 
national boundaries, assemble for a constructive exchange of knowledge, 
ideas and techniques, constitutes promise, merits sympathy, awakens hope. 
156 
Spénale continued to connect the specific challenges of the campaign against malaria, and its 
necessary confrontation with “local diversities,” such as those between the north and south of 
Cameroon, which those assembled through the course would seek solutions to overcome 
through “common faith” and “common will.”  Spénale moreover expressed “envy,” as a non-
medical official, at the “certainty” that those participating in the malaria course could feel about 
the value of their work.157  Colonial officials in Cameroon thus connected the work of the 
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malaria pilot zone—as both a site of international research and training—to a characterization of 
French Cameroon as being a place that fostered the international health ideals of a universal 
striving towards human betterment.   
 Over the term of the malaria course, SHMP personnel also played a central role in 
coordinating the field experiences of the participants.  The doctors participating in the malaria 
course visited Maroua in northern Cameroon to learn about the insecticide-spraying program in 
that region and to compare the work in the northern region with that in the pilot zone.  Dr. 
Paclisanu, the head doctor of the SHMP in the area, worked with the lamido (the name for a 
Fulani head of an administrative unit in the north) of Bogo to facilitate having the course 
participants examine children in villages that had been treated or not treated with the 
insecticides, seeking to determine the rate of malaria.  The possibility of this ‘field experience’ 
thus relied on the practices of intervention of the SHMP, of using traditional authorities as 
intermediaries, and allowed international medical personnel to examine children in a one-time 
event that would have no clear bearing on the pursuit of malaria eradication in the area.  Dr. 
Paclisanu even housed some of the course participants at his own home.158 The structure, 
operations and personnel of the SHMP thus facilitated the ability of a cadre of international 
health personnel to travel to a new place in Cameroon and partake in something as invasive as 
the physical examination of children.  
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The French colonial government also used the malaria course as an opportunity to 
defend and paint a flattering portrait of its work in Cameroon, representing it as a place that was 
properly engaged in international cooperation. The official press outlet of the High 
Commissioner of Cameroon reported on the visit of the course to the north in March 1955, 
highlighting the international character of the delegation visiting the north and the helpful 
interventions of Dr. Paclisanu.  The government also highlighted the course and the general 
work in the pilot zone in the required annual reports to the UN.   In 1954, the annual report to 
the UN on the Trusteeship included information on the “meticulous organization” underway to 
plan for the course.159  In 1955, the French reported on the malaria course in the annual report 
under the heading of “Cooperation with the UN and the Specialized Bodies.”160  In October of 
1955, the colonial government further highlighted the anti-malaria campaign when the UN 
Trusteeship Council visited Cameroon to make direct observations about French administration.  
The international delegates of the UN ‘assisted’ with a demonstration of DDT spraying in a 
northern village near Mokolo.161  While the French government strove to paint a portrait of 
progressive developments in the UN, particularly in the realm of health, the malaria program 
was one particular way that it not only defended its colonial governance but also connected this 
administration to the development of international coordination around health.  The program 
thus became further implicated in colonial administration in Cameroon by creating a new 
                                                          
159 France. Rapport Annuel du Gouvernement Français Aux Nations Unies Sur l'Administration du Cameroun 
placé sous la tutelle de la France, 1954, 192. 
160 France. Rapport Annuel du Gouvernement Français Aux Nations Unies Sur l'Administration du Cameroun placé 
sous la tutelle de la France, 1955, 24. 
 
161 ANOM Bibliothèque 22671 « La Mission de Visite de l’O.N.U. dans La Nord-Cameroun » Haut-Commissariat 
de la République Française au Cameroun, Service de l’Information, Bulletin d’Information et de Documentation, 
(29 Octobre 1955), 11. 
79 
 
avenue for France to attempt to justify, on an international stage, its ongoing control of 
Cameroon.   
 
Photo of malaria campaign included in French report to the UN. Rapport 
Annuel du Gouvernement Français a L’Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies 
sur l’Administration du Cameroun Placé sous la Tutelle de la France, Année 
1954 
 
 Only a few short weeks after the conclusion of the malaria course, the political climate 
in Cameroon would meanwhile take a significant turn with the increasingly visible opposition 
mobilized by the Union des Populations du Cameroun.  Founded in 1948, the party emerged as 
a radical nationalist party that called for immediate independence from France.162  Facing 
increasing repression from French authorities, the UPC launched a series of volatile protests in 
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Douala in May 1955.  In July, the colonial government subsequently banned the party in 
Cameroon.  
Part of the strategy of UPC leaders in the 1950s was to leverage the existence of the 
Trusteeship to make claims to the UN about human rights violations under colonial rule.163  
Thousands of UPC members submitted petitions to the UN General Assembly and to the 
Trusteeship Council to denounce French rule.  Some members of the UPC used petitioning to 
the UN to express their unease and fear with regard to the French administration of public 
health and medicine.164 While the UPC’s engagement with the UN began in years prior, 
Meredith Terretta has shown that from 1955 onward, the UPC nationalist platform and strategy 
specifically connected local conceptions of politics and sovereignty to the global politics of 
decolonization.165   
The connections that colonial health officials drew with the UN and the WHO through 
the malaria eradication program thus stood in direct contrast to how members of the UPC 
leveraged international connections, international institutions, and their own transnational 
mobility as a form of political power.166  As French colonial officials worked, through UN 
reports and UN mission visits, to positively portray French rule under Trusteeship, they also 
crafted a message about the connections between their governance and international health that 
focused on Cameroon’s ability to be a site of international health intervention and experience.  
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Colonial medical officials thus produced a new framework of international health in Cameroon, 
not only through new resources and through the integration of WHO personnel into medical and 
scientific networks on the ground, but also through these efforts to present public health in 
Cameroon as progressive and in line with a conception of medicine and science as global and 
universal.  French officials connected the malaria campaign’s rootedness in specific locales—in 
the pilot zone of Yaoundé and in the villages of northern Cameroon, and in the specificity of 
Cameroon as a Trusteeship- to the grander goals of global disease coordination and eradication.  
This political framing of the malaria program also relied on a conception of mobility—of 
experts and ideas—between the local, the colonial and the international.    
Eradication Hopes and Decolonization  
 As the insecticide-spraying program continued, the WHO continued to send 
malarialogists to work out of Yaoundé, but the SHMP took an increasing role in controlling the 
overall program, including the Yaoundé pilot zone.  With this progression, the program became 
more integrated into the structure of the SHMP itself, and the distinction between the 
operational work of the Yaoundé pilot zone and the broader malaria program in the south more 
indistinct.  This progression occurred in the context of the broader political changes in the later 
1950s that would ultimately lead to Cameroon’s political independence.  Through these 
intertwining changes, SHMP doctors ultimately positioned themselves as key intermediaries of 
Cameroon’s international health engagements as the country became independent.   
 This transition first began through the SHMP’s own restructuring, as it began to assign 
more personnel to focus specifically on malaria.   The Cameroon SHMP created plans in 1955 
to establish a specialized malaria service within its organizational structure. A SHMP doctor 
would oversee the service, assisted by deputy doctors in both the southern and northern zone 
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and a sanitary technician.  This service would provide quality control for the malaria program—
including oversight of house-spraying, collection of blood samples and of mosquito sampling.167 
Médecin-Commandant Jean Languillon served as the first head of the malaria section of the 
Cameroon SHMP.168  The SHMP thus now had a main person of contact, beyond the head of 
the SHMP service, with whom the WHO and UNICEF could work.   
 The arrival of the third WHO malaria expert to Yaoundé led to further changes that 
diminished this role to the overall control of the program by the SHMP.  Professor Gregory 
Livadas, a malaria expert of Greek nationality, arrived in Yaoundé in 1957.169  Livadas met with 
the head of the SHMP, now Médecin-Colonel Feyte, and with Dr. Languillon and the three 
devised a new plan of operations for the pilot zone.  This need for a new plan of operations 
grew in part from the insufficient coverage achieved by the spraying campaigns in the pilot 
zone; by 1957, spraying teams had only reached 50-60% of the intended population.170   Thus, 
going forward, Livadas would play a “purely consulatative” role in his position as the WHO 
representative.  The personnel of the SHMP malaria section would be assigned to work in the 
pilot zone and Languillon, would “assure the direction of these operations which will be carried 
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out according to the recommendations of Professeur Livadas.”171  A 1957 SHMP report on the 
malaria program referred to the Yaoundé pilot zone as the “former WHO pilot zone.”172   
 Following the reorganization of the pilot zone, spraying teams undertook an intensified 
and punishing schedule to achieve a better coverage with insecticides.173  The outcome of this 
intensified program produced a seeming breakthrough in the pursuit of malaria eradication.  At 
a conference on tropical medicine and malaria in 1958, Livadas, R. Chastang, the new head of 
the malaria section of the SHMP, and co-researchers reported that while “the possibility of the 
eradication of malaria in Tropical Africa is the object of numerous controversies,” results in the 
Yaoundé pilot zone showed that it was possible.174  They reported that in Yaoundé, at the center 
of the pilot zone, that transmission of malaria had been successfully interrupted. 
 The broader house-spraying campaigns in the south and north did not yield equally 
promising results.  The southern program also suffered from insufficient coverage by the teams; 
the teams’ travel became dependent on the existence of pathways navigable by vehicle and this 
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left at least 200,000 people intended to receive house-spraying outside of its domain.175  WHO 
officials meanwhile described results in the north as “slow and disappointing.”  French, 
UNICEF and WHO representatives decided in 1957 to subsequently reorganize this aspect of 
the Cameroon program with new trials of insecticides as well as of anti-malarial drugs.176  
 As the SHMP further absorbed the direction of the malaria program, legislative changes 
extending across the French empire in Africa created new political arrangements with 
implications for how the functioning of international health programs would continue. The loi 
cadre of 1956 invested new political authority in Cameroonians through the creation of a single 
elector college and new legislative assembly, led by a prime minister and cabinet of ministers.  
Thus, for the first time in 1957, the territory had a Cameroonian Minister of Public Health, 
Haman Adama.177  One of the objectives of the loi-cadre was to place responsibility for a 
territorial budget to Africans, while allowing the French to maintain control of essential areas of 
governance including defense and foreign affairs.178 Thus while the new territorial assembly 
could pass laws regarding health, the French maintained control over workings with 
international health institutions. 
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 The WHO and UNICEF in turn noted the legislative developments of 1957 as bringing 
little change to their dealings with Cameroon. A UNICEF document in 1957 detailing funding 
that the agency would provide to Cameroon outlined these political changes and the implication 
of these changes for health administration and dealing with international institutions.  First, it 
noted that it was imagined that “the SHMP will continue to function for several years as it has 
in the past.”179  Second, it noted that while the newly elected Territorial Assembly would have 
power over various internal legislative matters, France would continue to control Cameroon’s 
“relations with the outside world.”180   
 UNICEF representatives furthermore reinforced this arrangement in its dealing with the 
Cameroonian Minister of Health.  In September 1957, a UNICEF representative responded to a 
request that Minister of Health Adama had sent for more insecticide to use for an expansion of 
the malaria program in Cameroon.  The UNICEF representative explained that the organization 
was unable to fulfill the request but also noted that he was sharing this point of view 
“unofficially”; he stated that any official request for assistance had to come through the French 
Ministère d’Outre-Mer.181  Thus even as Cameroonians took some control over internal affairs, 
French officials guarded their role as intermediaries between the Cameroonian government and 
international institutions.  
 SHMP leadership meanwhile broadened its privileged connection to international health 
institutions. When the health agencies of the UN decided in 1957 to provide funding for leprosy 
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work in Cameroon, the head of the SHMP created the accords with WHO and UNICEF.  
Minister of Health Haman Adama transmitted these plans to the Cameroonian Prime Minister, 
André-Marie Mbida, noting that the accords followed the same general structure as those used 
for the malaria campaign.182  The role of Cameroonian officials in shaping these campaigns 
from a legislative perspective thus remained limited.  The limited number of Cameroonians 
medically trained at the same level as French physicians certainly compounded this situation.  
Adama’s role as the Minister of Health marked a political appointment. Dr Fernand Merle, who 
became the head of the SHMP in the final years of the 1950s wrote retrospectively about this 
time that the Cameroonian government knew that, despite the naming of a health minister, the 
work of the of administration would really be done by him, with regards to mobile health, and 
another French military doctor for fixed medicine.183 
  The Cameroonian who began and continued to play the most powerful role in 
Cameroon’s internal and external relations of health was Dr. Simon-Pierre Tchoungui.  One of 
the earliest Cameroonian recipients of the doctorate in medicine in France, Tchoungui began to 
carve out a key role as intermediary for international health organizations in the late 1950s. In 
1959, the Ministry of Health created a Service of International Relations to deal with external 
health organizations, and Tchoungui became its head.  In 1961, he became Cameroon’s Minister 
of Health.184  Having trained in the French system and maintained close professional ties with 
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French doctors, he helped to facilitate their ongoing prominence even as he developed his own 
position of authority.185 
 Meanwhile, the political unrest gripping southern Cameroon created an uncertain and 
volatile backdrop for the mobile teams trying to continue the intrusive work of going into 
people’s homes and spraying insecticide.  During the final years of the 1950s, the ability of 
teams to do this work in Sanaga Maritime, a central base for UPC activity, remained highly 
unpredictable.186  European managers of the teams often feared going to more remote areas, for 
fear of running into hideouts of the UPC maquisard.187  Many Cameroonians on the mobile 
teams also feared the region and refused to work there.  In 1958, Cameroonians on the mobile 
team in charge of house-spraying in Sanaga Maritime wrote to the Minister of Health and 
requested a raise in their salary before going to the region for their work.  They wrote that 
“without it, we will not go,” citing that they had worked hard despite fearing for their lives.188  
The SHMP Director, Médecin Colonel Feyte, sent a letter of support for the request to the 
Minister of Health, noting that “while other teams had refused to work” in Sanaga Maritime, the 
members of this team had continued “often under the protection of military escorts.”189   
 Yet, while the unrest in Sanaga Maritime posed challenges for the SHMP, the service 
also benefited from the repressive counter-measures enacted by French authorities against the 
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UPC.  Beginning in 1957, French and Cameroonian troops forcibly relocated entire villages to 
areas directly along roads and railroad lines in an effort to surveil and control the population.190  
Dr. Chastang, the head of the SHMP malaria section, wrote that this set up was “ideal for the 
teams” since it allowed them to move much more quickly in spraying homes.191  The facilitation 
of a public health program by colonial repression was not, in itself, unique to colonial 
Cameroon. Yet, in this particular time in Cameroon, as the UN Trusteeship Council encouraged 
a trajectory for Cameroon towards self-governance, it was colonial coercion in Sanaga Maritime 
that facilitated public health work in service of the WHO’s ideal of a global eradication of 
malaria.  This scenario thus highlighted two sides of a relationship between colonialism and 
postwar internationalism—one at odds over the political vision of Cameroonian independence 
and another in synchrony over the desire to pursue public health programs with a focus on 
outcome, regardless of Cameroonian political will.  
 When French Cameroon ultimately gained political independence in January 1960, the 
French doctors of the SHMP continued to play a central role in the malaria program.  This 
arrangement reflected the strong hand that France maintained in Cameroon after independence, 
as it did across most of its former colonies in Africa.  Formal independence thus marked only a 
partial change in Cameroonians governing their external dealings on health.   In 1960, 
Cameroon notably became a member of the World Health Organization, as it would of other 
international organizations.  At the same time, however, French military doctors continued to 
maintain leadership positions within the SHMP and thus, maintained a central role in the 
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planning of the malaria program and interactions with international health officials.192  On 
February 17, 1960, representatives from the Cameroonian government, from the WHO and from 
UNICEF met to discuss the future for the Yaoundé pilot zone, in light of its encouraging results 
in interrupting malaria transmission.  The Cameroonian delegation included two French military 
doctors still holding leadership posts within the SHMP.  In addition to Cameroonian Dr. Simon-
Pierre Tchoungui, Dr. Merle, the head of the SHMP and Dr. Chastang, head of the malaria 
section of the SHMP, joined the meeting.193  Thus, international health organizations continued 
to engage with a ‘Cameroonian government’ on issues of health that involved French doctors in 
essential ways.   
At this meeting, the health officials made the important decision to change course in 
light of the interruption of malaria transmission in the pilot zone.  The Yaoundé pilot zone was 
one of only two sites in Africa where malaria transmission had been successfully interrupted, 
and it thus presented a site of major importance for the larger question about the possibility of 
eradication on the continent.194 The health officials in this meeting decided to suspend house-
spraying in the pilot zone and they created a plan for surveillance of malaria rates.195     
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 The optimism about malaria eradication produced by the pilot zone results was, 
however, quickly destroyed.  After the cessation of house spraying in the pilot zone, 
Cameroonians in the area experienced a major resurgence of malaria, with the disease appearing 
at rates rarely recorded.196  Other pilot projects across Africa that had lowered malaria rates 
through the use of insecticides likewise saw an increase in the disease after the projects 
ended.197  The failure of the malaria pilot projects showed that residual insecticides like DDT 
could successfully reduce, but could not eradicate, malaria in tropical Africa.  Moreover, they 
showed that insecticides were not a viable long-term solution to controlling malaria, as 
instances of mosquito species that transmitted malaria becoming resistant to the insecticides 
were reported.198  Moreover, health officials had treated the pilot projects operating in Africa as 
containable, discreet geographic spaces and had vastly underestimated the mobility of Africans 
both within and across territorial boundaries.199  When the WHO’s entire goal of global malaria 
eradication ultimately failed, it became clear that health officials had failed to account for the 
complexity of the disease and had put too much faith in technical solutions to problems that also 
had social determinants.200 In the 1960s, Cameroonian health officials would eventually work 
with the WHO plans for ‘pre-eradication’ of malaria through the development of basic health 
services, a development that chapter 5 will discuss further.   
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 Thus, although malaria eradication failed in Cameroon, as it did everywhere in the 
world, it was through the program that Cameroonian, French and international health officials 
forged and adapted new operational relationships in the postwar context.  Because the malaria 
program relied on the operations of the mobile health teams, it became part of the SHMP’s 
particular practices of rural health intervention and organizational structure.  As this chapter has 
shown, the malaria program became inscribed in local workings of the SHMP, for example of 
health officials working through Fulani lamido or through the attempts by colonial officials to 
control the population of Sanaga Maritime.   Thus while the malaria program connected to the 
ambitious program of global malaria eradication, the operations of the program worked within 
these colonial parameters.  
The significance of this convergence between global disease eradication and colonial 
medicine within Cameroon was two-fold.  First, the public health interventions that 
Cameroonians experienced as part of the malaria program were part of their interactions with 
the SHMP.  While the nature of the medical intervention certainly changed, the basic structures 
of the mobile teams appearing for time-limited visits to perform targeted interventions 
remained.  Cameroonians’ reactions varied widely across regions and some welcomed, just as 
some actively resisted, these interventions.  Most significantly, the creation of the WHO and its 
espoused ideals of apolitical internationalism in the realm of health did not change the type of 
public health interventions that Cameroonians experienced in the 1950s.  They ultimately 
experienced new technologies within the framework of the colonial medical system.   
For French colonial officials, however, the WHO and its support of the malaria 
campaigns created new opportunities in terms of medical resources as well as in terms of 
political capital.  This chapter has shown how French officials used the malaria eradication 
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program to defend their rule to the UN and to promote their place in Cameroon as champions of 
health internationalism.  The positions of authority that the French SHMP officials assumed 
through the malaria eradication program also ultimately positioned them as intermediaries of the 
new resources for health work stemming from the creation of the specialized technical agencies 
of the United Nations.   As they guarded this role through the final years of the 1950s and 
through political independence, they positioned themselves, with the support of Cameroonian 
elites, to continue to play a central role in the operation of international health programs in the 
1960s.   The work of the mobile health teams in shaping the malaria eradication program in the 
1950s thus created the parameters through which health officials of independent Cameroon 













Chapter 2: Creating the Health Region: Mobile Health Teams, Decolonization, and the 
Organization for Coordination in the Fight against Endemic Diseases in Central Africa 
(OCEAC)  
   
 The independence of French Cameroon in January 1960 did not mark a rupture in the 
operation of mobile health teams and the work of French military doctors as much as it did a 
restructuring and a re-imagination of their place in the independent state,201 as well as their 
position in international health.  The ongoing role of the French in the medical system in 
Cameroon and specifically in the mobile health team service reflected the broader political 
context of decolonization in Cameroon, as in other former French colonies in Africa.202   
 Far from a severing of ties at independence, most African states instead engaged in an 
“intensification of the links with France,” in a system of policies, financial flows and networks 
of people often referred to as ‘la Françafrique,’ or ‘l’État franco-africain.’203  Key aspects of this 
system were the tying of African currencies to the French franc at a fixed rate, the creation of 
the French Ministry of Cooperation to distribute aid to African countries, and the accords signed 
between France and individual African governments outlining cultural, military and technical 
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cooperation.204   In Cameroon, this relationship was particularly marked by the ongoing role of 
French troops in violently suppressing ongoing opposition from the UPC to the rise of first 
president Ahmadu Ahidjo.205  
 The French Ministry of Cooperation (Coopération), created in 1959, meanwhile became 
the new administrator of bilateral aid to former African colonies and ensured an ongoing influx 
of French people working as technical experts throughout these countries.  In 1961, for 
example, France funded 576 civil servants in Cameroon, 80 of them working in health.206  The 
Fund for Aid and Cooperation (Fonds d’Aide et de Coopération, FAC) was the main avenue 
through which France distributed this aid in the form of technical assistance personnel, as well 
as money for operating budgets and equipment.  Between its creation in March 1959 through 
February 1964, FAC distributed roughly twenty-two and a half million dollars for public health 
programs across the former African colonies, with about one third of this money going towards 
campaigns led by the mobile health services.207 In Cameroon, this proportion was higher, with 
approximately forty-six percent of FAC public health aid going towards the mobile service.208  
                                                          
204 Chafer (2005), 9.  
 
205 Terretta, 2014. Richard Joseph, ed. Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadu Ahidjo (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth 
Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd, 1978). Thomas Deltombi, Manuel Domergue, Jacob Tatsitsa, Kamerun! Une guerre 
cachée aux origines de la Françafrique, 1948-1971 (Paris : Découverte, 2010).  
 
206 David E. Gardinier, Cameroon: United Nations Challenge to French Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 98.  
 
207 Division of Medical Sciences : National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Public Health 
Problems in 14 French Speaking Countries in Africa and Madagascar: A Survey of Resources and Needs, Volume 
I (Washington, DC, 1966), 38-39. France distributed additional money for public health through the European 
Development Fund (Fonds européen de Développement, FED).  
 
208 Division of Medical Sciences : National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Public Health 
Problems in 14 French Speaking Countries in Africa and Madagascar: A Survey of Resources and Needs, Volume 
I (Washington, DC, 1966), 45.  From 1959-February 25, 1964, FAC invested $2,693,000 in public health programs 
in Cameroon and $1,238,000 of that went towards “campaigns against endemic diseases,” the work of the mobile 
health service.   
95 
 
In this period among all of the former French African territories, Cameroon was second only to 
Chad in the amount of money it received to support the mobile health service.209 
 The distribution of Cameroonian and French medical personnel between the mobile 
health service and the rest of the medical administration continued to reinforce the particularly 
stark hierarchies forged during the colonial period within the mobile service.  French military 
doctors continued to dominate the leadership of the service at both the national level as well as 
at the level of leading each of the fourteen “sectors” designated by the mobile service within the 
country.210  The movement of Cameroonian doctors into positions of power did not upend this 
structure.  In 1961, Cameroon gained its first medically trained Minister of Health, Dr. Simon-
Pierre Tchoungui, who held a doctorate in medicine from France and thus held equivalent 
training to French doctors.211  The majority of more highly-skilled Cameroonian medical 
personnel at independence remained, however, at the status of médecin africain and also 
continued to work primarily in fixed health posts, such as hospitals and dispensaries.  Moreover, 
roughly half of the Cameroonian médecin africains (26) were in France pursuing the doctorate 
in medicine in 1961.212  By 1964, even as many of those in training returned to Cameroon, the 
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seventeen doctors posted to the mobile service were almost all French.213  The service thus 
guarded its particular culture and ethos, shaped by the shared French military training of its 
leaders, well beyond independence.  
 As France repackaged its avenues of funding for social and economic development to 
former African colonies, it also delineated new responsibilities with independent Cameroon for 
the funding of the Service d’Hygiène Mobile et de Prophylaxie (SHMP) and its personnel.   In 
July 1960, the fifteen French medical officers and one nurse of the Service de Santé militaire 
serving in the SHMP in Cameroon, as well as the twenty contractual Europeans medical 
personnel in the service, became funded through the program of ‘technical assistance’ of 
Coopération for African states.  The government of Cameroon would meanwhile take on the 
charge of salaries for the Cameroonian personnel working for the SHMP.214  
 At the same time, the postwar avenues of international health funding for the SHMP that 
opened in the 1950s continued in the early 1960s. In addition to funding from the Cameroonian 
national budget, and the French fund for Coopération, the World Health Organization and 
UNICEF served as the third source of funding for the mobile team service in 1961.  The French 
government meanwhile urged Cameroonian officials to revise agreements with these 
international organizations in order to move towards equal contributions from the three sources 
for the SHMP.215  The negotiation of the place of international health institutions, funding and 
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personnel thus became an immediate and central part of how both Cameroonian and French 
officials envisioned the future of the mobile teams in the independent state.  
 In this international context, the continuity of the mobile health teams along the French 
colonial model did not, moreover, proceed without discord and adaptation.  The failure of 
malaria eradication prompted new negotiations between Cameroonian, French and WHO health 
officials about the proper role of mobile health teams in rural public health.  In the 1960s, the 
WHO began to propose a new conceptualization of rural health that diminished the role of the 
mobile health teams, and French mobile health service doctors pushed back against these 
developments even as Cameroonian health officials embraced them.  Chapter 5 will more 
closely examine these debates and their implication for public health administration in the late 
1960s.  
In the early 1960s, health officials in Cameroon also faced questions unique among 
former French colonies as they designed national health policy and the place of mobile health 
teams within it.  In 1961, the former French Cameroon unified with part of the territory of the 
British Cameroons to create the Federal Republic of Cameroon, an officially bilingual French-
English state.  The territory formerly administered by the French became the state of East 
Cameroon and a smaller territory formerly administered by the British that became the state of 
West Cameroon.216  Throughout the 1960s, Cameroonian health officials negotiated how to 
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standardize a national health system from these two colonial medical infrastructures.  Within the 
Ministry of Health, for example, a deputy Minister from West Cameroon served alongside 
Tchoungui.  The Ministry also included two Directors of Public Health, one responsible for East 
Cameroon and the other for West Cameroon.217 Over the course of the 1960s, institutions and 
systems created under French colonial administration came to dominate the national medical 
system, as was the case in all areas of governance.  The larger population and territory of the 
former French Cameroon as well as the heavy-handed ongoing involvement of the French in the 
country all contributed to this outcome.  As Chapter 3 will show, debates over the extension of 
the mobile health teams to anglophone West Cameroon became emblematic of this broader 
national process.   
 Thus, while the French-Cameroonian relationship profoundly shaped the development of 
the mobile health teams after 1960, I claim in the following chapters that the negotiation of their 
place in independent Cameroon was also constituted along other key and intersecting axes—
between Cameroonian health officials, with international health organizations, and also with 
neighboring African states.  The subsequent chapters examine how Cameroonians formulated 
the future of the mobile health team model through each of these relationships and through the 
messy overlaps of these relationships.  This perspective does not de-center the French-
Cameroonian relationship in the development of the mobile teams after independence as much 
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as it insists upon an expansive, international context for its negotiation. Together these chapters 
ultimately show that through these debates over the future of the mobile teams, Cameroonian 
health officials forged an international politics of health that reflected at once the enduring 
impact of empire as well as a new postcolonial politics.  
 This chapter focuses on how health officials used the mobile health team model to forge 
new forms of regional health coordination in the 1960s.  I show how Cameroonian, Central 
African and French health officials used the mobile health teams to leverage the post-war 
language of ‘borderless’ international public health approaches in formulating both a vision and 
an institutional structure for international public health coordination after independence. Facing 
the simultaneous changes of decolonization and the growing influence of international health 
institutions, Cameroonian and French medical officials worked to preserve the mobile health 
team system, coordinate this system through a regional health organization of former French 
territories and, in turn, to assert this organization as a key player in international health work. 
 This regional organization grew out of broader discussions that began in the 1950s 
between French and African doctors about the future of inter-territorial health coordination, 
after African territories in the French empire became more autonomously administered from 
one another with the implementation of the loi-cadre after 1956 and then with independence 
after 1960.  French military doctors expressed particular concern for maintaining structures for 
coordination of mobile health teams across territories that had existed under colonial 
administration.  Although Cameroon had a separate administration due to its status as a United 
Nations Trusteeship, the federations of French West Africa (AOF) and French Equatorial Africa 
(AEF) had centralized administration of the mobile teams and thus had institutionalized the 
possibility for coordination of work across individual colonial territories.   Discussions in the 
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1950s focused on the kinds of health institutions that could be created in the midst of a changing 
political geography, with those involved seeking not so much to intervene in the form of 
broader political change that was occurring, but rather to salvage a sense of control over how 
these changes would play out in the realm of public health.  They employed similar language to 
those involved more directly in the broader political debates, repeating, for example, fears about 
the ‘balkanisation’ of Africa, while at the same time stressing the particular urgency of 
countering these developments given the demands of public health work.   
 In the wake of the formation of independent African states in the early 1960s and a view 
of this political geography as a potential threat to public health coordination, African and French 
public health officials created two new regional health institutions.  In 1960, a meeting in Ivory 
Coast of health ministers of former French West Africa created the Organization for 
Coordination and Cooperation in the Fight against Major Endemic Diseases (OCCGE).218  All 
former territories of French West Africa with the exception of Guinea became member states, 
with France also included as a member.219   The four former states of French Equatorial Africa 
(Chad, Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo and Gabon) plus Cameroon formed a 
parallel organization, OCEAC, the Organization for Coordination in the Fight against Endemic 
Diseases in Central Africa, in 1963. 220    
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 With headquarters in Yaoundé, Cameroon, OCEAC sought to coordinate the work of its 
members’ national mobile health team services, to compile and share epidemiological 
information, undertake research, and provide training for medical personnel.  In his speech 
opening the 1963 conference that created the organization, the Minister of Public Health of 
Cameroon, Dr. Simon-Pierre Tchoungui, emphasized the particular importance of cooperation 
in the realm of public health in which, “all isolated effort is irreparably doomed to failure.”221  
This language of the danger of isolation reproduced a common public health trope that disease 
knows no borders.  Yet, the form of regional health cooperation that became institutionalized 
through this 1963 meeting upheld a very particular vision of borderlessness, shaped less clearly 
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by purely apolitical epidemiological concerns than it was by a concern for shaping international 
health work after independence through the strengthening of ties across francophone African 
states and the safeguarding of the influential role of France in this realm.  More concretely, 
OCEAC carved out a role for ongoing technical assistance and leadership from France and 
through French military doctors at a regional scale.   
 The institutional vision of health coordination represented by OCEAC thus depended on 
shared leadership between African and French health officials.  Both OCEAC and its West 
African counterpart were inaugurated through elections of an African health minister as their 
Presidents and with French military doctors with long medical careers in the colonies as their 
Secretaries-General.  Dr. Jean-Claude Happi, the Commissioner General of Public Health for 
Cameroon, served as OCEAC’s first President in 1965 and French Dr. René Labusquière as its 
first Secretary-General.  Guillaume Lachenal’s work on decolonization and medicine in 
Cameroon helps to explain the willingness of African doctors and other public health officials to 
work so closely with French doctors after independence and to allow them major leadership 
roles in medical institutions such the Pasteur Institute in Cameroon and in OCEAC.  Lachenal 
has convincingly shown how a sense of a shared medical culture, professional order, and ties of 
‘familiarity’ between Cameroonian and French medical elite shaped the world of medicine and 
scientific research after political independence in Cameroon.222  Indeed, the powerful idea of a 
shared Franco-African medical tradition and culture drove OCEAC’s creation, existence, and its 
functioning.   
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I assert, however, that understanding OCEAC’s creation also requires attention to how 
French and African officials forged this professional world after independence through a very 
particular geographic vision.  Through OCEAC, French, Cameroonian and Central African 
health officials made a claim on how international public health problems should be framed.  
They claimed that the member countries shared public health problems and would in turn share 
approaches to combatting disease.  They asserted that OCEAC member states constituted a 
coherent health region and that external actors should approach it as such.  These health 
officials thus undertook a project of ‘region-making’ in the realm of health that would 
subsequently lead to the articulation of health problems and possible solutions through the 
framework of this region.223   
I argue that the assertion of OCEAC as a health region grew out of multiple influences:  
the desire of French doctors to maintain influence through the regional scale of colonial medical 
governance after independence, the desire of Central African officials to garner political and 
technical strength through regional integration, and the desire of both groups to create a regional 
health body different than that of the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa.224  
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First, through OCEAC, French military doctors pursued a protection but also an expansion of 
the regional scale of colonial medical governance.  As this chapter will show, decolonization 
spurred fears among French military doctors about the breakdown of the scale of coordination 
for mobile health teams through AEF.  They saw the power of coordination not so much in a 
sense of medical control over vast territories or in controlling medical borders; that vision of the 
geographic reach of the mobile teams was always an illusory one. Rather, their conception was 
rooted in the French conception of ‘la médecine de masse,’ that is medicine on a population and 
not an individual level.  Africans thus were framed as ‘populations’ and ‘collectives,’ rather 
than as individual patients.  The reforms of the Brazzaville conference institutionalized this 
approach to medicine as a priority through the mobile health teams.225  The mobile health team 
service meanwhile developed a distinct professional ethos and culture within the French 
colonial medical service, and through decolonization French doctors sought to protect their 
professional networks of coordination across territories.  The medical ‘borders’ that French 
military doctors upheld through OCEAC’s creation were thus based on an approach to rural 
health rooted in the French mobile health team tradition of medical intervention, and the 
geographic limits of this imperial tradition.226 Cameroon was central to the French colonial 
development of mobile medicine and thus, through this framework of medical borders, was tied 
to the former states of AEF in highly significant ways.   
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The post-independence forging of regional affiliation between Cameroon and other 
African states required, however, an investment by African health ministers beyond a simple 
protection of colonial ties. On one hand, Cameroonian health officials, namely health ministers, 
Dr. Simon-Pierre Tchoungui and Dr. Jean-Claude Happi, enthusiastically pursued this grouping 
of Cameroon with the former states of French Equatorial Africa in the realm of health.  Both 
French-trained and closely professionally aligned with French military doctors, they proudly 
celebrated their work as being part of the Jamot legacy of the French colonial mobile health 
teams.  Yet, while OCEAC officials mobilized the Jamot legacy to present Cameroon’s 
inclusion in the organization as an obvious, non-remarkable choice, the particular historical 
trajectory of decolonization and independence in Cameroon highlights the ways in which 
OCEAC cannot be seen as a mere bureaucratic extension of colonial medical systems, but 
instead must be examined as a historically contingent outcome of the decisions by health 
officials in the early 1960s.  Cameroon’s distinct administrative status from AEF due to its 
status as a League of Nations Mandate and then United Nations Trusteeship represented the 
most important historical element of this difference.  Moreover, Cameroonian health officials 
faced key questions about public health administration in the officially bilingual Federal 
Republic.  Thus while Dr. Tchoungui and Dr. Happi asserted the country as a key player, and 
indeed headquarters, for the creation of a French-speaking, French-funded and led type of 
regional health work after independence, this characterization also depended on a negotiation 
internal to the country about the significance of the Federal Republic to public health 
administration.227  Through OCEAC, Cameroonian and French health thus naturalized the idea 
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of independent Cameroon as a partner in health primarily with neighboring former French 
colonies through the framework of the French mobile health teams.   
Cameroonian and other Central African health ministers also justified the grouping of 
the states based on arguments about shared disease environments and political stances about 
African regional integration.  Health ministers in OCEAC talked about the organization as 
growing from the legacy of French colonialism, but in contemporary terms about the ecological, 
cultural and political links that bound the member states to each other and formed them as a 
region.228  It was thus African health officials who legitimized OCEAC through a sense of 
forward-looking political possibility.  Despite the absolutely dominant role of French doctors in 
OCEAC, Cameroonian and Central African health officials working through OCEAC 
paradoxically upheld the organization primarily as an example of progressive African regional 
integration and an avenue for development of their states.  Some of them saw the organization 
most importantly as a resource through which to gain additional technical and material 
assistance directly from France as well as serving as a channel for aid from other organizations.  
But they also saw it as a resource to solidify the cooperative connections between their states.    
It was thus both by evoking a shared history of the colonial mobile health teams as well as 
through a discourse about post-colonial unity that officials in OCEAC crafted the idea of its 
member states constituting a distinct health region.   
Finally OCEAC’s creation demonstrated an attempt by French and Central African 
health officials to create a health organization that operated at a scale beyond the nation but at a 
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smaller scale than the regional vision of Africa asserted by the WHO.    By creating a health 
region that was at once international while explicitly francophone, they thus staked a claim on 
the operation of international health in independent Africa.  This decision grew out of a longer 
history of general suspicion among French colonial officials towards WHO involvement in 
Africa and a specific opposition to the establishment of a Regional Office for Africa.229  In 
1952, the World Health Organization established a Regional Office for Africa in Brazzaville, 
with the intent for the office to focus on most of the continent, excluding North Africa and part 
of Eastern Africa.230 OCEAC officials argued that their organization was a more effective 
alternative to this framework for regional coordination proposed by the World Health 
Organization.   OCEAC thus intervened in the field of international health by creating a 
francophone African bloc that could assert itself as a forum for regional coordination, an 
intermediary between member states and international health institutions.  OCEAC’s exercised 
this role as an intermediary during the global Smallpox Eradication Program launched in the 
mid-1960s (see Chapter 4.) The creation and work of OCEAC thus shows how the colonial 
mobile health team service became reimagined by African and French officials as something 
that could claim authority in the realm of international health in the 1960s.   
 The first part of this chapter will zoom the lens out from Cameroon to examine the 
development of the colonial mobile health teams in the broader regional context of French 
Equatorial Africa.  I will then examine how the legislative and political changes of the 1950s 
catalyzed debate about the future of inter-territorial coordination of the mobile health teams. 
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The analysis of the 1950s takes a broad view, looking at how French and African officials 
discussed possibilities across West and Central Africa.  Finally, I look more specifically at the 
process and consequences of the creation of OCEAC in Cameroon in the 1960s.  
Mobile Health Teams and Inter-territorial Coordination in 1950s French Africa  
The French colonial mobile health team model first developed in response to a 
widespread sleeping sickness epidemic, caused by colonial penetration, in French Equatorial 
Africa in first decades of the 1900s.231  French military Dr. Eugène Jamot first established the 
mobile health team model in Oubangui Chari (present-day Central African Republic) in 1917, 
by designating a set geographic ‘sector,’ and the plan to examine as many people as possible 
within those boundaries. 232 The Governor General of French Equatorial Africa, Gabriel 
Angoulvant, first sought to expand this work through the creation of additional medical 
‘sectors’, although this expansion would be slow to develop in practice due to limited funds and 
personnel.233    
In the following decades, French officials institutionalized the model as a central part of 
the colonial public health administration across its African colonies.    Jamot further expanded 
his work in French Cameroon in the early 1920s, and a 1926 law established a permanent and 
distinct sleeping sickness service for Cameroon.234 Following closely in 1927, the then 
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Governor General of AEF, Raphaël Antonetti, also established a separate sleeping sickness 
service for the federation, the Service de prophylaxie de la trypanosomiase (SPT).235  The SPT 
remained both financially and administratively autonomous from the more general colonial 
health service in French Equatorial Africa, the Assistance médicale indigène (AMI), which 
worked primarily through stationary medical posts in the forms of hospitals and infirmaries.  
The budget of each individual colony in French Equatorial Africa funded the running of the 
AMI in its own territory.  The SPT, focused on the mobile approach to sleeping sickness, gained 
funding through the federation’s general budget, with support from France in the form of 
subsidies.236  As a League of Nations mandate under French administration during this period, 
Cameroon’s health service, including the sleeping sickness service, had a distinct territorial 
administrative structure from the neighboring colonies of French Equatorial Africa.    
In the 1930s, French officials also implemented this model in French West Africa, with 
Jamot based in the area between 1931-1935.  In 1939, Médecin-Colonel Gaston Muraz, who 
had previously led the sleeping sickness service in AEF, became head of the newly 
institutionalized Service général autonome de la maladie du sommeil (SGAMS) for French 
West Africa and Togo with the head of the service in Bobo-Dioulasso.237  These teams across 
the French empire in Africa focused exclusively on sleeping sickness at first, but they also 
established a new philosophy and model for French colonial medical administration.  This 
model would endure, even as it was modified, in the years ahead. 
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 The Brazzaville Conference in 1944 put forward recommendations to make the sleeping 
sickness service into a multi-purpose one.238  The service would continue to deal with sleeping 
sickness but would also take on the task of confronting other endemic diseases, such as malaria, 
tuberculosis and leprosy.  The service previously known by the acronym of SGAMS became the 
SGHMP, le Service Général d’Hygiène Mobile et de Prophylaxie.239  Both French West Africa 
and French Equatorial Africa had their own SGHMP centralized at the level of each federation.  
Despite its special administrative status similar to that of Cameroon, the legislation called for 
the mobile service of French West Africa to be extended to Togo.  Cameroon, on the other 
hand, created its own distinct service from the start; it was not administratively tied to the 
neighboring federation of French Equatorial Africa.240 The headquarters for the West African 
service was based in Bobo-Dioulasso and in Brazzaville for French Equatorial Africa. The new 
legislation maintained the structure of having the budget for the mobile service at the federation 
level in the general budget.241  The service divided the given territory of coverage (both the 
federations and Cameroon) into ‘sectors’ and strove to cover each of these units with teams that 
could regularly travel to rural areas to examine people for disease, perform vaccinations and in 
some cases pursue treatment of disease.  The postwar French program for development in the 
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colonies, FIDES (Fonds d’Investissement Economique et Social), contributed to the growth of 
the teams through funding for equipment, infrastructure and supplies.242 
 The full realization of the plans for the SHMP was, however, slow, to develop and 
uneven across territories.  In 1945, colonial authorities in AEF designated 19 principal and 7 
secondary sectors for the work of the mobile health teams with the intent to have at least one 
mobile team operating for each sector.  Due to a lack of medical staff and equipment, each 
sector did not have an operational team until 1957.243  Despite further investment in health after 
World War II, the colonial service in AEF operated throughout the postwar period with 
relatively few medical personnel.  In 1952, the SHMP worked with a staff of only 277 for the 
entire federation.244 Cameroon, a privileged site of French investment due to its status as a 
Trusteeship, reported in 1951 the use of 203 medical personnel in the SHMP for the single 
territory.245 
At the same time, although the mobile teams were much-celebrated by the French 
military doctors running them, the teams were not without their critics within the colonial 
administration.  Before the reforms of the Brazzaville conference, some criticized the singular 
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focus of resources and personnel on sleeping sickness.246 Legislation in the early 1930s had 
attempted to integrate the sleeping sickness service with the AMI in both French Equatorial and 
French West Africa, but this direction was abandoned before the decade ended.247   But after the 
expansion of the service to focus on various ‘grandes endémies,’ such as leprosy and malaria, 
critiques from both within and outside of the French colonial health service continued, often 
focused on the autonomy of the mobile service from the rest of the colonial health structure.  
Debates between colonial medical officials continued through the early 1950s about the most 
desirable structure for the mobile service, and some continued to raise questions about the 
optimal balance between ‘fixed’ and mobile medicine, between curative and preventive 
medicine, and about the autonomy of the mobile service, which grew in part from its 
centralized, federation-level structure.   
A 1952 Conference of Directors of Public Health in French Africa brought these debates 
to the foreground.  Dr. Louis-Paul Aujoulat, Secretary of State for Overseas France, presided 
over the meeting and opened a session of the conference on July 29th devoted to a discussion of 
the mobile service across the French territories in Africa. He noted that a memo he had sent out 
early that year had raised concern from medical officials that he wished to eliminate the mobile 
service, but he assured the assembled group that his concern was really to find a better structure 
between the mobile service and the territorial health services. 248  He spoke about the need for 
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better coordination and communication between the two distinct health service branches.  
Aujoulat also addressed the question of centralization: 
Another aspect of the problem is this: in certain federations, and I am 
thinking here mainly of AEF, the tendency has been, on several occasions 
to dismantle the service général d’hygiène mobile et de prophylaxie to 
reestablish it in parts in each of the territories.  I don’t have to tell you that 
in this regard the position of the Department has always been unequivocal. 
We reckon that as long as the governments general exist the service général 
d’hygiène mobile et de prophylaxie must have an existence within the 
framework of the federation and it must be supplied, of course, by the 
federal budget.249 
 
Colonel Lotte, Director of the SGHMP for AEF, continued on this point, warning of the 
“imminent peril” facing the SGHMP in AEF from a budgetary standpoint, and from the 
possibility of “territorial vivisection.” He argued that the budget of the SGHMP had remained 
unchanged since 1948, all while the number of sectors for their work had increased from nine to 
thirteen.  Meanwhile, the government of AEF “had established a project of budgetary 
decentralization of the SGHMP, that is to say that the general budget would furnish a subsidy to 
the territories and the territories would have entire responsibility for the administration and 
functioning of their mobile service.”250  He warned of this set up leading to a situation in which 
the federal government would become detached from local work and local authorities would 
have the excuse of not receiving adequate funds.  Ultimately, he argued, this arrangement would 
be completely at odds with the letter and the spirit of the decree of 1944 that established the 
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AEF service.251  Dr. Aujoulat responded that it was “absolutely not possible to let the SGHMP 
be dismantled or to accept a territorial separation” and that explanations would be required from 
the High Commissioner of AEF. 252   
 As the attendees continued to discuss a desirable coordination between the SGHMP and 
the general health service, the AMA253, Médecin-Colonel Vaisseau, highlighted his experience 
as Director of Public Health for Cameroon.  When it came to the relationship between the two 
branches of the health service, Vaisseau observed that Cameroon was lucky, “even enormously 
lucky” to be a territory “one and indivisible.”  Referring to Cameroon’s special status as a 
United Nations Trusteeship under French administration, which required that its administration 
remain separate from the federations, Vaisseau concluded that “the problems of communication, 
of collaboration between the fixed and the mobile are infinitely less delicate to resolve than in a 
federation.”254  He compared this to his five years of service in French West Africa where he 
saw and prepared memo after memo about the need for collaboration and communication, but 
then saw that this hope largely stayed on paper.  
 Vaisseau argued that safe-guarding both the distinctness of the mobile medicine model 
and its budgetary autonomy were absolutely necessary, but that at the same time public health in 
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any given territory should not be seen as bifurcated between the two services. He offered that 
Cameroon could serve as an example of the relationship between the fixed and mobile service, 
an example that could then be applied to a federation.255  Colonel Sanner of AOF pushed back, 
saying that “the solutions offered to us by our colleagues from the autonomous and mandate 
territories did not provide a solution to the problem, and they propose a solution that leads to the 
breaking up of the SGHMP.”256  This meeting did not reach consensus on how to best resolve 
these ongoing issues, but it did affirm the necessity of maintaining the intended centralization of 
the SGHMP by federation.   
 Despite this ultimate affirmation of the SGHMP structure in 1952, the practical 
questions surrounding the parameters of the service continued to provoke debate in the years 
that followed. In 1954, the Federal Director for the SGHMP of French Equatorial Africa, Dr. 
Pierre Richet, wrote a pointed memo about the budgetary difficulties facing his service in the 
wake of a refusal by the Grand Conseil of the federation to accord certain requested aid. Richet 
responded to critics who saw it as a well-endowed service that had misused and wasted its 
resources, countering that the service didn’t have enough money for sectors’ necessities such as 
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the repair of broken down vehicles.  Twelve new sectors projected to be established in 1945 had 
never been created.  Richet argued that the current budget further prevented the purchasing of 
necessary medications and supplied. 257  He pleaded that the SGHMP of French Equatorial 
Africa not be left to “die little by little” and referred to the affirmation of the service’s work, its 
financial autonomy, and its federal administration made in the 1952 Conference of the Directors 
of Health.   
 Similarly, speaking to ongoing suggestions in 1954 to decentralize the service in French 
West Africa, Dr. Robert, the Directeur du Service de Santé de la France d’Outre-Mer, also 
pushed back against the idea, pointing to the earlier attempts in the 1930s to combine the mobile 
service with the general health service and characterizing them as a mistake.  He emphasized 
that the “prophylactic, mobile and rural” action of the service was only possible for a service 
granted, “budgetary, administrative and technical autonomy, a central management, freedom 
from administrative borders, and a specialization of personnel.”258 Speaking specifically to a 
need to work across ‘administrative borders,’ Robert argued that action against disease would 
crumple in the face of a focus on ‘local interests’ and that responding to more general concerns 
must be the goal of public health. He continued to say that the SGHMP of West Africa was a 
model that was starting to be replicated by other governments in Africa, and notably that it had 
gained the admiration of representatives from international organizations, a group he noted to be 
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otherwise quite ‘stingy’ with compliments.  Finally, he argued that ‘the federal conception’ of 
the mobile service: 
..is consistent with the evolution of world politics in the domain of health; the 
creation of international or intergovernmental organizations: the WHO, 
UNICEF, CCTA, is dictated by the more and more clear necessity of a 
coordinated action against disease; medical cooperation between countries is 
the order of the day, particularly in Africa.  (Accra Conference in 1946, Dakar 
in 1951, Léopoldville planned for 1955).   
It is at this exact moment when this development asserts itself that we are going 
to, with our own hands, dismantle a particularly effective national organization, 
which the Conference of Directors of Public Health, presided over by Doctor 
Aujoulat, Secretary of State of Overseas France, reaffirmed in 1952, judging 
from the technical point of view, the necessity of avoiding its ‘break-up.”  
It’s at the moment where the coordination and the medical cooperation between 
countries proves to be more and more necessary that we are going to destroy in 
large part the possibilities of medical cooperation between our own 
territories..... 
Decentralization in the area of the SGHMP of AOF would be a step back of 
thirty years as much from the point of view of the protection of health of the 
populations concerned as from the world evolution of the conception of this 
protection.259 
Robert thus characterized the inter-territorial nature of the mobile health service, in its federal 
structure, as something that was progressive and in line with developments in international 
health.  More importantly, this was a French model of such developments, which facilitated 
claims by French colonial medical officials about the strength of their work in African 
territories.  These comments spoke to a broader anxiety among French colonial medical officials 
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at this time about the growing role of international health organizations in Africa and the desire 
to maintain control and influence over the nature of this role.260 
 Within these conversations about the need to maintain the autonomy and inter-territorial 
nature of the mobile teams, Cameroon continued to represent an outlier through its 
administrative distinctness and status as a United Nations Trusteeship.  From the inception of 
the teams in the interwar period, when Cameroon was classified as a League of Nations 
Mandate, this administrative distinctness had ramifications for the functioning of the mobile 
health service.  In the early 1930s, for example, mobile Sector 11 in Chad, based between Fort-
Lamy and Lake Chad did not coordinate at all with teams across the border in Cameroon and 
their work proved to be particularly inept and disorganized.  People living in Chad in turn 
leveraged this political and medical border to their own ends, crossing the border into Cameroon 
to avoid medical examination.261   
Any subsequent efforts at medical coordination could not bypass the political and 
bureaucratic divide between Cameroon and the neighboring territories belonging to the 
federation.  In 1951, the head of the SHMP in Cameroon, Médecin-Colonel Beaudiment, 
corresponded with the head of the mobile team in Fort Foureau, Cameroon, about a proposal to 
coordinate with medical officials across the border in Chad on a canvassing of the area for cases 
of sleeping sickness and potentially a joint effort to proceed with injections of lomidine, the 
drug being used at this time in both curative and protective capacities against the disease.262  
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Beaudiment reminded the mobile team head that such coordination, particularly the idea of an 
actual entrance of the Cameroonian team into Chadian territory, was not just a medical question 
and must be fully approved by administrative authorities of Chad.263 At the same time that 
French colonial officials upheld the administrative significance of this border, they also 
recognized the fluidity of people across it, to a degree that they often felt helpless to control.264  
The ‘medical border’ between AEF and Cameroon was thus politically or administratively 
constituted in ways often at odds with how people actually lived and moved in the space, but 
this border did create practical realities for the implementation of health campaigns.  
Throughout the postwar period, colonial officials framed the challenges of rural health through 
the mobility of the health service itself, rather than through the mobility of people.265  
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 This border illustrates one of the many gaps between the rhetoric of the reach of mobile 
health teams and their practical implementation. This often large gap between what colonial 
medical officials set out to do and the success or even possibility of acting on these plans when 
confronted with the choices of individuals and groups targeted for intervention, or with their 
own professional shortcomings, certainly constitute a central part of the history of the mobile 
teams, as they do more broadly in many histories of colonialism and medicine. And during this 
time in the early 1950s, the French mobile teams were often very far from living up to the ideal 
of their mission given the many histories of resistance or indifference to their work in 
communities, inefficiency due to lack of funds, equipment and personnel, and in some cases, 
outright medical disaster.266   
Meanwhile, the ideal of a structure of federation-wide mobile services pursing 
polyvalent work remained contested and unstable. Even before the political changes of the late 
1950s that would raise increasing alarm about the fate of the mobile teams, a constant discourse 
of threat and of potential breakdown ran through conversations about the health services. When 
French doctors began in the 1950s, therefore, to lament the possible breakdown of the inter-
territorial coordination of mobile health teams, they were lamenting something that was in fact 
relatively new and certainly far from fully realized in its specific formulation.   
That said, during the period between the reformulation of the teams through the 
Brazzaville conference in 1944 and the loi-cadre in 1956, French medical officials created a 
geographic vision of the mobile services that would serve as an enduring and powerful 
reference point even as African medical officials eventually took positions of authority within 
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their territories.  At the heart of this geographic vision was the idea that a certain kind of 
medicine must not be contained by stationary medical posts or by politically-invested borders.  
As shown, some upheld this model as a French version of postwar trends towards 
geographically vast and coordinated approaches to disease as represented by international 
organizations. In this way, proponents of the teams were able to argue that their interests 
extended beyond the ‘local,’ to a more powerful, more modern vision of the possibilities for 
medicine.  The idea of a legacy of the mobile teams to protect—one that was conceptually 
shaped by a philosophy of medicine as well as a geographic framework--became a powerful one 
among African and French medical officials.  This idea drove reactions of health officials to 
political changes in the late 1950s, and ultimately to the creation of regional health 
organizations in the 1960s.   
Health Services and the Loi-Cadre 
The broader political changes to colonial administration in Africa in the mid-late 1950s 
forced fundamental questions about the future of the mobile health services. The 1956 loi-cadre, 
or ‘framework law,’ which moved legislative and administrative authority away from the 
federation-level Government-General of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa  
towards elected territorial assemblies, brought significant changes for the structure of mobile 
health teams.  The law placed greater responsibility for the budgets of individual African 
territories in the hands of locally elected officials, thus deflecting to them the burden of 
responding to the mounting claims of African citizens for greater equality between metropole and 
colony in areas such as civil service salaries.267   People in each territory would from this point 
                                                          
267 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: the Labor Question in French and British Africa 




forward vote by universal suffrage on a territorial assembly, which would have ministerial 
powers.  The law also specifically created two spheres of governmental powers: the ‘Services 
d’État’ and the ‘Services Territoriaux,’ with the concept that there would be a division between 
powers exercised centrally through Paris (Services d’État) and those that were exercised at the 
level of individual African territories.  A decree in April 1957 set the actual parameters of this 
division of power.  While the French government maintained authority over areas such as foreign 
affairs and defense, the individual ‘territorial services’ would have responsibility over most public 
services.268  Those services falling under the realm of territorial responsibilities included the 
health services. The law also turned the African civil service into territorial services.269  The 
decree characterized those responsibilities maintained by the French government as those 
considered necessary for ‘maintaining the solidarity of the elements comprising the Republic.”270  
 Meanwhile, the law significantly emptied power at the federation-level of authority in 
both French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, with the Government-General and the 
Grand Conseil having little authority over the territories.271  Historian Tony Chafer writes that 
the loi-cadre thus produced “the political and economic ‘balkanization’ of French Black Africa” 
with political leaders finding themselves “increasingly locked into the logic of a system that 
attached political primacy to the territory.”272  Prominent political leaders such as Léopold 
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Senghor, future president of Senegal, had opposed the legislation precisely due to this fear of the 
‘balkanization’ of French Africa, or the move towards more autonomy in the form of smaller 
political and geographic units as opposed to federations.273  Political leaders in French Equatorial 
Africa expressed less concern over these changes and were more focused on “maintaining and 
increasing France’s financial and economic aid to AEF and with the reorganization of the civil 
service.”274 
French Cameroon’s political trajectory in relation to that law was somewhat distinct from 
French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, given its status as a United Nations 
Trusteeship.275  There, for example, the question of federal vs. territorial power did not have 
relevance.  Similar to other territories, however, the law did lead to territorial elections with 
universal suffrage and a single electoral college, thus investing more political power in elected 
Cameroonian officials, while continuing to reserve a broad sphere of control for French 
authorities.  One notable change came through a 1957 statute changing Cameroon from a ‘trust 
territory’ to a ‘trust state’ with nationals categorized as Cameroonian citizens.276  Within the realm 
of health, as in other territories, Cameroon would have a Minister of Public Health within its 
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government from 1957 forward, but overall structural changes were less pronounced than in the 
federations.277 
For the federations of West and Equatorial Africa, the changes to the health services 
revolved around the newly defined designation of territorial services.  First, the loi-cadre 
catalyzed the decisive ‘territorialization’ of the general health service.  For the mobile services, 
some structure of cross-territorial coordination remained.  French observers of this change, 
however, characterized the law as ultimately producing the same fundamental changes for the 
mobile service: an emptying of federation-level coordination and a cutting up of the service into 
smaller territorial units. A decree of December 16, 1957 created the Service Commun de lutte 
contre les Grandes Endémies (S.C.L.G.E.) for French West Africa from the former SGHMP.278  
This change downgraded the role of the director of the federal service for French West Africa; 
the active director, Dr. Pierre Richet, became the ‘adviser’ of the SCLGE for West Africa, with 
his posting moved from Bobo-Dioulasso to Dakar. The position, while maintaining a level of 
oversight over the grouping of territories, was ultimately a diminished role.279  Each territory 
now also had an individual mobile service, called the Services territoriaux d’hygiène mobile et 
de prophylaxie (STHMP).280   Decrees in April and November 1957 similarly established the 
new structure of the service in French Equatorial Africa, going by the less succinct name of the 
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Service de la lutte contre les Grandes Endémies du Groupe de Territoires de l’A.E.F.  Similar to 
French West Africa, the head of the service could provide technical direction, but ultimately the 
authority over mobile teams moved to the individual territorial level.281 
Writing in 1958 about these changes, Dr. Louis-Paul Aujoulat noted that the mobile 
service maintained some structure at the inter-territorial level, he asked, “but for how long, and 
with what means of action?”282  He lamented the application of the loi-cadre in the realm of 
health precisely because of the move away from inter-territorial direction and the potential for 
ongoing and progressive developments in this direction: 
How to actually be assured that the local governments, who are the master 
hand, will bring to vaccination or screening campaigns the material and 
administrative support without which they will not reach the masses. Who 
can guarantee that the territories will always decide to harmonize and 
synchronize their efforts so that the sanitation undertaken by some is not 
thwarted by the inertia of others. What good, for example, to attempt to 
eradicate malaria in Togo if it remains in Dahomey? What good to establish 
a rampart against trypanosomiasis in Upper Volta by the permanent 
reduction of contamination if it at the same time is given free reign in Côte 
d’Ivoire?  It is on this plane that a harmonization, which cannot be imposed 
by law, must be organized and negotiated spontaneously between the 
territories. 
 
Aujoulat’s concerns highlighted the superficiality of politically designated borders in the face of 
disease spread, but he notably contained these concerns within the borders of French empire.  
He used the illustrative example of the Togo/Dahomey (present day Benin) border, for example, 
but not the border between Togo and the newly independent Ghana, or between Dahomey and 
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Nigeria.  Using these two smaller territories, sandwiched between British and former British-
controlled territories, as examples in fact highlighted the political parameters of this vision of 
public health.  One might have asked instead, what good to attempt to eradicate malaria in Togo 
and Dahomey if it still existed in Nigeria?  But Aujoulat took up the concept of disease 
eradication—an inherently global concept—and shrunk it to the scale of French territories. He 
was specifically focused on the changes to public health administration in the face of the loi-
cadre and his public health concerns, while emphasizing ideals of cross-border coordination and 
‘harmonization,’ maintained these ideals as something that had and should continue to happen 
between the French-administered territories of Africa.   
 Meetings between health officials in both French West Africa and French Equatorial 
Africa took up these questions of what inter-territorial coordination would entail in the context 
of this ongoing political change.  In July 1958, Ministers of Health of the territories of West 
Africa met under the title of the Commission Consultative du Service de lutte contre les 
Grandes Endémies in Dakar for four days of meetings.283 The commission met twice yearly 
between 1957-1959.284 The commission grew out of the 1957 legislation creating the Service 
Commun, with the role of meeting to examine the annual programs, campaign plans and budgets 
of the services identified through this same legislation.  The legislation had on one hand created 
the Service Commun de lutte contre les grandes endémies, which included an “executive body 
and organizations for research, study and the training and specialization of technical personnel” 
and on the other hand the territorially-bound mobile health teams. By extension, the budgets of 
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the health teams were also “territorialisés.” 285   Dr. Richet, who served as the head of this 
service, wrote retrospectively in 1965 that these meetings had served to “recreate this 
coordination that sorely lacked and to remedy its temporary disappearance.”286   
 Attendees of these meetings raised not only the question of how they would interact 
among themselves going forward, but also how they would interact with international health 
organizations in light of the new administrative structure.  At the request of the representative 
from Dahomey, a point of discussion for the meeting characterized as a “Study of relations with 
international organizations” became part of the agenda of the meeting.  Minister Eouanignon of 
Dahomey raised the question of what these ongoing changes to health administration meant for 
interaction with organizations such as the specialized United Nations bodies of the World 
Health Organization and UNICEF.  He asked, should the territories interact directly with these 
organizations, or should they pass through the Conseiller à la lutte contre les Grandes 
Endémies, Dr. Pierre Richet.287  This point raised essential questions about the extent of newly 
designated territorial autonomy; how and when would this autonomy be recognized or asserted 
on an international stage in the realm of health?  The decision on that front at this particular 
moment in time helps to clarify the limits of this autonomy, particularly in relation to more 
regional or international approaches to disease.  Dr. Richet responded that the relationships of 
territories with international organizations continued, for the time being to be established by his 
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service (my italics), the Service Commun.288 After some discussion, delegates agreed to 
continue with this structure.  The consequences of coordination were thus seen not just as a 
question of how to balance newfound autonomy with the connections built through empire, but 
also as a question of how the francophone territories of West and Central Africa would be more 
broadly positioned in the realm of international health.   
Notably, the limits of this centralizing coordination role became clear on the question of 
finances.  Later in the same 1958 conference, Eouangnin of Dahomey made clear one of the 
reasons he was interested in how relations with international organizations would work: he was 
hoping that local costs associated with research and experimentation related to a malaria 
program, financed in part by the WHO and UNICEF, would be taken under the umbrella of the 
budget général, rather than that of his territory, with the argument that the results of this 
program would benefit the entire group.  A presiding French official, Risterrucci, replied that 
current legislation would not allow this; the malaria program was based on accords between 
Dahomey and international organizations, and if Dahomey was not able to uphold the part of the 
accords that called for responsibility for some local costs, it had the capacity to end the 
program.  The Service Commun would not be able to step in on its behalf.289  These 
conversations highlighted a new tension and uncertainty over the delineation of responsibility 
and control between territorial African governments and French administration and between the 
individual African territories and the group of them.   
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Ministers of Health in the territories of French Equatorial Africa met as part of a broader 
‘Conférence Interterritoriale’ in Brazzaville in April 1958.290  They discussed plans to 
reorganize the structure of the Service de Lutte contre les Grandes Endémies and present the 
proposed new structure to the Grand Council of AEF.  These discussions responded to 
controversy that arose between November 1957 and March 1958 over the proper breakdown 
between the mobile service budget and authority at the inter-territorial versus individual 
territorial level.  While the Grand Council had in November 1957 voted to decentralize the 
service as much as possible, and doubled down on this position in January 1958, representatives 
from Moyen-Congo (future Congo-Brazzaville) pushed back against this stance and argued for 
maintaining strength (budgetary and otherwise) in the Service Commun at the level of the group 
of territories.  Ministers of Health thus met in April 1958 to discuss this ongoing tension. The 
Minister of Health of Chad, Baba Hassan, presented the proposal for the restructuring and 
focused on ways to strengthen the avenues for centralized planning and coordination between 
the territories.  This included the installation in Brazzaville, at the level of the group of 
territories, of a stronger ‘Direction du Service’ in charge of technical and administrative 
management, scientific research and training of personnel.291 Secondly, they called for the 
creation of a Commission Administrative constituted by the High Commissioner, the Ministers 
of Health of the four territories and the director of the service, entrusted with establishing the 
program of action, the budget of the service and the distribution of funds.  
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In 1959, the structure of the mobile health team system continued to evolve and be 
further entrenched in their individual territorial form, in the wake of the political changes of the 
creation of the French Community, which decisively brought an end to any remnants of the 
federations of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. At this time, the teams became 
fully ‘national’ in their orientation, doing away with the remaining degree of inter-territorial 
coordination that had existed since 1957.  Each African state now had an individual service 
called the Service national des Grandes Endémies (SGE). These services fell under the 
authority of the each national Minister of Public Health, with no institutionalized mechanism to 
coordinate their work.292  
The Ministers of Health of the African states continued to meet, however, along with 
French officials to discuss and create avenues for inter-territorial work.  In October of 1959, a 
meeting in Bangui of officials from the former French Equatorial Africa created a permanent 
‘secretariat’ responsible for collecting epidemiological information from the states and putting 
out an annual report on the group data.  The responsibility for the task initially fell to the public 
health staff of Gabon.293 This format, while preserving the idea of shared epidemiological 
concerns, certainly took a step back from the previous vision of a centralized and coordinated 
response at the federation-level.  Ministers from West Africa similarly met twice in Bobo-
Dioulasso in June and September 1959 to discuss coordination going forward.294  These 
discussions would take on new dimension as all of the involved territories became independent 
nation-states in the year ahead.  Reflecting back on this period, 1957-1959, which he 
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characterized by “the splitting up of the large federal services, their ‘cutting up’ by territory,” 
Dr. Pierre Richet wrote thankfully about the authorities and politicians who hesitated in the face 
of these changes, as “they were more and more persuaded that it was impossible to simply cut 
into eight independent fragments, [in French West Africa] one per Republic, a Service that was 
from 1939-1959 so closely coordinated, and that benefited from such unified direction, doctrine 
and action at the federal level.” 295 
Towards Regional Health Organizations 
 In April 1960, health ministers of former territories of French West Africa met in 
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and formed the inter-state health organization OCCGE, l’Organistion de 
Coordination et de Coopération pour la Lutte contre les Grandes Endémies.  In addition to the 
seven original African member states, France also became a member state and contributed 
substantial funding and personnel to the organization.  Beyond centralized administration 
through un Conseil d’Administration and the office of the permanent Secretary General, the 
organization also would serve as an umbrella for four scientific centers and institutes based in 
Upper Volta (present day Burkina Faso), Mali and Senegal.296   Dr. Pierre Richet became the 
first Secretary General of the Organization, a position that he would hold until 1970, when 
Malian doctor Cheick Sow took over the position.  Even then, Richet retained the title of 
‘honorary director.’297  Writing retrospectively in 1980 on the founding of the organization, 
Richet noted: 
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In recreating, in April 1960 in Abidjan, in the form of 
OCCGE, a federal type of organization capable of pursuing 
the life-saving work of the former SGHMP, they made our 
pithy expression theirs: ‘Germs, viruses, vectors defy the 
geographic boundaries drawn by men and local 
particularisms ; and our slogan: disease and suffering know 
no borders.298  
Richet’s saw the organization not as an entirely new chapter of health work among independent 
African states, but as a move to recreate some of what had existed before, specifically by 
striving to replicate some basis for inter-territorial coordination of the mobile health service that 
had existed through the centralized federation of French West Africa before the implementation 
of the loi-cadre.  Richet also asserted this much-repeated idea that the urgent need for this type 
of coordination grew out of the lack of regard of viruses and diseases to politically delineated 
national borders.  Richet did not speak, in this case, to the question of other borders, those that 
were not shared by former French African states, and he certainly did not touch upon the 
political reasons for which Guinea, a part of the federation of French West Africa, was not 
joining this organization as an independent state.299  OCCGE’s ‘borderlessness,’ asserted on the 
grounds of the fundamental public health concerns of how diseases spread, was at the same time 
deeply implicated in the framework of the French colonial administration of health services as 
well as the particular political geography that grew out of decolonization.  
 While OCCGE quickly formed a West African health block, African public health 
officials from the former French colonies also gathered in larger groupings in coordination with 
French officials.  In May 1961 in Paris, public health officials from Africa met in a “Conference 
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of Ministers of Public Health of French-speaking States.”300  Bernard Chenot, Minister of Public 
Health and Population for the Republic of France, presided over the conference, assisted by 
Jean Foyer, Secretary of State of Relations with the states of the Community and Jacques 
Foccart, Secretary General of the Community.301  Additional delegates from France attended 
along with Ministers of Public health and/or other health officials from Cameroon302, 
Madagascar and all of the former territories of AEF and AOF, now independent states, with the 
exception of Guinea.  Dr. Pierre Richet, in his capacity as the Secretary General of the newly 
created West African health organization, OCCGE, also attended the meeting as an observer.  
 Jean Foyer opened the conference, framing the question of cooperation against disease 
as something that benefited all parties, arguing that, “as long as there existed, in any area of the 
world, an epidemic outbreak, no country, as developed as it might be, will be sheltered from a 
possible aggression.” 303  He asserted the interest of France in providing bi-lateral aid to support 
health programs in the countries, while also pointing out that the preference would be to fund 
preventative medicine or ‘médecine de masse,’ as well as research, given the high costs and 
personnel needs of hospitals.304  Foyer characterized the health collaboration as the “pursuit of a 
work that had been undertaken by France for many years,” but he added that it would not 
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suffice just to maintain or continue this work, “it must broaden and develop.”  He added that 
this would entail, not just a connection between France and each of the states, but a ‘close 
cooperation’ between all of the African states and ‘us.’305 He noted the succession of meetings, 
beginning in 1959, of the former territories of AOF, which began to set up this structure, and 
referred to the former territories of AEF also taking the first steps towards this coordination with 
the secretariat set up in Gabon.  
 After the welcoming statements, Ministers of Health from the African states gave 
presentations on the public health systems in their respective countries.  These comments 
reflected the uneven development and investment in health services across French territories. 
Minister of Health of Cameroon, Pierre Kamdem Ninyim306 began with the overall conclusion 
that Cameroon already had a “sufficiently robust infrastructure” and that their intention was to 
“improve on the existing establishments.”  He reinforced that Cameroon had no intention “of 
abandoning the work undertaken by the Services d’Hygiène et de Prophylaxie, which had 
already proven their worth’ and rather strove to ‘reinforce the preventive role of medicine.”307 
 Not all presentations were as straightforwardly positive about the legacy of French 
medical administration in the former colonies.  The Minister of Public Health of Congo 
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306 Kamdem-Ninyim’s tenure as minister would only last one month more, until June 1961, and his life not much 
longer.  He was executed by firing squad in 1962 after being accused of being involved in the murder of a local 
deputy, as part of the ongoing political violence and unrest in Cameroon in the 1960s.  Mark W. DeLancey and H. 
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Outlaws, State of Violence: Nationalism, Grassfields Tradition, and State Building in Cameroon (Athens, Ohio: 
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Brazzaville, Raymond Mahouata308, discussing the vast need for investment in health 
infrastructure and personnel in his territory argued that “it must be recognized that France left us 
with a meager legacy, regarding medicine.”309 He asserted the critique of this legacy as a way to 
express an urgency for greater investment from France going forward, saying that the technical 
assistance conventions passed between France and Congo gave him hope that “the metropole 
would come to our rescue.”  Mahouata framed this in the gravest of terms, saying that any delay 
in responding to the need for more medical personnel could only be considered “an 
infringement on human life and the future of our nation.” It was up to France, he added “to do 
the impossible and make sacrifices.”310  The Minister of Public Works of Chad, N’Gantar, 
representing the Minister of Health of the country in this meeting, adopted a similar stance.   He 
outlined the serious problem of personnel for this country and asked that France and other states 
of the French Community help with the need for doctors, nurses, mid-wives and ‘assistantes 
sociales.’ He projected this need growing greatly in the decades ahead.  After outlining these 
needs, he adopted a reprimanding tone towards France, observing that “France seems to have 
great difficulty responding to our growing needs…”311  Turning to the interwoven histories of 
France with his country, he added that “each time that France has called our children to serve in 
it ranks for the defense of liberty and of fundamental freedoms, we have always been there.  
                                                          
308 Mahouata was the first Congolese biomedical doctor. Headrick, 428.  
 
309 SHD 2013 ZK 005 224-Fasicule 1, p. 18 
 
310 SHD 2013 ZK 005 224-Fasicule 1, p. 18. 
 
311 M. Dannaud, Directeur des Affaires Culturelles et Techniques for the French delegation replied to this 
complaint later in the meeting, arguing that France would provide needed personnel in the short-term for certain 
countries, such as Chad, but that that the ultimate goal was to support training of lower-level health personnel in-




Today we call on France to help us protect the health of our fellow citizens and in particular that 
of our children.”312 
 The language of coordination and post-independence cooperation used by African 
officials thus operated on different registers based on the specificities of local or colonial 
histories.  France had indeed invested more in the health infrastructure of Cameroon, when 
considered as amount spent per inhabitants, compared to its neighbors of AEF, and in 
comparison to AOF as well.313 Thus, while the Minister of Health of Cameroon called 
essentially for an amplification of the French system of medicine after independence, the 
Minister of Congo worked to evoke a sense of debt owed in the name of an ongoing bilateral 
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314 A French survey of medical personnel and French investment in the former states of AEF and in Cameroon in 
1961 ranked the countries in terms of its needs for ongoing investment in personnel from France.  The report 
ranked Cameroon as the best equipped and projected that Cameroonian doctors (including those currently training 
in France) would be able to replace technical assistance doctors in roughly ten years.  Congo and Gabon came in 
the second ranking in terms of existing doctors and possibilities for replacement.  Central African Republic and 
Chad came last, with estimates that the countries would not have sufficient doctors for at least 25 years and only 
then would a reduction in technical assistance be viable.  SHD ZK 005 406, « Enquête sur la Coopération 
Technique en Matière Sanitaire au Congo, Gabon, Centrafrique, Cameroun et Tchad, » 4 octobre-6 novembre 






Distribution of State Medical Personnel in Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Central African 
Republic and Chad in 1961315 
 








3,200,000 800,000 420,000 1,200,000 2,800,000 
State doctors per 
capita 
1: 38,095 1: 19,512 1: 11,351 1: 41,379 1: 77,777 
Percentage of 
Doctors in Mobile 
Health Service 
17.8% 6% 5.4% 17.8% 11.4% 
French Military 
doctors* 
54 33 25 23 33 
Additional doctors 
funded by France 
2  12 3 2 
Total French-
funded Personnel 
75** 74 57 57 72 
National doctors 
*** 








1343 780 800 521 436 
 
*French personnel funded through the Ministry of Cooperation 
 
**Gardinier gives this number as 80 in 1961.  
 
*** Includes both ‘Docteurs en médecine” and “Médecins Africains” who completed training at Dakar School of Medicine, 
working for the state.  In addition to the 28 in Cameroon, 26 médecins africains were studying in France in 1961.  An additional 
6 Cameroonian doctors worked in private practice. Note that numbers for Cameroon only include personnel in East Cameroon 
and not in the former British West Cameroon.  The mobile health services in each country were run by a French military doctor, 
with the exception of the Republic of Congo, where the service was headed in 1961 by a Congolese médecin africain.  
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 Others, such as Minister of Public Health, Boungougou, of Gabon, called for aid and 
coordination above and beyond the bilateral level, instead seeking technical support at a 
regional level.  In describing the service of mobile teams in his country, he reported that “the 
only difficulty concerns the lack of technical directives.  There is the WHO, of which the 
experts are very useful to us in the evaluation of needs and the elaboration of programs, but for 
the problems that arise daily, Gabon does not have sufficient qualified personnel to issue 
authoritative solutions.”316  Boungougou suggested the creation of an organization primarily 
technical and statistical in nature which could study health problems and propose solutions.  He 
envisioned an organization that would not so much meddle directly in the administration of 
national mobile services, but one led by a qualified expert who could work in connection with 
all of the states, proposing solutions to epidemiological problems facing the countries. He 
concluded that he envisioned the organization “led by a doctor possessing an unquestionable 
moral and professional authority” based in Paris, which would still allow for exclusive 
responsibility for decisions over which plans were executed to the Minister of Health.  He added 
that “the creation of this technical organization will not at all prevent the continued functioning 
of the permanent Secrétariat permanent des grandes endémies created by the four states of 
Equatorial Africa.”  
The Minister from Chad also remarked on the need for coordination between states.  He 
expressed the wish that the Secrétariat d’Afrique Centrale, based in Gabon at the time and 
coordinating the grandes endémies programs would collaborate closely with the West African 
O.C.C.G.E.  He continued, “we wish to see these two organizations spread their field of action 
and become a true high commission of coordination of public health in Africa, a true common 
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market of health” (un vrai marché commun de la santé”).  He placed this vision in the context of 
his ‘disappointment’ over the slowness and inefficiency of the specialized organizations of the 
United Nations in Africa.  He ventured that “if, through a common action, we could get posts 
and regional offices better spread between Francophone-trained staff and Anglophone-trained 
staff, we could more easily shake this inertia.”317 
 In comments he made later that day following the presentations by the Ministers of 
Health, Dr. Aujoulat318 looped back to this comment by the Minister from Gabon to speak to the 
possibilities for inter-state coordination. He referred to OCGGE, the regional health 
organization created by the states of the former AOF, and how it fulfilled this role, but he posed 
the idea: “but perhaps could one go further and envision, in effect, that at a scale still larger and 
at the level of what one of you called ‘Le Marché Commun de la Sante,” referring to the 
comments by the Chadian Minister.   He imagined aloud if it would be possible to form 
‘committees of experts’ who follow the evolution of epidemiological and therapeutic situations, 
and passing through the common organizational structures that did exist, could respond directly 
to requests by states and provide the technical direction required.  Aujoulat pointed to l’Ecole 
du Pharo in France, with its research resources and experts, as a source for this kind of work, 
noting that the committees of experts they could provide would be “comparable to those that 
work at the level of international organizations” but would have the added benefit of working at 
a faster pace, without the delays imposed by international organizations.319  
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 This kind of language about the inefficient, cumbersome nature of international 
organizations would reoccur in the early 1960s among both African and French doctors in their 
discussions about health coordination.  While international organizations—undoubtedly in this 
context referring largely to the World Health Organization—might embody the shared spirit of 
transcending state borders in confronting disease, they were seen as not fully up to the task. In 
this meeting and others, public health officials and doctors working in this shared French-
African space instead focused on what other forms of regional, cross-border cooperation could 
be possible.  At this particular moment in 1961, with the francophone West African health 
coordination newly institutionalized through OCCGE, and ongoing discussions about how the 
Central African states might proceed, there was also a significant imagining going on of what 
bridging these two regional spheres, with the backing of France, might look like.  
 The creation of a concrete system to marry these infrastructures for regional cooperation 
ultimately did not develop quickly, but Central African public health officials did take further 
steps to strengthen their own regional coordination. Ministers of Health of the former territories 
of French Equatorial Africa had met bi-annually in the first years of independence, with 
Cameroon acting as an observer.320  In January 1962, health ministers of these four states and 
Cameroon met in Fort-Lamy to continue discussions about coordination.  They reviewed the 
1960 report from the permanent secretariat in Gabon that had been entrusted with coordinating 
health information between the territories and found its results and capacity to do more quite 
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lacking.  The Ministers of Health decided in this meeting to turn the permanent secretariat into a 
rotating one, with each state taking a turn at bearing the responsibility.321    
In addition to the meeting in Chad, the health ministers also crossed paths in attending a 
meeting of the West African OCCGE, and had discussed informally in this setting the need to 
create the basis, as soon as possible, for a similar organization. They convened again in 1963, 
bringing together public health ministers of the five countries-Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Gabon, Central African Republic and Chad, in Yaoundé, Cameroon in August to pursue the 
creation of their own inter-state health organization, the Organisation de Coordination et de 
Cooperation pour la lutte contre les Grandes Endémies en Afrique Central (OCEAC).322  
Minister of Public Health of Cameroon, Dr. Simon-Pierre Tchoungui, opened this 1963 
conference, emphasizing the purpose of the conference as being to discuss modes of 
cooperation in the fight against “les endémo-épidemies.”   Tchoungui situated the meeting in the 
context of the “vast movement of grouping (regroupement) and cooperation that is taking place 
in Africa,” but underlined the particular urgency of cooperation in the realm of public health in 
which, ‘all isolated effort is irreparably doomed to failure.” Tchoungui referred to the prior 
creation of a rotating secretariat between the states, meant to collect and diffuse health 
information, but characterized this arrangement as a ‘first step,’ and ‘only a beginning.”  “What 
we need is a stable organization, perfectly structured and equipped, capable of providing the 
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exchange of information, technicians to study methods of action, harmonization, legislation and 
even the organization of common campaigns..” 323   
 Reflecting on the full scope of health coordination that had arisen between French-
speaking African states in the previous three years, he posed the hypothetical question or 
objection to the order of the current meeting: why wouldn’t the Central African states simply 
join the already established West African Organization of OCCGE with its headquarters in 
Bobo-Dioulasso, Upper Volta?  Dr. Tchoungui outlined the ‘geographic considerations’ that 
made this union unreasonable, among them that the Central African states were a far distance 
from the OCCGE headquarters and they didn’t share common borders with the other member 
states of the organization, meaning that even “if the problems are similar, it seems all the same 
difficult to resolve them through a concerted effort.”  He contrasted these circumstances with 
the proposed member states of OCEAC: “we have the same health problems and we adhere to 
the same customs union.”324   
 In addition to these observations about the relationship between the West and Central 
African states, however, Dr. Tchoungui also made an important comparison with another form 
of regional health cooperation in Africa: the Regional Office for Africa of the World Health 
Organization. He pointed out the example of the office, which was located in Brazzaville, 
therefore within OCEAC territory, and characterized it by its “enormous administrative 
machine.” He asked whether it was thought necessary by the group to create another 
organization “as cumbersome.”  He saw this possibility if the five states of Central Africa were 
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to join the West Africa OCCGE, warning that in this scenario the existing organization risked 
becoming “hypertrophic.”325  Instead, he spoke for the group saying “what we desire is a simple 
organization, inexpensive but effective and I think that the example of OCCGE of West Africa 
can serve for us as a model.”  
 Dr. Tchoungui also drew justification for the creation of a regional health organization 
from the scientific research resources in the group of states including: the Pasteur Institute of 
Brazzaville, the Tropical Veterinary Institute in Fort-Lamy, Chad, and the Medical Research 
Institutes of Cameroon including the Pasteur Institute, the Center for research on Helminthiasis 
and Onchocerciasis in Kumba, the nutrition branch of I.R.C.A.M326, and the entomology branch 
of the National Malaria Eradication Service.327  Cameroon was also in early stages of planning 
for the creation of a medical school at the Federal University of Cameroon and for an Institute 
of Public Health, which Dr. Tchoungui envisioned would help train personnel specialized in the 
fields of preventative and rural medicine.   
 The public health officials in the meeting also reflected on the need to strengthen the 
existing efforts they had made towards coordination in the form of the rotating secretariat.  Dr. 
Ziegler of the Chad Delegation reported, in fact, that there was little to report.  The results were 
‘meager, if not nonexistent’, and ‘this system, without a leader, with a guiding idea’ was totally 
inadequate for a coordinated approach to disease control.328 
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 In the further discussion of creating a more permanent regional health organization, Dr. 
Tchoungui of Cameroon again took the floor and proceeded to place the work of the conference 
within a historical narrative: that of the creation of the mobile medical system under Dr. Eugène  
Jamot.  He gave an origin tale of Jamot’s work in combatting sleeping sickness in the 1920s in 
Cameroon and the subsequent creation in 1944 of the multi-faceted mobile health teams in 
French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, and Cameroon.  Throughout the speech, 
Tchoungui peppered his language with asides, of “as you all know,” recognizing that the history 
was well-known by the conference attendees.  It was a historical narrative resurrected for 
performance value, more so than information.329 He traced a similar story of that produced at 
earlier dates about the significance of the loi-cadre, as a change that disrupted the centralized 
organization of the teams across territories.  And with independence, although ‘in theory,’ the 
mobile medicine work continued, that political and health authorities of the independent states 
quickly realized that coordination between countries had been lost and was necessary.330 
Tchoungui reviewed the efforts of the states of former AEF plus Cameroon to create first a 
rotating, and then permanent, secretariat to coordinate between the states, arguing that the time 
had come to create a specialized organization with personnel fully focused on the task.   
 The delegation to the meeting from Cameroon had prepared proposed regulations and 
statutes for the new organization, based on the structure of the West African OCCGE, and 
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brought them to the group to be discussed piece by piece.  The meeting appears somewhat pre-
determined in this regard, and the Cameroonian delegation played a defining role in shaping 
how this conversation about the parameters of the organization would proceed.  The President 
and Secretary General of the West African OCCGE had consulted directly with health officials 
in Cameroon about the structuring of their organization before the meeting of the Central 
African health ministers.331 The composition of the Cameroonian delegation is thus worth 
noting. Of the four official delegates representing the country, two were Cameroonian and two 
were French.  The Cameroonians were Dr. Tchoungui, the Minister of Public Health and Dr. 
Jean-Claude Happi, Director of Public Health.  The French were Dr. Aretas, ‘Technical 
Advisor’ to the Minister of Public Health, based in Yaoundé and Dr. Bereni, the Director of the 
mobile health service in Cameroon.332 Dr. Aretas, the French advisor to the Ministry of Public 
Health was the one who first introduced the proposals to the group, highlighting the kinds of 
dynamics that were so very formative to the creation of OCEAC and its West African 
counterpart: a French doctor, in his capacity as part of the ‘Cameroonian Delegation’ spoke to a 
meeting of Central African Ministers of Health about proposals to create a new regional health 
organization among them.   
 The administration of the organization would involve the Administrative Council 
composed of the Ministers of Health of the member states, with a president elected by the 
council for a term of one year.  The ‘Secrétariat Général’ would be based in Yaoundé and 
consist of a Secretary General elected by the Administrative Council with a technical deputy, an 
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administrative deputy, and junior operational personnel. The Secretary General would play a 
key role in ‘the execution of decisions and instructions of the Council of Administration,’ and 
Aretas pointed to Dr. Pierre Richet’s role in leading the West Africa OCCGE, calling him the 
‘kingpin’ of that organization.  The new Central African organization would also include 
medical research centers and eventually training centers.333  The organization did state within its 
statutes that it would be open to any other states of Central Africa that wished to join, on the 
condition of unanimity by all member states.334  The meeting also affirmed that OCEAC would 
have close and permanent connections to West African OCCGE, as well as with international 
organizations dealing with health such as the WHO and UNICEF.335  
The funding for the organization would derive from contributions from member states, 
the proportion of which would be determined annually by the Administrative Council, as well as 
from international and bilateral assistance.  Dr. Aretas talked in this meeting about how the 
delegates hoped France would become a member state, as it was of the West Africa OCCGE, 
and contribute financially to a similar degree.336  France ultimately declined membership in the 
Central African organization, but agreed to make substantial contributions towards its 
functioning, particularly in the realm of personnel.337   
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Debate then took place in this meeting as to exact break down of member state budget 
contributions: a preliminary proposal of breakdown according to population met opposition, 
particularly from the Chadian delegation, which insisted that the actual health budgets of each 
state be taken into account. Others in turn opposed this idea, arguing that the overall budget of 
each state was more important in representing its economic situation.   By any calculation, 
Cameroon would be paying the lion’s share of the budget due to its population and resources.338  
Ultimately, the group settled on a distribution based on the average of the percentage 
contributions based on population and budget (notably the same formula followed by West 
African OCCGE), which resulted in the following breakdown: Cameroon: 42.55%, Chad 20.77 
%, Central African Republic 13.07 %, Gabon 12.9 %, Gabon 10.71 %.339   
The meeting defined the precise goals of the organization: 1) “to establish and 
coordinate all programs of action aimed at the control and eradication of the major endemic and 
epidemic diseases (grandes endémo-épidémies) striking the territory of the member states: 
trypanosomiasis, leprosy, treponematosis, malaria, onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis, trachoma, 
tuberculosis, etc…2) To pursue all studies, research, prospections or investigations necessary to 
successfully fight against these endemic and epidemic diseases.”340 The Cameroonian 
delegation proposed to take on the charge of beginning to establish the organization until the 
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member heads of state formally ratified its creation.  Dr. Tchoungui of Cameroon closed the 
conference with the words: “Vive les Etats d’Afrique Centrale, Vive l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C.”341 
OCEAC subsequently held its first official meeting of health ministers in July 1965 in 
Yaoundé, in which the members settled the leadership of the organization.  Notably, John Ngu 
Foncha, hailing from the Anglophone West Cameroon, and Vice President of the Federal 
Republic of Cameroon, presided over the meeting.342  The health ministers elected Dr. Jean-
Claude Happi, now Commissioner General of Public Health for Cameroon, as President of the 
organization for the established one year term.  The technical leadership of the organization 
were French military doctors.  René Labususquière343 became the Secretary General.  Dr. Jean 
Dutertre was named his second in command.344  
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Comments in the first OCEAC technical conference in 1965 highlighted the politically 
delicate balance this leadership arrangement presented.  In his opening remarks, Dr. Happi 
spoke about the need to break down the divisions of borders and concluded, “we wish to live 
independently, we do not want to live in isolation.” 345   Secretary-General Labusquière made 
sure in this meeting to emphasize that OCEAC was not attempting to resurrect the former 
colonial mobile health service and did not seek to intervene directly in the affairs of the member 
states, but to always focus on improving the national mobile health services.346 The leadership 
of OCEAC forged a language that emphasized the sovereignty of the African states and health 
coordination as part of this sovereignty, while also institutionalizing a clear place for French 
medical leadership.   
The joint Cameroonian and French leadership of OCEAC at its inception thus embodied 
many of the political, social and economic relationships between France and its former African 
colonies after independence.  OCEAC exemplified these ties of ‘coopération’ between 
individual African states and France, while showing how this context also led to the forging of 
connections between African states.  Situating this institution only on this French-African axis 
is to bypass the important ways in which it also brought newly independent African states 
together and promoted its region as a scale of public health intervention—a scale for 
coordinating health campaigns, for collecting epidemiological data and certainly for gathering 
funding.  French doctors paradoxically remained central in the forging of these ties, but the 
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approaches and agendas of the African leaders involved should not be disregarded. The impetus 
for Cameroon to play such a large role in OCEAC’s creation and functioning provides a 
significant and illustrative example.  
Cameroon as Headquarters  
Attendees of the conference in 1963 to create OCEAC chose, with reported unanimity, 
the capital city of Cameroon, Yaoundé, as the headquarters of the organization, based on the 
idea that Cameroon was the sole member state to share borders with the four other members, 
which would facilitate communication.347  This decision, represented as a simple, logical and 
straightforward one in the institutional historical record of the organization flattens the 
complexity of the significance of Cameroon’s participation, and indeed its centrality, to the new 
regional health organization. In the discussion of the progression of coordination in the region in 
the final years of colonial administration, a slippage occurs between discussions of coordination 
between the four former territories of French Equatorial Africa in the late 1950s, to the 
inclusion of Cameroon in this grouping.  This slippage obscured both the historical distinctness 
of Cameroon’s health administrative structure, in particular the independence of its mobile 
health structure, throughout the period of French administration. As shown, public health 
officials in Cameroon in the 1950s cited the territory’s distinct medical administration as a 
positive feature that allowed for greater efficiency.  This difference from the colonial period 
should be recognized while not overstated: the health administrations of Cameroon and French 
Equatorial Africa still fell under the same umbrella of the French colonial health service.  
Similarly, the circuits traveled by French colonial administrators, and particularly medical 
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personnel, were not hindered by this difference of status; the famous Dr. Jamot’s work on 
sleeping sickness in Cameroon became a venerated and replicated model throughout the French 
empire in Africa. French doctors commonly worked throughout the various African territories 
over the course of their careers.  Some African medical officials had similarly traveled cross-
territorial paths of training and work, through training at the Dakar Medical School or in France.  
The shared medical history between French Cameroon and its neighbors mattered greatly for the 
creation of OCEAC.  At the same time, Cameroon’s distinct administrative status significantly 
shaped the broader politics of decolonization and independence in the territory and thus also 
drove it’s involvement in OCEAC in ways not fully revealed in the organization’s self-
narrative.   
The difference of status created by the Mandate and Trusteeship system became a 
defining feature of Cameroonian politics both locally and internationally in the 1950s; the anti-
colonial political party, the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), leveraged this status 
and petitioned the United Nations as part of their call for immediate independence from France, 
also taking up an armed struggle within the territory.348  The French administration outlawed 
and violently fought against this movement, and helped to facilitate the ascension of power to 
political leaders in Cameroon amenable to an ongoing relationship with France.  The early 
1960s were, moreover, a time of continued conflict as the independent government worked, 
with significant support from the French military, to violently repress the ongoing armed 
opposition.349 The independent state of Cameroon had also charted a different course than its 
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neighbors in terms of the cementing of state political borders and national identity by the time 
of the creation of OCEAC. In 1963, when the health organization was founded, the Federal 
Republic of Cameroon had for two years been an officially bilingual English-French state, 
growing out of the 1961 referendum that led to the joining of the southern territory of the British 
Cameroons with the former French Cameroon.350 The history of this distinct status during 
colonial administration and the circumstances of the Federal Republic created a complex set of 
factors surrounding the international relations of the independent state.  
Medical officials crafted their own particular discourse about the necessity and purpose 
of their coordination through OCEAC, but these choices within the medical field largely 
adhered to the bottom-line international affairs agendas and regional policy of first 
Cameroonian President Ahidjo, while also exhibiting some important differences.  Ahidjo’s 
policy towards other African states in the early 1960s encompassed two paradoxical 
characteristics: first, an assertion of Cameroon’s distinctness from other formerly French-
administered territories and second, a practical turn towards diplomatic work with former 
French territories.  On one hand, Ahidjo had actively avoided membership in the French 
Community and asserted Cameroon’s distinct status from those African territories that were 
members.351 While this stance grew from Cameroon’s history as a United Nations Trusteeship, 
which meant that it had not participated in the 1958 referendum giving French colonies the 
choice to join the Community352, it also became re-enforced in the face of the ongoing political 
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opposition of the UPC353, and as French Cameroon joined with the southern British Cameroon 
to form the Federal Republic.  As part of the blueprint for unification of the territories, leaders 
had pledged in 1960 to represent the commitment of the new state to bilingualism by foregoing 
membership in either the French Community or the British Commonwealth.354  That said, the 
trajectory of independence and the creation of the Federal Republic, with French Cameroon first 
becoming independent in 1960 and then joining with the southern British Cameroon territory in 
1961, facilitated the initial diplomatic stances that Ahidjo took before unification as remaining 
the policy afterwards.355  In 1960, Ahidjo had indeed focused diplomacy on Francophone 
African states, contributing, for example, to the creation of the Union Africaine et Malagache 
(UAM) in 1960.356  Even as he moved forward with coordination through select French-African 
affiliations, however, Ahidjo maintained what historian Mélanie Torrent has characterized as “a 
distinct caution” vis-à-vis these bodies.357   
Ahidjo appeared slightly less weary of Francophone association on a smaller regional 
scale. In 1960 he made clear his position that working closely with the states of former French 
Equatorial Africa might be a path towards regional unity, while he struck a less enthusiastic 
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note about the more grand discourses of the time about a continental African unity.358  In 1961 
Cameroon joined the Equatorial Customs Union, first created by the former territories of French 
Equatorial Africa in 1959.359  Chad and the Central African Republic would benefit from this 
affiliation through the avenue to coastal access through Cameroon, as would all of the states due 
to Cameroon’s “relative demographic, economic and military power.’360  After many decades of 
Cameroonians insisting on their distinctness from AEF due to their divergent colonial history, 
the French Ambassador to Cameroon in 1963 characterized this turn by Cameroon towards the 
former states of AEF as a strategic economic one.361  This cooperation with the former AEF 
states remained limited to certain spheres, however, with Ahidjo rejecting in 1961 the idea of 
joining a military Defense Council formed by the AEF states.362  Ahidjo moreover displayed an 
aversion to working with inter-state organizations headquartered in Brazzaville, which seemed 
to indicate a folding of Cameroon into a former model of AEF governance.363   Ahidjo thus 
pursued this scale of regional cooperation in a Francophone framework through certain avenues, 
while remaining active yet more reserved towards the creation of larger groupings.   
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The Cameroonian doctors involved in OCEAC’s creation and early work, particularly 
Dr. Simon Pierre Tchoungui and Dr. Jean-Claude Happi, championed this vision of regionalism 
through the lens of health work while also asserting and representing Cameroon’s centrality to 
it.  Unlike Ahidjo, the Cameroonian leaders of OCEAC did not at all emphasize Cameroon’s 
distinctness in either a historical or contemporary sense in the context of the organization.  On 
the contrary, they rather advanced the idea that what mattered most in the relationship between 
the member states were the historical connections of the French colonial health service, of the 
mobile health teams and of the great ‘founding father,’ Jamot.364 Moreover, while in the 1950s 
French medical officials had expressed such concern for the integrity of the mobile health 
service across the colonial federations, now Cameroonian doctors, their counterparts in the four 
other member states of OCEAC, and French doctors together drew on this prior geographic 
vision while also expanding it to include Cameroon.  The material benefit of Cameroon’s place 
in OCEAC to the other states is clear from the breakdown of the each state’s contribution to the 
organization’s budget.  For Cameroon, the organization solidified its position as a powerful 
center of public health work in the region.   
The Cameroonian leaders of OCEAC chose to present Cameroon in this grouping 
through the emphasis on this shared past, rather than through the additional complexity of a 
legacy of British colonial administration within the country.  Orienting internationally towards 
Francophone medical affiliations bolstered the force of the mobile health teams and other 
aspects of the French colonial medical system as the blueprint for the public health system of 
the independent Federal Republic. Through their national and regional leadership roles, these 
Cameroonian doctors advanced the simultaneous processes of making Cameroon’s entire 
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national public health administration run on the French model, supporting contemporary roles 
for French doctors in health institutions, and crafting an international relations of health focused 
on francophone African states.  The viability of Cameroon’s position as OCEAC’s headquarters 
thus depended both on the external politics of public health affiliation with other Francophone 
African states and on an internal state process of centralization of the national medical 
administration around the French model, which included the extension of mobile health teams 
and French medical personnel to Anglophone West Cameroon (discussed in Chapter 3).  
Tchoungui and Happi’s advancement of OCEAC thus promoted the definition of the public 
health administration along the French model in independent Cameroon through its inclusion in 
the region.   
OCEAC as a Health Region 
 In addition to a discourse that emphasized Cameroon’s shared colonial medical history 
with the former AEF, however, African health ministers also advanced a view of the 
organization’s member states as naturally tied together through both geography and through 
post-independence political imperatives.  In a 1968 ministerial conference of the organization, 
for example, Dr. Happi argued that the goal of health coordination between the states was 
facilitated by this geographic unity:  
And this was somewhat facilitated because our five member states present 
the same pathology due to a similar geography, the fact that the south of 
three of our states is a forest region whereas the north of these states, and 
Chad, are savannah and even sahelian regions.  It’s certain that this 
geographic unity supports a pathological unity, as none of our states are 
separated from his neighbor by borders naturally difficult to cross, but by 
administrative borders, they have never mounted a barrier to microbes, 
viruses, parasites, insects who have spread across our countries a pathology 
particularly rich and particularly deadly. The goal of OCEAC has 
principally been to knock down these virtual borders, to disregard political 
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divergences that are often passing, to come to a true and effective fight 
against the causes of illness and their vectors. 365 
 
In this instance, Happi cast OCEAC’s unity not through terms of medical infrastructure but 
through landscape, and he essentially argued that all political arrangements were but a fleeting 
imposition on a fundamental ecological truth.  This statement was not inaccurate as much as it 
was selective, by defining the parameters of this ecology purely through the boundaries of 
OCEAC states.  As will be further explained in Chapter 4, the Cameroonian border with Nigeria 
presented one of the most significant in terms of the control of disease across political borders.   
By carving themselves out as a group both through positive affirmation of their own internal 
cooperation, OCEAC thus designated space beyond their borders as a source of possible disease 
threat.  Nigeria fell outside of this grouping and was thus identified by public health officials as 
a potential source for ‘imported’ diseases.   
 At the same time, Health Ministers also cast OCEAC as a part of a future-looking 
regional integration, as a unity that was being actively built.  Dr. Jacques Bouiti of Congo, for 
example, characterized Central Africa as:  
…an entity, a region that is building itself slowly but surely.  OCEAC is 
living proof of this human solidarity, an effective and active 
solidarity…Political authorities of the five sister republics have long 
grasped this mission, thus realizing that their role is not only to reconcile 
and protect the inviolable rights of their citizens, but also to share with the 
other states of Central Africa their projects, their resources, to achieve 
objectives that would otherwise be inaccessible to them. 366 
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From a political standpoint, the ministers of OCEAC also argued that without the organization, 
they would not be able achieve this level of coordination and would also not be able to obtain 
comparable levels of external assistance.367  Health officials connected to OCEAC thus justified 
its existence and argued for its coherence through a variety of different framings.  In all of their 
celebrations of OCEAC’s work, however, they constructed the idea that the member states’ 
collaboration constituted something at once inevitable and of great political importance.  And it 
was through all of these historical, ecological and political arguments that OCEAC officials 
asserted the idea of their grouping as an entity that both reflected and advanced the fundamental 
concerns of public health.  
OCEAC at work 
In the late 1960s, the work of OCEAC would develop through the headquarters of the 
Secretary General in Yaoundé, as well as through yearly ministerial and technical conferences.  
The organization took on a variety of tasks falling under the general rubrics of coordination, 
research and training.  This work included the collection and analysis of statistics on 
communicable diseases and vaccination rates across the states.  It provided technical direction 
on the launching and coordination of vaccination campaigns and oversaw the provision of 
common medical materials to the states.  In the realm of research, OCEAC collaborated with 
other institutions such as the Pasteur Institute in Cameroon and the American Centers for 
Disease Control and conducted some small scale research on vaccination associations.  In the 
realm of education, OCEAC developed a training program in Yaoundé for health personnel 
working with the mobile health teams. Finally, OCEAC accepted and coordinated regional-level 
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international aid to the member states and sent representatives to international health 
conferences.368  This was one of the key ways that OCEAC preserved a role for French doctors 
as brokers of coordination between African states and with international health bodies.  René 
Labusquière and his French deputy, for example, often traveled to international health 
conferences in their capacity as the leadership of OCEAC, thus creating the paradox of having a 
French man representing an inter-state organization of independent African countries.369  
OCEAC meetings also themselves became a forum of discussion with international 
health organizations. When OCEAC held its first technical conference in December of 1965, 
representatives from the American Centers for Disease Control and the World Health 
Organization attended to discuss the implementation of a regional program for smallpox 
eradication, as part of the larger program for global eradication of the disease.  OCEAC would 
play a defining role in the framing and local implementation of this program, thus cementing its 
position as a regional broker of international health programs (see Chapter 4).  
By investing in OCEAC, African health officials and French military doctors 
transformed a regional conception of the governance of colonial medicine into a postcolonial 
health region of significance for international health. They made a statement about what kinds 
of health infrastructure were internally generated, already on the ground, and shared between 
certain independent African countries.  OCEAC at the same time presented itself as being in 
line with trends towards more geographically expansive, cross-border visions of public health, 
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represented by the WHO and the focus on disease eradication at this time.  Creators of the 
organization claimed that their ‘borderless’ work grew naturally and internally from the history 
of mobile health teams and the political affiliations of African states, rather than externally from 
the agendas of international health organizations. 
Through both its creation and its work in the 1960s, OCEAC thus staked an important 
claim on the functioning of international health coordination in Cameroon and other states.  
While defining itself explicitly against the regional model for Africa proposed by the World 
Health Organization, OCEAC officials asserted that the most efficient avenue to public health 
coordination beyond the national scale would be through the smaller scale of the region it 
encompassed.  Rooted in a purportedly successful and coherent medical past while claiming a 
role in a progressive, international, public health future, OCEAC created its region as a resource 
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Chapter 3: Bilingual medicine in the Franco-African state  
 In 1965, groups of Cameroonians began marching to the office of the Director of 
Medical Services in the coastal city of Victoria (now Limbe)370 to protest conditions of the 
medical services across the state of West Cameroon and in the city hospital.  Four years after 
the unification of part of the former British Cameroons and the former French Cameroon into a 
Federal Republic, Cameroonians in the anglophone federated state particularly emphasized their 
dismay over the work of French doctors sent to the region and their inability to communicate 
with the population.  On October 20th a delegation of chiefs and elders led by a member of the 
West Cameroon House of Assembly, R.N. Namme, marched to the Director’s office and 
presented a signed petition.  They wrote, “We the chiefs and people of Victoria have come to 
you as the Commissioner General of Health’s delegate to protest over the deteriorating services 
in the General Hospital of Victoria.  We say deteriorating because frankly speaking patients had 
better Medical attention in the pre-independence years.” Their list of grievances was long and 
included shortages of drugs and the discontinuation of hospital meals for “paupers and patients 
with infectious diseases.”  They also highlighted one problem that reflected a very particular 
challenge of medicine in independent Cameroon:    
We must emphasize that 99% of the people in Victoria speak only English 
and therefore any doctor to be posted to Victoria must be able to speak and 
consult in English, be he a French Aid or World Health Organization 
Doctor….We strongly protest against the present trend of affairs and this 
delegation is a spontaneous reaction of how bitter we feel.  We know that 
our post independent government is our own government. Yet if it is our 
own government we have a right to advice and to register our concern when 
a bungle of the Medical Services is brewing.  We expect a better service 
than before and not to be given serpants (sic) when we require bread.  For 
                                                          
370 The city name was changed to Limbe, its current name, in 1982.  Mark W. DeLancey and H. Mbella Mokeba. 
Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon, 2nd edition (Metuchen, NJ & London: The Scarecrow Press, 
Inc, 1990), 122.  
163 
 
your immediate attention, we require more doctors should be English 
speaking and more drugs and equipment.371  
These tensions and the demands by people living in Victoria illustrate a new dimension of the 
politics of public health and medicine that developed in 1960s Cameroon in the wake of the 
creation of an officially bilingual federal republic, constituted by the francophone state of East 
Cameroon and the anglophone state of West Cameroon.  Histories of health and medicine in 
Cameroon have given little attention to the implications of this political arrangement, and works 
on state biomedicine have instead largely examined the trajectory of Cameroonian medical 
history in light of the relationship to France.372 We see a similar trend in the place accorded to 
Cameroon in histories of international health, such as institutional histories of the global 
smallpox eradication program of the 1960s, with Cameroon being described exclusively as a 
former French colony and part of the bloc of francophone African states.373  Chapters 2 and 4 of 
this dissertation delve into closer analysis of the political and operational significance of these 
characterizations, but this chapter looks more closely at internal dynamics of Cameroonian 
medical services in relation to its unique regional circumstance of bringing together a former 
French and former British territory into an independent African state.  
 The protests over French doctors working in West Cameroon who could not 
communicate with their patients highlights a broader tension over the parameters of a 
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Cameroonian public purportedly served by national public health and medical services after 
independence.  The drive from the Ministry of Health in Yaoundé to merely extend the medical 
structures and personnel of francophone East Cameroon to West Cameroon proved problematic 
and became a source of debate over the course of the 1960s.  Moreover, France’s efforts to 
extend its influence from East to West Cameroon via medicine raised questions about the role of 
the former colonial power across the Federal Republic.  
 The specific push by East Cameroonian and French health officials to extend the mobile 
health system to West Cameroon embodied these tensions and represented a central aspect of 
debate about public health administration in the new nation.  As discussed in the previous 
chapters, the mobile health service, created by French military doctors during colonial 
administration, remained the absolute hallmark of French colonial medicine for generations of 
French doctors and francophone Cameroonian medical personnel.  After independence, French 
military doctors continued to dominate the administration of the mobile health service in 
Cameroon through the framework of ‘technical assistance’ provided by the former colonial 
power.  This arrangement had far-reaching implications, as East Cameroonian health officials 
asserted the mobile teams as foundational to independent Cameroon’s politics of national, 
regional, and international health work. As discussed in chapter 2, Cameroon became the 
headquarters for a regional health organization that championed the mobile health team model 
as the basis for public health coordination between neighboring African states that had been 
French colonies.374  The focus on sustaining and growing mobile health teams after 
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independence thereby greatly shaped how Cameroon engaged with other African states and 
subsequently how it engaged with international organizations on health programs during the 
formative decade of the 1960s.   
  The push from the federal Ministry of Health to extend the mobile health team system 
to West Cameroon was therefore emblematic of developments within Cameroon that ultimately 
shaped the country’s external dealings on public health.  The plans to extend the teams 
represented the centralization of Cameroonian health policy around Yaoundé, the dominance of 
French-created institutions, and the privileging of ongoing ties to France in the field of 
medicine. But rather than frame these developments exclusively through the lens of the French-
Cameroonian relationship, this chapter grounds their negotiation in the vantage point of medical 
administration in West Cameroon and thus highlights the formation of a set of concerns about 
medicine distinctly rooted in the politics of post-colonial Cameroon.   This chapter places the 
extension of the mobile health teams in the context of broader debates about the future of 
medical administration in the country.   
 The debates among Cameroonians surrounding the integration of medical infrastructures 
in the two federated states, growing from two different colonial legacies, merits examination for 
at least three reasons.  First, Cameroonian doctors, as well as other citizens, created a discourse 
highlighting the differences of medical practice and infrastructure along the fault lines of these 
colonial legacies to make arguments about what needed to be done in the field of public health 
planning for the independent state.  Looking specifically at which elements of the two systems 
Cameroonians defended and critiqued provides a window into the development of health policy 
and medical culture in the 1960s within Cameroon, while also pointing to dynamics that 
developed surrounding medical coordination more broadly between former British and French 
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colonies in West and Central Africa.  Second, while the ongoing presence of French doctors in 
francophone East Cameroon exemplified the close ties maintained between France and former 
African colonies after independence, the post-independence presence of French doctors in 
anglophone Cameroon raised entirely different questions about the meaning and the limits of 
these ties for the new bilingual nation.  The work of the French doctors in West Cameroon 
points to rather ambiguous parameters of national versus international public health in 1960s 
Cameroon.  Finally, these debates over what the federal system meant in the context of 
medicine merit attention because Cameroonian public health officials so firmly entrenched the 
country in francophone medical networks in the 1960s, presenting the state on these terms in the 
context of international health organizations and campaigns.  A closer look at the dynamics 
between West and East Cameroon surrounding public health administration complicate the idea 
of a history of cooperative continuation of French-Cameroonian medical networks after 
independence. Examining the questions Cameroonians raised in the 1960s about the nature of 
medical policy in the new nation therefore ultimately highlights an active negotiation over what 
constituted external versus internal influence, insight, and decision-making power over the 
administration of public health and medicine in the wake of decolonization.   
Public Health and the Federal System 
 The creation and then dissolution in 1972 of the Cameroonian federal system remains a 
politically charged and debated topic in the country to this day, related in large part to 
continuing political tensions over the anglophone/francophone divide in the country.  At the 
height of these tensions, anglophone Cameroonians have at times called for secession and the 
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formation of their own country.375  The complexity of this much longer history, while beyond 
the scope of this study, serves as essential context.376  The broader question of relationships of 
national administration, institutions, and cultures across the two areas is a pertinent 
contemporary as well as historical topic, but this chapter will focus on the preliminary 
discussions about the integration of public health and medical services in the 1960s.    
 The Federal Republic of Cameroon came into being on October 1, 1961 and comprised 
the territorial boundaries of Cameroon that are still in existence today.  The independent country 
grew out of what was formerly French Cameroon, a United Nations Trusteeship under French 
administration until 1960, and the former British Southern Cameroons, also a former United 
Nations Trusteeship until 1961.377  The entirety of the British Cameroons United Nations 
Trusteeship included a Northern and a Southern Territory on the western border of French 
Cameroon, and the British essentially administered the territories as part of Nigeria.  In a 
February 1961 UN-run plebiscite, people living in each of the British Cameroons voted 
separately on whether to become independent by joining with either Nigeria or the newly 
                                                          
375 The federal republic was created in 1961 and dissolved to create the United Republic of Cameroon following a 
referendum in 1972. On the politics of this divide see: Verkijika G. Fanso, “Anglophone and Francophone 
Nationalisms in Cameroon,” Round Table 350 (April 1999): 281-296.  Piet Konings and Francis B. Nyamnjoh. 
“The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon,” The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 35 No. 2 (June 1997): 207. 
Konings and Nyamnjoh date a hardening of positions and articulation of the existence of an ‘anglophone problem’ 
in Cameroon to the early 1990s, a period of political liberalization, and the contested presidential elections of 1992.  
 
376 Notably, the contemporary political context of this issue clearly informed comments made in some of the oral 
history interviews I conducted in Cameroon.  For example, one person I spoke with in Cameroon insisted that as 
soon as the Federal Republic was created, there was no sense of divide between the British and French medical 
systems in Cameroon.  My archival research and other interviews suggest otherwise.  Moreover, this interviewee 
had a large picture of Cameroonian President Paul Biya hanging in the living room, suggesting support for the 
ruling political party which has sought to downplay the volatile “anglophone problem.” 
 
377 The entire territory was first a German protectorate from 1884 to 1916, known as Kamerun, the German 
spelling.  The territory was divided after WWI and made into League of Nations Mandates under British and 
French administration.  With the end of the League of Nations and of WWII, the Cameroons became ‘Trust 
territories’ of the United Nations, still under British and French administration.   
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independent République du Cameroun to the east.378  The British Northern Cameroons voted to 
become part of Nigeria and the Southern Cameroons voted to join with the République du 
Cameroun.  Delegates from the two territories of the new Cameroon met at the Foumban 
conference of July 1961 to create a constitution and framework for the state.  The resulting 
system for the Federal Republic of Cameroon created two states-West Cameroon, the former 
British Southern Cameroons, and East Cameroon, the former French territory.  Cameroonians 
established the Federal Republic as officially bilingual, with both French and English as official 
languages.  At the time of the creation of the federation, the population of West Cameroon 
constituted about twenty percent of the total population of Cameroon and the state territory 
comprised about nine percent of the total national territory.379 Each state had its own 
government with a Prime Minister, and the federal administrative structure was headed by a 
President and Vice-President.  The delineation of federal and state responsibilities evolved over 
the course of the 1960s, but the entire system came to an end in 1972 with the dismantlement of 
the federal system and the creation of a unitary state.  The politics of the Federal Republic were 
thus both fleeting and enduring in that the political and administrative structures of the 1960s 
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 With the creation of the federal system in 1961, questions about the coordination of a 
host of administrative issues between the states, such as currencies, trade, and transportation, 
arose quickly.380  Cameroonian political elites created a system that preserved some separate 
governmental representation and administrative functions for the East and West states while 
centralizing certain aspects, such as foreign affairs, finance and justice, at the federal level.381 
Both contemporaries and retrospective observers have often argued that the dominance of East 
Cameroon over that of the Western state was inevitable, due both to the imbalance of geography 
and population between the two territories as well as the terms of the constitution adopted in 
1961.382  Delegates from West Cameroon sought a loosely associated federation, while the 
proposals advanced by the first president, Ahmadou Ahidjo, and other delegates from East 
Cameroon ultimately prevailed in the creation of a constitution allowing for increasing 
centralization of administration at the federal level and a strong presidency.383 From 1961 to the 
end of the federation in 1972, President Ahidjo consolidated his own power through the creation 
of a singular national political party in 1966 and the increasing concentration of the 
administrative functions of the state through federal avenues.384  
                                                          
380 Victor LeVine, The Cameroon Federal Republic (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971), 34-35. 
 
381 Mélanie Torrent. Diplomacy and Nation-Building in Africa: Franco-British Relations and Cameroon at the End 
of Empire (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2012), 69.  
 
382  LeVine, 94. On the outcomes of the Foumban conference developing the 1961 constitution, see Fanso, 1999, p. 
291. See also Victor Julius Ngoh, “The Origins of the Marginalization of Former Southern Cameroonians 
(Anglophones), 1961-1966: An Historical Analysis,” Journal of Third World Studies 16 (1999): 165-185. Chapter 
8: Willard R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1970).  
 
383 Johnson, 184-191.  
 
384 On the politics of this centralization and consolidation : Jean-François Bayart,  L’Etat au Cameroun, (Paris: 
Presse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1984). Bayart has argued that the unification of West and 
East Cameroon did not impede, but rather bolstered, the argument for a need for a unified national party and 
national integration, 109. He also argues that Ahidjo knowingly played off political divisions among Anglophone 
elites in order to bring them in line with the unified party and centralize his own power, 116.  
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 The general trajectory of public health administration in the 1960s also began with a 
degree of separate control by the federated states but moved increasingly towards a consolidated 
federal administration.  Even as this consolidation progressed, the delineation between state and 
federal functions of health were far from being rigidly defined or protected. The constitution of 
1961 set public health administration as a state function, but one that could be taken over 
eventually by federal authorities.385  1961 laws created the Federal Ministry of Public Health 
headed by a Minister and Deputy Minister, meant to assist the Minister with all concerns related 
to West Cameroon.386  French-trained Dr. Simon-Pierre Tchoungui served as the first Minister 
of Public Health of the Federal Republic,387 with Anglophone Augustine Ngom Jua as the first 
Deputy Minister.388  This appointment created an imbalance of expertise, however, as Jua was 
not medically trained.389   A Director of Medical Services based out of Victoria in West 
Cameroon and another based out of Yaoundé for East Cameroon were the highest state-level 
officials of each federated state and reported to the Federal Minister of Public Health.390  West 
Cameroon was further divided into six divisions, each overseen by a Medical Officer, who 
                                                          
385 Johnson, 185.  Public health was listed as a ‘second stage federal power” under Article 6 of the 1961 
constitution.  
 
386 NAC Decree no. 61/DF/22 of November 6, 1961. Presse du Cameroun, No. 3469, Mercredi 15 Novembre 1961, 
“Attributions des Ministres et Ministres Adjoints de la République Fédérale.”  
 
387 Named Minster by a decree of October 1, 1961. National Archives of Cameroon. Presse du Cameroun, No. 
3449, Samedi 21 et 22 Octobre 1961.  
 
388 LeVine, 83.  
 
389 Jua had originally trained as a teacher before becoming a prominent political figure in the 1950s in the British 
Southern Cameroons.  He later served as Prime Minister of West Cameroon beginning in 1966, but his efforts to 
protect the autonomy of West Cameroon led to conflicts with federal authorities.  President Ahidjo replaced Jua as 
Prime Minister with Solomon Muna in 1968. DeLancey and Mokeba, 113.  
 
390 NAC Buea. James G. Roney, Jr. Health and Medicine, Volume III of: The Economic Potential of West 
Cameroon—Priorities for Development. Prepared for the Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon and 
the Government of the Federated State of West Cameroon (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, 
1965), 17.  
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reported to both the Director of Medical Services and the Federal Ministry of Public Health. 
Internal state functions of West Cameroon were thus from the start defined by a somewhat 
ambiguous and uneven autonomy from the federal government. Initially, state and federal roles 
were divided along different realms of the public health and medical administration.  State-level 
Directors oversaw hospitals and environmental health. The Federal level functions of public 
health included the Yaoundé-based head office for the Service des Grandes Endémies et de 
Médecine Rurale. This service oversaw the mobile health teams, but it did not truly extend into 
West Cameroon until the mid to late 1960s.391  Despite the unevenness of internal state 
autonomy, the distinction between state and federal functions was ultimately more pronounced 
in West Cameroon than it was in East Cameroon in the first half of the 1960s due both to the 
distance from Yaoundé, the seat of federal services, and the historical differences of the health 
systems. 392   
 Legislation in 1965 further consolidated public health administration at the federal 
level.393  At this time, the Ministry of Health became the Office of the Commissioner-General of 
Health (CGH).   A Federal Director of Health Services replaced the former positions of Director 
of Medical Services for both East and West Cameroon.  The Director of Health Services in 
West Cameroon was instead named ‘Commissioner-General’s Delegate.”394 The change, while 
semantic in nature, marked a move towards centralization through Yaoundé of the health 
                                                          
391 The functions of this Service were was established through Decree no. 63/DF/143. Journal Official de la 
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393 Decree no. 65-DF-238 of 4th June 1965 to organise the Office of the Commissioner General for Public Health 
and Population. Journal Officiel de la République Fédérale du Cameroun, 15 juin 1965, p. 603-606.  
 
394 NAC Buea. Sc/1959/2, G.G. Dibue, Director of Medical Services, Commissioner-General of Health’s Delegate 
“Annual Medical Report, West Cameroon, 1965,” April 23, 1966.  
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services.  New legislation also further unified and centralized in Yaoundé the systems for 
preventive medicine, and for maternal and child welfare services. 395 As the new Federal 
Assembly in 1965 worked more broadly to harmonize institutions and services across the 
federated states, this year became a turning point by which the various branches of the medical 
services became in some way tied to federal oversight.396 
 Beginning with legislation in 1968 and through the dismantlement of the federal system 
in 1972, health policy also moved towards designating administrative health regions within the 
country that would be politically centered on the federal Office of the Commissioner-General of 
Health.397  In this process, the CGH classified West Cameroon as one of the ‘health regions’ in 
the country, and thus indistinct from other designated ‘health regions’ of the country.  In 1968, 
the country was first divided into four health regions, with a Chief Regional Medical Officer in 
charge of each area.  The former office of the Director of Medical Services for West Cameroon, 
now called the Commissioner-General’s Delegate, would fill the role in the Anglophone 
state.398  That role had thus transitioned from being a separate state authority to a delegate of the 
federal authority.   By 1972, the CGH increased the number of health regions to seven, with 
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398 Decree No. 68-DF-455 of the 27th November 1968. Journal Officiel de la République Fédérale du Cameroun. 1 
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West Cameroon divided into two regions.399 The health administration of West Cameroon thus 
became streamlined from a somewhat distinctly autonomous apparatus in the country to part of 
a regionalized national structure centered on Yaoundé.   
 Thus, while the federal legislative changes over the course of the 1960s advanced a 
subsuming of a distinct West Cameroonian medical system into national policy based on a 
French model, this outcome obscures the uneven and contested trajectory of this development.  
Throughout these legislative and administrative changes in the 1960s, West Cameroonian 
medical personnel, political officials and citizens pushed back against many of these changes 
and expressed interests in preserving a distinct administration of health services in West 
Cameroon.  The remainder of this chapter considers how both East and West Cameroonians 
navigated these circumstances through questions of national standardization, in the case of the 
mobile health teams, as well as through questions of language, professional relationships and 
patient care.  As East and West Cameroonians framed the differences, needs, and possibilities of 
medical structures between East and West Cameroon, they made commentary about their 
respective colonial histories but also about how they hoped to protect and advance their own 
stake in these systems.  
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“Two Civilizations”: Defining a Divide 
 In the early 1960s, Cameroonian political officials often characterized the challenges of 
building a new nation as rooted in the legacy of dual colonial rule.  Other questions of regional 
difference within the country certainly played an important role in the politics of this time, 
notably that of the largely Fulani area of northern Cameroon and the western Grassfields region 
of the Bamiléké, but the difference of institutions, language, and history between the two states 
of the federation led to a particular discourse about the gap between them and the need to bridge 
it.  After the talks that led to the creation of the Federal Republic constitution in 1961, Prime 
Minister of West Cameroon and Vice President of the Federal Republic, John Ngu Foncha gave 
a statement characterizing the young country by the “existence of two Cameroon cultures,” 
hoping that one day a unified “indigenous one” would take their places.400  While maintaining a 
critical perspective on the way this discourse assumed a certain totalizing force of colonial 
administration and legacy on Cameroonian lives and flattens other, and perhaps deeper, forms 
of regional or ethnic identification, the ways in which Cameroonians formulated and leveraged 
language about the nature and importance of this division is essential for understanding the 
country’s post-independence trajectory.  
 From the early 1960s onward the anglophone/francophone distinction became 
significant within Cameroonian society as something that designated linguistic difference, but 
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also differences in political and cultural life.  These differences were rooted in experiences of 
the educational opportunities, institutions and political systems created under British and French 
colonial administration.  Cameroonian historian Verkijika Fanso has also noted the important 
differences in how nationalism developed in the two territories, marked in part by different 
regional orientations, with the British Cameroons heavily influenced by the relationship to 
Nigeria.401  After independence and the creation of the Federal Republic, the significance of this 
divide surely took on different dimensions and meaning for different kinds of people in 
Cameroonian society, such as those concerned with the impact of market trade, education, or 
law.    
 In the same vein, Cameroonians drew specific divisions in discourse about state-run 
public health and medicine.  In a 1965 meeting of public health officials concerning the future 
of education for health personnel in Cameroon, the Commissioner General for Public Health 
and Population, Dr. Jean-Claude Happi, talked about the need to find a synthesis between the 
“two civilizations” in Cameroon, francophone and anglophone, that worked both for the 
Cameroonian system, while still responding to the norms of modern medicine.402  The idea of 
two “civilizations” in the realm of medicine and public health spoke directly to differences in 
medical training and medical administration between the former British and French in 
territories.  Whereas West Cameroonian medical personnel had trained primarily in Nigeria and 
England, East Cameroonians had trained in French Cameroon, Senegal, and France.403 In 
                                                          
401 Fanso (1999).  
 
402 NAC. Agence Camerounaise de Presse  No. 139 du Mardi 22 juin 1965. “Hier à Yaoundé: Importante Réunion 
de la Santé Publique,” p. 1-2.  Note: Chapter 5 provides more information on efforts towards bilingual medical 
education in Cameroon.  
 
403 The Yaba Medical Training College in Nigeria opened in 1930 to train medical assistants.  In 1940, the course 
offered extended by one year and students could train as Assistant Medical Officers.  In 1948, this school was 
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addition to training in different languages and educational systems, East and West 
Cameroonians also had experiences working in different medical systems.  
 Cameroonians trained in each system in many instances proudly protected the different 
inherited infrastructures of their respective state systems.  The most prominent French-speaking 
Cameroonians in the public health administration in the 1960s, for example, championed the 
legacy of French colonial medical administration and drew a stark contrast with that which had 
been done in West Cameroon under British administration.  In 1964 then Minister of Public 
Health, Dr. Simon-Pierre Tchoungui, who had trained in Senegal and in France, wrote about the 
organization of health services in Cameroon and highlighted not only the superiority of the 
health structure in East Cameroon over that of West, but also highlighted the sophistication of 
East Cameroonian medical systems in relation to other former French African colonies.  He 
characterized Cameroon at independence as one of the most “privileged” countries among the 
former colonies in terms of health equipment.404   By contrast, he wrote that the territory that 
comprised West Cameroon, while being administered as part of colonial Nigeria, had been 
relatively neglected in comparison to the other Nigerian provinces in terms of health equipment.  
He noted the ‘surprise’ in discovering after independence the point to which the health 
infrastructure in West Cameroon was underdeveloped in comparison to East Cameroon.405  Dr. 
Tchoungui placed the two territories both in relation to each other as well as in a comparative 
                                                          
moved and expanded to create the University College Hospital in Ibadan. The University offered medical degrees 
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404 NAC Buea. Sc/a 1964/14  Organisation Générale des Services de Ministre de la Santé Publique et de la 
République Fédérale du Cameroun, par le Docteur S.P. Tchoungui, Ministre de la Santé Publique 1964.   
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regional context to further emphasize the disparity between the two.  In his estimation, East 
Cameroon shone even in comparison to the rest of the former French empire in Africa, while 
West Cameroon had been but a neglected region of Nigeria.  
 Tchoungui considered the mobile health service as absolutely central to the strengths of 
the medical system in French Cameroon.  He most pointedly connected the ‘privilege’ of French 
Cameroon to the creation of the mobile health team service in the territory under the famous Dr. 
Eugène Jamot.  Outlining the medical system under colonial administration, he noted, “We 
had…{in addition to the institutions of curative medicine}.. a mobile medical service that is still 
one of the best equipped because it was the first created in Africa.”406  He thus cast the mobile 
health service, the pride and joy of the French-Cameroonian medical world, as making the 
territory exceptional in vast geographic and imperial terms.   
 Likewise, one of the most serious differences that Dr. Tchoungui noted between West 
and East Cameroon was that of the mobile health system.  After listing other deficiencies he saw 
in the West Cameroonian medical system, he wrote: 
But more seriously, there does not exist a mobile medical service 
directed by a doctor; one could thus reckon that, in the wake of 
reunification, the immense majority of the population does not 
benefit from medical care.407 
The premise of the French mobile health service was going from village to village, diagnosing 
and treating patients and thus expanding medical care far beyond the confines of hospitals or 
even rural dispensaries.   Tchoungui thus characterized the lack of this system as a major gap in 
the reach of the medical system in West Cameroon.  West Cameroon did, in fact, in the early 
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407 NAC Buea. Sc/a 1964/14  Organisation Générale des Services de Ministre de la Santé Publique et de la 
République Fédérale du Cameroun, par le Docteur S.P. Tchoungui, Ministre de la Santé Publique 1964, 8.  
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1960s have its own system of itinerant nurses and medical personnel, which will be discussed 
more fully later in the chapter.  The characterization, however, of the impact of the French 
mobile health service versus that which existed in West Cameroon invested the discourse of 
difference in medical culture between West and East Cameroon with both the weight of colonial 
history and the stakes of contemporary care for Cameroonians across the new nation.  
 Dr. Tchoungui also made stark comparisons between East and West Cameroon on several 
other aspects of medical infrastructure.  He articulated the differences on the basis of general 
resources, but also on the differences in models used for things such as authority over dispensaries 
and patient payment for treatment.  These models reflected the broad differences between French 
and British colonial administration in Africa.  Whereas some East Cameroonian dispensaries fell 
under the public health authority, West Cameroon ran its dispensaries through the Native 
Authority Administration, with customary chiefs overseeing construction and financial 
functioning.408  Dr. Tchoungui noted a limited number of state-hospitals in West Cameroon, and 
the relative importance of missionary-led hospitals in the region.409   He characterized the hospital 
equipment as insufficient and noted that there were not specialized services available in the entire 
territory, making evacuations to Douala or Ibadan, Nigeria often obligatory.410 Another great 
difference highlighted between East and West Cameroon was that most people in the West were 
required to pay for medical treatment. The Minister also characterized the formation of public 
health personnel between the two territories as “totally different” and noted the need to harmonize 
                                                          
408 NAC Buea. Sc/a 1964/14  Organisation Générale des Services de Ministre de la Santé Publique et de la 
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the teaching methods.411  With these observations, Dr. Tchoungui laid out some of the tasks ahead 
for health policy for the newly independent country, summarizing that although the overall health 
infrastructure of the country was satisfying, an immediate imperative was to reorganize and 
modernize it in East Cameroon, whereas the need existed to create it almost entirely from the 
ground up in West Cameroon, as was the case with certain regions of the East.412  The overall 
number of biomedical personnel in West Cameroon was not, however, as starkly different as 
Tchoungui suggested.  With West Cameroonians constituting roughly twenty-percent of the 
Federal population, the health personnel in the state constituted about fifteen percent of the total 
for the whole country.  However, a much higher proportion of personnel in West Cameroon 
worked in the private sector.  Thus, while 76% of medical personnel in East Cameroon worked 
for the state, only 46% did so in West Cameroon.413  In turn, private medical establishments, 
including missionary posts and the medical establishments of the plantation corporations, played 
a relatively bigger role in West Cameroon.414   
 While East Cameroonian health officials viewed West Cameroon through the lens of 
insufficiency, West Cameroonians lamented the lack of respect for and recognition of the 
differences of their system by East Cameroonians.  In a 1963 letter to Dr. Tchoungui entitled 
“Medical Policy for West Cameroon,” West Cameroonian Prime Minster and Federal Vice 
President Foncha bluntly expressed his dissatisfaction over recent discussions between the two 
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413 In 1964/65, of a total of 164 doctors in East Cameroon (including “médecins-africains), 112 worked in the 
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during a recent visit of his to Yaoundé about the running of hospitals in the anglophone region.  
He wrote to Tchoungui, “to inform you that your present plans seem to have ignored all the 
existing medical policies and plans made before Unification.”  He continued, “It seems to me 
that you are trying to carry exactly the same policy as exists in East Cameroon into West 
Cameroon without looking or enquiring from us what our plans were.”415  Foncha specifically 
listed the wish to continue a policy of ‘grants-in-aid’ for the running of medical facilities by 
missionary groups, and the Native Administration authority over building and financing local 
dispensaries and maternities.416  Other complaints involved the Minister ignoring a site chosen 
by local personnel for the building of a new hospital in favor of a different site, and a directive 
sent to the Director of Medical Services in West Cameroon stating that personnel transfers in 
the region would go through the ministry in Yaoundé.  Foncha wrote that this could not possibly 
be a sound course of action, given the limited knowledge of the ministry on local matters and 
staff.417  He suggested a compromise in having the Director of Medical Services in West 
Cameroon initiate any transfers and put them to approval from the Minister.  He concluded the 
letter with a more general statement about the governmental relationships at play: “Remember 
that your work is to improve the medical facilities for the people of West Cameroon and we, 
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who are benefitting from this, should be able to say what we want.”418 Foncha made powerful 
statements both about the specificity of the West Cameroonian medical system—such as a much 
more decentralized approach and reliance on missionary groups and local authorities-as well as 
trenchant questions about the role of the public in public health.  The system he sought to 
protect was a product of colonial administration, but in West Cameroon this system also 
entailed a higher degree of reliance on and autonomy of local authorities.  The question of how 
much the medical systems of West Cameroon should and would mirror those of the East 
reflected broader concerns about the influence of West Cameroonians themselves on these 
decisions.   
 The positions Cameroonians took in the process to define the public health future of the 
independent state were, therefore, not exclusively protections of the legacies of colonial 
administration and infrastructure.  Cameroonian officials also infused these positions with an 
emphasis on their own stake in these systems in the postcolonial context.  The significance of 
upholding existing systems served as a measure of their own relative stake and influence in how 
health structures would develop.  At the same time, individuals who had been trained to work in 
one system or another were also protecting the integrity of their training and their work.  In this 
regard, Cameroon faced unique circumstances in its first decade of independence.  The 
questions faced were not just those of Cameroonian doctors or nurses taking over where 
Europeans had once held control, but also of negotiating the coming together of training and 
experience in two different medical systems, in two different languages.  
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 The existence of these two professional working languages inevitably led to problems of 
communication.  In November 1963, Minister of Public Health Dr. Tchoungui issued a 
“Technical Circular relating to vaccinations for those going on a pilgrimage to Mecca.”  The 
original copy written in French was stamped as having been delivered to the West Cameroon 
Prime Minister’s Office ‘Translation Bureau’ which then reproduced the document in English 
for readership by West Cameroonian officials.  This document is just one example of a process 
that was followed for countless other official documents, but reading the French and English 
copy side by side provides some insight into the extent to which issues could be lost in 
translation in these early days of the Federal Republic.  The original French document lists the 
three vaccines required for the pilgrimage by international regulation: ‘antivariolique, 
antiamarile, anticholérique.”  The English translation listed the vaccine requirements as follows: 
“against smallpox, antiamarile (?), against cholera.”419  The question mark next to the word 
‘antiamarile,’ a French term for the yellow fever vaccine, reappears throughout the English 
version of the document, showing the inability of the translator to provide an equivalent for this 
technical term.  Public health and medicine across the federation lacked a shared technical 
vocabulary in the most basic sense, and the process of translation undoubtedly led to these 
instances of miscommunication or complete inability to communicate.   
 The ideals of the officially bilingual federal republic faced concrete limits.420 The 
establishment of translation bureaus in state prime minister’s offices, in the presidency and in 
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some ministries sought to bring bilingualism into the functioning of the government.  The 
reality, however, was often quite different from the ideal of creating all federal documents in 
both languages given the limited number of truly bilingual staff.421  Equally important, the work 
that went into creating bilingual documents and holding meetings and conferences with 
interpreters often slowed down administrative work and communication in the early years of 
reunification.422  The energy spent on institutionalizing this official bilingualism meanwhile did 
not even begin to broach the much larger complexity of the African languages also spoken by 
Cameroonians423 or the limitations on the number of people who spoke formal English or 
French at this time.  The problem of translating the memo on vaccination illustrates a broader 
challenge at reunification, while also highlighting the particularly high stakes of this issue for 
public health and medicine. Technical vocabulary of medicine may have been less familiar to 
non-medical staff performing translation services, and yet the stakes of incorrectly identifying 
medicine and vaccines were incredibly high.  The issue of bilingual translation in medicine thus 
represented much larger issues about the capacity of the new state to protect the health of its 
citizens.   
French Doctors in West Cameroon  
 Differences in language certainly undermined the ability of Cameroonian officials to 
seamlessly exchange information on health-related matters, but the question of language also 
provoked controversy and created complication at both the broader level of foreign aid and at 
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the most intimate level of doctor-patient exchanges.  These two factors intertwined through the 
presence of French doctors sent to work in West Cameroon after reunification. The close ties 
maintained between Cameroon and France after independence, resulting from the initially 
separate trajectory of decolonization in East Cameroon, greatly shaped the development of 
health policy and personnel in the 1960s. But while the impact of this development on 
Cameroon’s medical culture and structure are in many ways emblematic of the Franco-African 
ties redrawn and bolstered at independence, an important question remains of what these ties 
meant in the context of the federation—a political entity marked by the ideals of official 
bilingualism and a more complicated colonial past.  The work of French doctors in West 
Cameroon in many ways shows the regional limits of the privileged Franco-Cameroonian 
culture of the medical world, while also highlighting the ambiguity of national versus 
international health work at this time.  
 In the early 1960s, a new crop of foreign doctors began working in West Cameroon, 
both under the auspices of the World Health Organization and the French Government.  The 
World Health Organization originally sent six doctors of varying nationalities in the early 1960s 
through an agreement with the Cameroonian government to assist with the development of 
medical services.424  French doctors also came to the Anglophone state as part of the broader 
program of technical assistance established between the French and Cameroonian governments 
after independence.   The numbers of these foreign doctors were small in the early 1960s, but 
this must be placed in the context of the very low numbers of biomedically-trained, state 
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recognized doctors in West Cameroon at the time.425   A total of 14 doctors, most of them 
foreign, worked in all of West Cameroon in 1962426 and the number had grown to 32 by 
1964.427  Nurses and medical auxiliaries instead comprised the majority of medical personnel at 
this time.  
 The French government sent this handful of physicians to West Cameroon in the early 
1960s through the Ministry of Cooperation in the interest of extending French influence and 
gaining a ‘foothold’ in the anglophone territory.428  As a former British territory, the French 
government saw West Cameroon as a unique avenue through which to extend its influence in 
Africa.  French interventionist approaches to West Cameroon also grew out of concerns that the 
legacy of British rule left the territory open to ‘anglo-saxon’ influence and contributed to a 
desire to make an imprint through technical assistance, infrastructural investment and cultural 
programming.  The French Ambassador to Cameroon in 1962 saw the extension of this French 
influence as a key concern, and he identified French doctors in West Cameroon, some of the 
few French technical assistance personnel in the region, as one of the few concrete efforts 
towards exerting this influence.429 The French Ambassador recognized the obstacles to 
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extending influence in West Cameroon, remarking after a trip to the territory that he found not 
one person there who understood French, but he equally interpreted the widespread use of 
pidgin English by West Cameroonians as a sign of the limited cultural “penetration” of the 
British.430   To be sure, the approaches towards Cameroon that the British and French 
governments took after independence developed in starkly different ways.  Many British 
expatriates left the territory in the early 1960s431 and British policy makers reacted to the strong 
ongoing influence and presence of the French in Cameroon.  Due to this ongoing influence of 
French policy in East Cameroon, the British government came to see the federation in its 
entirety as first and foremost a French partner.432   
 The nature of this French ‘foothold’ created in West Cameroon through the doctors’ 
presence, however, did not develop quite as intended.  The behavior and work of the French 
doctors provoked controversy in various instances in the early 1960s with complaints from 
Cameroonians ranging from lack of respect for political authorities to gross professional 
negligence.  Much of this controversy revolved around incidents at the General Hospital in 
Victoria.   
 One controversy that arose revolved around a lack of respect shown by the doctors for 
West Cameroonian political figures.  In early August 1964, the wife of the Prime Minister of 
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West Cameroon and Vice President of the Federal Republic, made an official planned visit on 
behalf of the Cameroon Red Cross Society to the hospital in Victoria, but none of the three 
French doctors posted there reported to the hospital on the day of her visit to greet her.  Many 
people in West Cameroon saw this as a major lack of respect for the authority of the country, 
with both the Federal Inspector and Director of Medical Services in West Cameroon writing to 
the Minister of Health to complain.433  An anglophone newspaper, The Cameroon Times, 
published an editorial soon after the visit, entitled ‘Punish this Insolence.” The editorial stated  
We abhore the temptation to sound parochial and clannish but we note that 
these members of the hospital staff who so disrespectfully stayed away, are 
all expatriate personnel.  And the three doctors are all of French origin.  We 
want to ask very bluntly whether such disrespect would be showed to the 
wife of the French Head of State if she visited an institution where these 
doctors were working—even in her private capacity, much more as an 
official of an organisation of world-wide fame as the Red Cross Society?  It 
is a sad reflection on our status as an independent nation that some 
expatriates in our midst can still treat our leaders with great impudence and 
get away with such insults unpunished….Lest we be misunderstood, we 
have nothing against Frenchmen in general.  In fact, we have the highest 
esteem for those French nationals who are contributing effectively and 
sincerely towards the growth of Cameroon.  But we certainly would ask that 
stern disciplinary measures be taken against any person who shows 
disrespect to our leaders whether they be Frenchmen, Jamaicans, Germans, 
Britons, or even Cameroonians.434 
This moment may be read broadly as an instance of Cameroonians protecting the new status of 
the independent nation, but the specific significance of this instance involving Frenchmen can 
also not be overlooked.  The lack of a shared Franco-Cameroonian past and future in West 
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Cameroon, an ideal regularly touted in the medical field in East Cameroon in the 1950s and 60s, 
frames the significance of this interaction.  The very irrelevance of the doctors’ Frenchness, the 
assertion that such disrespect by anyone would be reprehensible showed just how different the 
dynamics of the medical profession were in West Cameroon.   French and East Cameroonian 
doctors had developed a shared, albeit hierarchical, professional world with its own norms of 
conduct435 but this tradition had no roots in West Cameroon.  Frenchmen were foreigners, 
without ties of ‘familiarity,’436 and their behavior was judged accordingly.   
 Moreover, the question of language became central to the controversies over French 
doctors working in West Cameroon, with many Cameroonians complaining that the language 
barrier left the French unequipped to care for patients in the territory.  The protests in Victoria 
described at the beginning of the chapter revolved partially around this issue.  After the death of 
a West Cameroonian in the hospital, the Security Service office of Victoria reported to the 
Federal head of security in a letter entitled “Language Difficulties by French Speaking Doctors 
at General Hospital Victoria-Caused Public Alarm.” A prominent figure in the West 
Cameroonian government had been admitted to the hospital on August 20th, 1965 and had died 
there on September 1st.  The Security Service reported popular speculations that the death 
resulted from the patient not being well attended to by the hospital doctors and that he would 
have been better off going to Nigeria for care.  People were also articulating the incompetence 
of the doctors as largely related to the problem of language, saying that unqualified interpreters 
were translating patient histories to the doctors and leading to improper treatment.  French 
doctors were also writing prescriptions in French to leave by patient bedsides, which the West 
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Cameroonian nurses were not able to read and understand.  The Security Service finished the 
report letter by endorsing the suggestion that only doctors who spoke English be posted to West 
Cameroon.437 
 Another death in the hospital also sparked outrage the same year.  In 1965 a woman died 
in Victoria hospital from an obstructed labor.  All of the French doctors had left the hospital for 
the weekend and were not present when the patient arrived.  In an interview I conducted with 
Dr. Thomas Nchinda, a doctor in West Cameroon at the time, he remembered that women of 
Victoria took to the streets to protest the death and circumstances at the hospital. “They were 
going to march to see Mr. Foncha in Buea.  They said, we told you from the start we don’t want 
these French doctors coming in here, they don’t speak English, we can’t talk to them, we don’t 
have interpreters, how can you talk to the doctor?” 438  After the death of the female patient, the 
women of Victoria first marched to the office of the Director of Medical Services for West 
Cameroon, Dr. Godfrey G. Dibue, in Victoria, threatening to march to Mr. Foncha’s office in 
Buea if something was not done.  Dr. Dibue presented the issue to the Minister of Health in 
Yaoundé in meetings also attended by the French technical advisor to the ministry.  Dibue 
proposed that the only way to appease the community would be to post a Cameroonian doctor 
as medical officer in charge of the hospital.  As a result of these meetings and the controversy, 
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the ministry transferred Dr. Nchinda from his posting in Kumba to be in charge of the Victoria 
hospital.439 
 Dr. Nchinda remembers his new position feeling like being “a sheep in a lion’s den,” 
faced with the circumstances of being much younger than the French doctors, not being from 
the same professional milieu of their military training, and the fact that they were “always 
bosses wherever they were.” 440   When visiting hospitals in the Eastern state of Cameroon, he 
remembers that ‘The French medical doctors did what they please, how they please, when they 
pleased.” The French doctors complained about being under Dr. Nchinda’s direction to the 
French Technical Advisor to the Cameroonian Minister of Public Health, but since the advisor 
had been privy to the meetings on the matter, there was little room for change.   Dr. Nchinda 
remembers the dynamic improving only one to two years after his appointment when he felt he 
won the respect of the other doctors.  A French surgeon posted to the hospital had asked Dr. 
Nchinda to cover his call for the hospital one weekend in order to entertain visiting friends.  An 
emergency surgery arose over the weekend, which Dr. Nchinda handled, and he remembers 
finally being appreciated more as an able doctor and colleague from that point forward.   
 In complaining about the French doctors, many West Cameroonians repeated the 
common refrain that they did not speak English, but the dichotomy of English/French did not 
capture the full linguistic complexity at play in doctor-patient interactions in West Cameroonian 
hospitals.  The dynamics that Dr. Nchinda described in Victoria hospital were about more than 
just language.  Notably, Dr. Nchinda did not draw the distinction between just the ability to 
speak English or French, but emphasized the benefit of speaking the pidgin English language of 
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West Cameroon in dealing with patients.  He remembered the need to sometimes use subtle 
language, ask leading questions, and sometimes even humor to work with female patients in 
West Cameroon, particularly for obstetric problems.441  At his posting in Kumba, Dr. Nchinda 
had also worked with a World Health Organization doctor of Greek nationality who did speak 
English, but Nchinda noted that the problem was really that he did not speak pidgin.  He talked 
about patients preferring to consult with him over the WHO doctor at that hospital.  He saw this 
as a natural outcome, “because not only was I a Cameroonian, but because I would get into the 
intricacies of the pidgin, with even the most, most illiterate.  And because it is my country and I 
have grown up there, I know even the background and some of the reasons why they do what 
they do.”442 Although the discourse of complaining about foreign doctors in West Cameroon 
often revolved around the complaint of them not speaking English, the needs of clear doctor-
patient communication were actually much more complex and steeped both in the ability to 
speak the regional pidgin as well as having the cultural context for the language and appropriate 
ways of communicating about health behaviors and situations.  
 But the situation Dr. Nchinda describes also contrasted sharply with certain dynamics of 
the medical profession in East Cameroon at the time.  Historian Guillaume Lachenal has 
convincingly shown how the intimate ties between French and East Cameroonian medical 
workers trained in the French system shaped the medical and scientific realms in Cameroon 
after independence.443  Important questions remain, however, about the geographical limits of 
this ‘familiarity’ within the independent Cameroonian state, as well as the significance of these 
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ties in the context of an officially bilingual country.  French and Cameroonian doctors in West 
Cameroon did not share the language, both literally and figuratively, with which to talk about a 
professional medical culture rooted both in a common past and active present.   
 Perhaps no example is more emblematic of this rift between the legacy of French 
colonial medicine in East Cameroon and its irrelevance in West Cameroon than the experience 
of French physician Dr. Jean Jamot in West Cameroon in 1966.  Jean Jamot was the son of 
Eugène Jamot, the much celebrated creator of the French mobile health team model.  As 
evidenced in Dr. Tchoungui’s discussion of the mobile health service, francophone 
Cameroonian medical workers regularly referenced Jamot as endowing them with a very 
particular and important medical legacy to honor and uphold. 
  The son of this chosen hero of francophone Cameroonian medical history did not fare as 
well in the anglophone territory.  Dr. Jean Jamot had been working in Algeria when he was 
given the choice for his next posting through the French system between Cameroon and other 
countries.  He chose Cameroon in memory of the work of his father.444  His ultimate stationing 
at the General Hospital in Bamenda in West Cameroon, however, didn’t seem to work for 
anyone involved.  Reports indicated that he had “no notion of English,” which made it 
impossible to do consultations or to write prescriptions.445  Faced with these circumstances, Dr. 
Jamot wrote to the Ministry of Public Health to request that he be reposted in francophone East 
Cameroon.  The outcome of his request is not discernible from archival documents in 
Cameroon, but it is notable that the son Jamot does not appear in any other of the available 
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medical archives from West Cameroon from the 1960s.  His stay in the region was likely quite 
brief.   
 Jean Jamot’s discontentment in the region and his apparent inability to effectively 
practice medicine in West Cameroon provides a stark contrast with the experience of his famous 
father, a contrast through which to see the limits of the reach of a celebrated legacy of French 
colonial medicine as well as a post-colonial future in Cameroon.  Rhetoric and ritual to 
celebrate this past and the future of Franco-Cameroonian ‘Cooperation’ that may have resonated 
in Yaoundé fell flat in West Cameroon.   In this context, French doctors were particularly inept 
foreigners, ill-equipped to engage with the most basic elements of local communication and 
expectations.  They were stripped in this context of the claims to insight into local cultures or 
the medical terrain that some French doctors made on the basis of careers in the colonies.   
 Whereas in East Cameroon the tight relationships of French and Cameroonian personnel 
that underpinned the medical system became the basis for international health programs and 
institutions to work with the country, in West Cameroon the French doctors were as much 
actors of ‘international health,’ in the sense that they were seen and functioned almost entirely 
as external players in an unfamiliar realm.   French doctors in East Cameroon could make 
claims to understanding the local context and thus position themselves as international 
intermediaries, but on the ground in West Cameroon this positioning was quite precarious. 
French doctors were in fact singled out in a more targeted way than those World Health 
Organization doctors placed in Cameroon who at least spoke English, even if this language, 
spoken formally, still presented barriers to patient communication.  The French doctors were 
outsiders to the utmost extreme—both expatriates and unable to speak the language needed for 
medical work.   In independent Cameroon, the demarcations of who engaged in work that we 
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might call national and work that would be called international health work were deeply 
ambiguous.   
 The influence of French physicians, however, and their impact on the Cameroonian 
medical world did not reside solely in personnel on the ground.  The medical infrastructure of 
East Cameroon at independence was deeply ingrained in the French colonial past and a future 
predicated on Coopération.  Cameroonian officials saw the extension of this infrastructure to 
West Cameroon as either a necessity or an imposition, depending on their position within the 
federation.  This next section will look more closely at the work to extend the mobile health 
team system of East Cameroon to the West, a system considered by health officials in East 
Cameroon to be both emblematic of the imprint (and benefits) of French colonial administration 
as well as having the potential to fill what they perceived as the biggest lacuna in the West 
Cameroonian medical system.  
Extending Mobile Health Teams 
 The push from Yaoundé to extend the mobile health team system of East Cameroon to 
the western state grew out of the idea formed by francophone Cameroonian and French officials 
that the former British territory had no comparable system for rural preventive care.  As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, Dr. Simon-Pierre Tchoungui, the Minister of Public Health 
from 1961-1964, deplored the lack of mobile health teams for rural care in West Cameroon.446 
A 1962 report from the newly established French consulate in Buea in West Cameroon also 
observed that there were one or two mobile health teams in the area, ‘theoretically’ charged 
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with smallpox vaccination among other tasks, but that the program was not well established 
along set geographical circuits and suffered from a major lack of personnel and finances.  The 
report concluded that the efficacy of the mobile team here was basically ‘null’ for most of the 
rural population and that the organization of the Service des Grandes Endémies, must be set up 
in the territory.447 
 International health observers and officials also reported on the situation of the mobile 
teams in the early-mid 1960s.  The Cameroonian government drew for its health planning on a 
variety of these externally prepared reports on the medical infrastructure of the Federal 
Republic. One such report, prepared by the World Health Organization by a public health 
advisor to Cameroon, suggested that the government give greater attention to the coordination 
of the Service des Grandes Endémies in West Cameroon.448  An American doctor who prepared 
a report on economic planning for the government of Cameroon led a study from June 1964-
February 1965 that included visits to medical facilities in West Cameroon and interviews with 
public health officials across the federation.  In studying the relationship between federal-level 
and state-level health programs, he examined how the federal level Services des Grandes 
Endémies connected with work in West Cameroon.  Based on interviews with the officials he 
met, he wrote that “inadequate liaison between Yaounde and Buea were cited by officials in 
both East and West Cameroon as one reason why West Cameroon has not become a more active 
participant in these programs [of the Grandes Endémies office of the Ministry of Public Health].  
The lack of communication between East and West Cameroon is partly an outgrowth of staff 
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shortages and partly a result of language problems and incompatible features of the French and 
British medical traditions.” 449 The fault lines between the systems of the two territories, rooted 
in the history of different colonial administration, were thus brought into the foreground as an 
important aspect of national health planning, both internally and in the context of consultation 
and engagement with international health officials.   
 These reports varied between concluding that there was not preventive rural care in West 
Cameroon to arguing that it was inadequate, but none explained fully what the existing system 
actually was.  West Cameroon did have its own version of a traveling health service established 
under British colonial administration, called Medical Field Units. The Medical Field Units 
pursued a similar objective to the mobile health teams of East Cameroon.  They toured rural 
areas diagnosing and in some cases treating diseases, and performing vaccinations.450  The 
medical field unit assistants were male nurses that had formerly trained at the School of 
Hygiene in Aba, Nigeria, although no such program existed to continue this kind of training in 
West Cameroon.451   The teams in the British Southern Cameroons had fallen under the larger 
umbrella of the Nigerian Medical Field Units structure, since the territory was administered as 
part of Nigeria.452  British doctors created a similar system in other colonial territories, such as 
Ghana.   Moreover, the doctors who created the system in the British colonies drew heavily 
from the French as well as Belgian models for combating sleeping sickness in creating the 
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system.  In the 1920s and 30s, as the service was being created in Nigeria, British doctors even 
went to observe the work of Dr. Eugène Jamot against sleeping sickness in French Cameroon 
and brought these observations back with them to Nigeria.453  Also similar to those in French 
Cameroon, the teams in the British southern Cameroons served as the on the ground basis for an 
international health campaigns in the 1950s.454   
 In the early 1960s, there were at least three medical field units in the state, but a WHO 
official reported that in West Cameroon, “the activities of detection, prevention and treatment of 
major endemic diseases are entrusted in most cases to a number of non-qualified health workers 
who are only trained for a particular endemic disease: yaws scouts, leprosy inspectors…”455 
These personnel had not completed the more comprehensive training of the medical field unit 
assistants who had trained in Nigeria.  The work of the Field Units was severely limited, 
moreover, if not halted entirely in some areas, by 1965 due to lack of finances and equipment.456    
 The work of the Field Units was never as robust in practice as it was in theory, but the 
same is certainly true of the mobile health teams under French colonial administration and in 
independent East Cameroon.  The heroic claims made by French doctors about their work with 
the mobile health teams in the 1950s obscured a long history of shortcomings and in some 
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454 The teams carried out a WHO/UNICEF-funded anti-yaws campaign.  Buea, Sc/a/1949/5, Medical Field Unit 
(Epidemic Team); Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration. Report for the Year 1957. Report by Her 
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of 
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455 WHO M 2/3723 Cameroon. Programme for Malaria Eradication in Cameroons. Dr. M. Torfs, Public Health 
Advisor, “Main Aspects of Planning for Basic Health Services in the Federal Republic of Cameroon (1966-1980).” 
1966.  {based on a survey of health facilities in 1964/65} 
 
456 NAC Buea. Sc/1959/2, ‘Annual Medical Report, West Cameroon, 1965.”  
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cases, medical disasters.457   French and Cameroonian doctors overstated the difference between 
that two systems, at least in the sense of intent.  One of the most important differences between 
the teams came through the imprint of the French medical military corps, and the ethos of 
militaristic-style campaigns that shaped the development of the mobile service.  The teams in 
French Cameroon had thus operated according to more rigid schedules and procedure in their 
“assembly-line” village visits.  While those in East Cameroon saw the West Cameroonian teams 
as lacking, some in West Cameroon saw superiority in their system in key areas such as 
environmental health, sanitation, and hygiene efforts.458  Furthermore, in spite of structural 
differences, the reach and efficacy of the teams in both areas was geographically uneven in the 
1950s and early 1960s.459  
 Despite the unevenness of the reach of teams, health officials working in Cameroon 
framed one of the most pressing questions of the mobile service as being that of harmonization 
and coordination of the systems across the country.  This concern certainly reflected a broader 
political project of national standardization, but East Cameroonian health officials also upheld 
the mobile health service as one of the most significant aspects of public health administration. 
In the mid-1960s, Cameroonian officials took more concrete steps to bring the preventive health 
services of East and West Cameroon in alignment.  The federal government put legislation into 
place in the spring of 1965 to further centralize public health administration at the federal level, 
                                                          
457 Jean-Paul Bado, Eugène Jamot, 1879-1937 : Le Médecin de la maladie du sommeil ou trypanosomiase (Paris : 
Éditions Karthala, 2011). Guillaume Lachenal, Le Medicament qui devait sauver l’Afrique : Un scandale 
pharmaceutique aux colonies (Paris : La Découverte, 2014), 57-101. 
 
458 Interview with Dr. Nchinda.  
 
459 For example: NAC 1AC 9413 ‘Prospection du SHMP dans le Mbam 1957’ on ongoing hostility to villages to 
mobile teams and absenteesim in the late 1950s;  1AA 502 Nord Cameroun, Rapport Politique Trimestrial-2ème 
Trimestre 1963, Préfecture du Département du Diamare. Reports that the work of the mobile health team in the 
area had been reduced due to insufficient funds.  
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which had important ramifications for preventive medicine across the federation.460  The 
legislation sought to merge the Medical Field Unit Service of West Cameroon with the East 
Cameroonian Service des Grandes Endémies under the Director of Grandes Endémies in 
Yaoundé.  A similar plan for harmonization and centralization went into place for the maternal 
and child welfare service.461 The Director of Medical Health Services in West Cameroon at the 
time of the change, G.G. Dibue wrote  
In centralizing two important sections of the health services as these two, 
one would have expected some consultations between doctors from each 
sector bearing in mind that the French system of Grandes endemic has its 
own merits and at the same time, the British method of eradicating major 
endemic diseases through the Medical Field Units has been praised by 
neutral observers of international repute.  The writer had advocated since 
1962 that before harmonization of any section of the health services, 
Cameroonians themselves, doctors or nurses or technicians should be 
chosen from East and West Cameroon and given the assignment of studying 
the type of work, methods and results achieved in each state and recommend 
what should be accepted as the model for Cameroon. The idea was to 
produce a cross pollination through the marriage of French and English 
systems of health services as practiced in East and West Cameroon.  To 
ignore the West Cameroon Medical Association in such matters produced 
feelings of frustration, especially among Cameroonian doctors in West 
Cameroon who have felt that their feelings were ignored.462 
Instead of the ‘cross pollination’ that Dibue had hoped for, he found himself instead with a plan 
for the extension of the French-originated system of mobile health teams.   
 The legislation put a legal finish on a process of expansion of the service that had 
already been put in motion. In 1964, the Cameroon federal government made a request to the 
French Ministry of Cooperation for financial support for the creation of three new bases for 
                                                          
460 NAC Decrees 65/DF/221 of 16 May 1965 and 65/DF/238 of 4 June 1965. Agence Camerounaise de Presse, No. 
127 du Mercredi 9 Juin 1965 “Organisation du Commissariat General À la Santé Publique,’ 4-5.  
 
461 NAC Buea. Sc/1959/2, G.G. Dibue, Director of Medical Services, Commissoner-General of Health’s Delegate 
“Annual Medical Report, West Cameroon, 1965,” April 23, 1966.  
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mobile health teams in West Cameroon.  The Ministry of Cooperation agreed to provide for 
only two, honing in on Bamenda and Kumba as the priority areas, and requested the 
Cameroonian government to complete plans and cost estimates for the envisioned 
construction.463 In 1966, Dr. Emile Elom Ntzouzo’o, the assistant deputy director of the Service 
des Grandes Endémies et de Médecine Rurale toured the major medical centers of West 
Cameroon—Victoria, Buea, Kumba, Bamenda and Mamfe—to study the possibilities of 
creating the new bases for the service in the western state.464  The French Ministry of 
Cooperation ultimately provided funding for the establishment of two mobile team bases in 
West Cameroon in the highly populated zones of Bamenda and Kumba.  The project funding 
description again reiterated the observation that West Cameron had “no infrastructure adapted 
to the needs of preventive medical action”465 and that “just up until the reunification of the two 
Cameroons in 1961, mobile medicine had not been practiced in West Cameroon.”466 The 
organization of vaccination campaigns against smallpox and yellow fever, along with screening 
for other diseases such as leprosy in West Cameroon were characterized as presenting a 
“particular urgency.”467 Through the agreement for aid, the French government, via the head of 
                                                          
463 CADN 744PO/1/31. « Conclusions de la Mission d’Etudes du Ministère de la Coopération au Sujet de la 
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464 NAC « Le Docteur Elom en Tournée au Cameroun Occidental » Agence Camerounais de Presse. No. 189 du 
jeudi 18 Août 1966.  
 
465 CADN 744PO/1/40. Convention de Financement no. 36/c/66/0 conclue entre le Gouvernement de la République 
Française et Le Gouvernement de la République Fédérale du Cameroun. Projet no. 144/CD/66/VI/0/19, p. 7. My 
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467 CADN 744/PO/1/32, p. 39  
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the Mission d’Aide et de Coopération à Yaoundé would finance the construction of the base, 
and the Cameroonian federal government would finance the equipment and furnishing for the 
bases, as well as the personnel and material costs for their functioning.468  The bases were 
envisioned as a means to coordinate preventive medicine in the regions in a more efficacious 
way, by providing a central point from which mobile teams could work to provide vaccinations 
and some basic care to rural populations.469 
 Notably, agreements for the financing of the bases continued to refer to the 
Cameroonian mobile health team service by the acronym for the service’s name under colonial 
administration, ‘SHMP,’ standing for the Service d’hygiène mobile et de prophylaxie rather than 
the contemporary name used by the Cameroonian government, the Service des Grandes 
Endémies et de Médicine Rurale.  Repeatedly and consistently through the reports on the 
project, the French Ministry of Cooperation used language that blurred lines of any changes to 
the mobile service made after independence, and instead wrote in a language suggesting a 
seamless continuation and extension of the colonial medical infrastructure.  
 The reorganization of the mobile health team service along federal lines in West 
Cameroon took shape by 1967.470  This moment was in many ways a crossroads for public 
health administration in Cameroon, which will be discussed more fully in subsequent chapters.  
At this time, the mobile teams across Cameroon became intermediaries for the global Smallpox 
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469 CADN 744PO/1/32, p. 40. This particular model was also tied to evolving rural health care reforms that will be 
discussed more fully in Chapter 5.  
 
470 A. Delas, “La Trypanosomiase au Cameroun: Situation Actuelle, » Rapport Final de la Quatrième Conférence 
Technique de l’OCEAC, Yaoundé du 21 au Janvier 1969, 140 ; Archives Nationales du Cameroun, Yaoundé.  
« Visite Officielle du Chef d’Etat au Cameroun Occidental » Agence Camerounaise de Presse No. 10 du mercredi 
7 mai 1969 ; « Le 1er Conseil National de l’UNC : Point de Départ d’une activité plus intense et plus étendue » 
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Eradication Program, and United States funding for vaccines and supplies bolstered the work of 
the teams across the country.  On one hand, it was in part the US-funding provided for the 
smallpox campaign that facilitated the reorganization of mobile health units in West Cameroon. 
At the same time, laying the ground work for harmonization of the systems between East and 
West Cameroon allowed health officials to present the country’s health system as cohesive in its 
dealings with international organizations for planning this campaign.  It was a culmination of 
East Cameroonian officials’ consolidation of the state around Yaoundé and around institutions 
originating from French colonial rule.  It was also a culmination of the long-celebrated 
trajectory of the mobile health teams in the Franco-Cameroonian medical world and of the 
assertion of this history as central to Cameroon’s national and international health policy. 
 The significance of the extension of the teams was thus a culmination of developments 
spanning the 1960s, but it was also a point of departure.  At the same time, Cameroonian public 
health officials began to reconceptualize how the mobile health teams would fit into the larger 
public health administration, in line with recommendations from the World Health Organization 
calling for strengthened rural health services.  These recommendations called for a greater 
integration of curative and preventive medicine, and a potentially diminished role going forward 
for the mobile health service as it existed.471  Anglophone Cameroonian doctors, moreover, 
continued to play an active role in medicine and public health, and they helped to forge new 
opportunities within the country for bilingual medical training and work.  Thus while the 
harmonization of the mobile health team service from East to West Cameroon illustrates the 
prioritization of French institutions within the country, the future trajectory of the teams would 
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be marked both by international influence and the unique circumstances of the Cameroonian 
state.  
 In this sense, public health illuminates many of the broader tensions and the trajectories 
of state institutions and politics in the first decade of Cameroon’s independence.  The broader 
tensions of federalism and bilingualism drove many of these particular concerns in the fields of 
public health and medicine.  The difficulties of coordination of a variety of other issues across 
the federation, particularly issues such as currency and education, also came quickly to the 
forefront of public debate. But rather than just using public health as a lens through which to see 
the state, we can also see the politics of the Federal Republic as an illuminating context in 
which to view the regional politics of public health in postcolonial Africa in their own light.  In 
many ways, Cameroon presented a microcosm of the fault lines of biomedical training, culture 
and legacy that would play out more broadly in the 1960s across national borders between 
former British and former French colonies in West and Central Africa.  The forms of regional 
health cooperation between states that did and did not develop across African borders at this 
time were entirely based on these legacies, even in instances when diseases, and thus public 
health concerns, operated across other shared borders and other geographies.   
 Thus, we might see the significance of how Cameroonians during this time discussed in 
pointed ways the differences of health infrastructure in the two federal territories on two levels.  
First, these discussions were formative of the dynamics of creating national health policies in 
Cameroon and thus are essential for understanding that history.  But second, these conversations 
brought into light some of the ways in which African medical elite in the region viewed the 
possibilities for public health work in the first decade of independence as they took control over 
the functioning of state health infrastructures created under colonial administration, as well as 
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how international actors and institutions would function in this context. The assessments they 
made were commentaries on the training they had received, the systems they had worked in 
during colonial administration, and how they saw these experiences in comparison to one 
another.   These commentaries are in turn key to understanding how African public health 
officials saw the role of their states both in relation to one another and in relation to 
















Chapter 4: Mobile teams and smallpox eradication 
As Cameroonian and French health officials continued to re-formulate the place of the 
mobile health teams in the new national health administration, dramatic new plans for global 
disease eradication began to develop within international health organizations. The World 
Health Assembly of the World Health Organization first voted in 1959 to endorse a proposal 
from the Soviet Union for smallpox eradication.472  The idea languished for many years at the 
level of the WHO until 1966-67 when the World Health Assembly voted to set up a budget for 
smallpox eradication and to initiate a plan for a ten-year global eradication program.473  This 
bold new plan relied not on new postwar technologies such as DDT, but rather on the long-
existing technology of vaccination.474  Yet, in its vision for complete global disease eradication, 
this program exemplified all the ambitions of postwar international health rooted in 
technological solutions.  
In West and Central Africa, the development of the smallpox eradication program 
meanwhile launched the United States as a significant new player in the realm of international 
public health. In 1965, the United States announced a plan to support a regional program for 
smallpox and measles vaccination in Western and Central Africa.475 The United States Agency 
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for International Development (AID), a branch of the U.S. Department of State, had originally 
begun providing aid for measles vaccination in the region in the early 1960s, and the US 
Communicable Disease Center (CDC)476 became involved to provide operational structure and 
personnel.477  After American President Lyndon Johnson’s announcement of support for 
smallpox eradication, CDC officials proposed that the existing measles vaccination program in 
West and Central Africa be combined with the smallpox eradication program.478  By late 1965, 
American health officials were prepared to announce to health officials in West and Central 
Africa that USAID would fund a five-year program for smallpox eradication and measles 
control, with technical and operational direction provided by the CDC.   
 The history of the smallpox eradication program in West and Central Africa has to date 
been told primarily through the lens of the small cadre of American personnel who helped run 
the program.479 Accounts of the US-funded regional program in the expansive WHO history of 
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the global smallpox eradication program similarly reproduce this focus on a small number of 
foreign personnel.480  While these histories do acknowledge the role of the mobile health teams 
in former French colonies and of OCEAC in facilitating the eradication program, they frame 
these relationships through the lens of what it meant for the smallpox program, rather than what 
they meant for existing, and evolving, health administrations within Africa.  Moreover, these 
histories almost entirely erase the role of African doctors, health officials and personnel in the 
campaign.481   Notably, no in-depth histories of the smallpox campaign have been written by 
historians of Africa. 
 I seek in this chapter to reframe the significance of the smallpox eradication program in 
Cameroon as part of a longer history of negotiation through decolonization of the place of the 
mobile health teams as guardians of rural health intervention and purveyors of international 
health programs.  First, I argue that French and Cameroonian health officials used the 
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opportunity of the smallpox eradication program to assert the centrality of the Service des 
Grandes Endémies (SGE) and of the Organisation de Coordination pour la Lutte contre les 
Grandes Endémies en Afrique Centrale (OCEAC) as a framework for international health 
campaigns. They did so by insisting upon the use of the existing mobile teams for the 
eradication program as well as on US coordination with OCEAC states as a bloc.  In so doing, 
French military doctors of the mobile service elaborated their role as local intermediaries of 
international health, creating new dynamics through work with American health agencies and 
officials.  At the same time, Cameroonian officials saw this positioning as a way to bolster 
resources for the mobile teams and for regional health coordination.  Health officials in West 
Cameroon, in particular, used the occasion of the smallpox program to work on bolstering 
vaccination systems and the flow of health resources to that region. Given the already low 
incidence of smallpox in Cameroon in the late 1960s, I ultimately assert that the significance of 
the smallpox program in Cameroon had less to do with the goal of eradication itself and more 
with how Cameroonian and French health officials leveraged the new resources and 
professional networks opened through the program.482   
 At the same time, I argue that the final stretch of the smallpox program revealed the 
limits of the OCEAC framework of regional health, rooted in the geography of French empire, 
in addressing smallpox’s spread.  With the last phases of the smallpox eradication program in 
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Cameroon focused on movement across the border with Nigeria, it was the absolutist goal of 
global eradication that mobilized concerted action in addressing the spread of the disease in new 
ways.  This aspect of the story thus shows the limits of post-colonial state frameworks for 
health, rooted in colonial geographies, in the face of the mobility of people across space rooted 
in a deep African past.  
 These perspectives offer a rejoinder to recent scholarship arguing that, because the 
global smallpox eradication program asserted global over local humanitarian concerns in Africa,  
“it is in fact a history that cannot be written from the vantage points of African states; the story 
much be told through its creators, the WHO, the CDC and to a lesser extent AID.”483 This 
chapter will seek to show how aspects of this history can indeed be written from the vantage 
points of African states.  While supporting the point that the global vision of disease eradication 
did not mirror local concerns in many ways, I hold that the participation in the program by 
Cameroonian officials often served other political purposes. 
 The chapter begins by offering a brief background on smallpox in Cameroon in the 
colonial period and early 1960s, and the role of the French mobile health service in smallpox 
vaccination.  It then moves to the launch of planning for the smallpox eradication program 
during the first technical conference of OCEAC in Yaoundé in 1965.  After showing how 
French and Cameroonian officials shaped the operation of the program through OCEAC, I 
examine how the program operated in anglophone West Cameroon.  Finally, the chapter 
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analyzes the persistence of smallpox in the late 1960s in northern Cameroon, questions about 
the spread of disease across the Nigerian border, and the ultimate success in eradicating 
smallpox in Cameroon.  
Mobile Health Teams and Smallpox Vaccination 
 The central issue of smallpox vaccination in colonial French Cameroon, as well as in the 
independent state, was undoubtedly framed by two distinct and sometimes competing forms of 
mobility: that of the mobile health teams and that of people within and across borders.  In 1932, 
French officials made smallpox vaccination compulsory in Cameroon and called for 
vaccinations to be done every six years. 484  The mobile health teams soon took up the mantle of 
providing these vaccinations through their work of traveling to villages and assembling people 
for disease screening and vaccinations.   
 Mobile teams intensified vaccination schedules in response to outbreaks of the 
disease.485  After an outbreak of smallpox in 1944, the reported number of smallpox cases in 
Cameroon stayed relatively stable and low in the years immediately following World War II.  
Between 1951 and 1952, epidemics broke out in the northern region of the territory.  The 
French reported 721 cases of smallpox in 1951 and 1,105 cases in 1952.486   In 1951, the mobile 
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teams examined 298,222 people and 231,850 of those were given a smallpox vaccination.487   
Smallpox vaccination thus became one of the primary interventions of the mobile health teams, 
and helped to control the relatively infrequent epidemics in Cameroon.488 
Throughout the colonial period and the last stretch of the smallpox eradication 
campaign, the concentration of cases of smallpox largely occurred in the far northern region of 
Cameroon, an area bordered on one side during the colonial period by British Cameroon and on 
the other by Chad.  After independence, this part of British Cameroons became part of Nigeria 
and demarcated a national border with Cameroon.  For people living in northern Cameroon, 
particularly those living in the Mandara mountains, smallpox had long represented a fearsome 
force, striking communities in memorable episodes of disease retained in oral tradition.489 One 
anthropologist of northern Cameroon described the impact of smallpox epidemics on 
communities as “opening a parenthesis in time,” suspending all social and economic activity.490 
Communities across the northern region had in turn developed varied approaches to addressing 
                                                          
487 France, (1951), 231.   
 
488 Schneider, 203. William Schneider has argued that the WHO institutional history (Fenner et al.) has been taken 
as the ‘last word’ on the smallpox eradication program, but points out that it does not consider the history of 
vaccination campaigns in Africa before the eradication program. William H. Schneider, “Smallpox in Africa during 
Colonial Rule,” Medical History 53 (2009): 193-227.  William H. Schneider, “The Long History of Smallpox 
Eradication: Lessons for Global Health in Africa,” in Global Health in Africa: Historical Perspectives on Disease 
Control, ed. Tamara Giles-Vernick and James L.A. Webb Jr. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013): 25-41. 
  
489 Oral traditions recorded in 1995 in the region told of 7-8 major epidemics: 1866-1867, around 1890, 1904-1906, 
1914-1915, 1929-1933, 1943-1944, 1951-1952, 1961-1962.  Christian Seignobos, « La variole dans le Nord-
Cameroun: Représentation de la maladie, soins et gestion sociale de l’épidémie, » Cahier des Sciences humaines 
31, 1 (1995) : 150. French colonial archives record mark epidemics similarly from 1929-1931, slightly earlier in 
1940, 1944-1947 and around 1952-1954. See Schneider 2009, 223.  Seignobos also notes the various names for 
smallpox used by people in the area, translating to ‘the big thing’ from Fulfulde or ‘the fire of God’ among the 
Mofu Duvangar, 149.  
 




the disease, including prevention of its spread through inoculation and regimented practices of 
care, through isolation and other means, for those who fell ill.491   
The mobility of people in this area, rooted in a deep regional history, facilitated the 
spread of smallpox. The cross-border region shared a history rooted, in part, in the consolidation 
of the Sokoto caliphate, the spread of Islam and of Fulbe political dominance in the nineteenth 
century.  Although European colonial powers demarcated borders across this space at the end of 
the 19th century, it remained a place heavily demarcated as well by indigenous African political 
formations and networks of trade.   
 French colonial officials treated mobility, both in this area and more broadly across the 
colonies, as a challenge to governance and something to seek to counteract. Beginning in the 
late 1920s, for example, the colonial government had pursued a ‘regroupement’ policy for some 
communities in the Department of Adamawa, seeking to stabilize people into newly formed 
villages that could then be administered in accordance with French needs for labor and tax 
collection.492  Historians have noted, however, ways in which people might use mobility as a 
“political strategy and means of dispute regulation.”493   People might use the border, for 
example, to economic ends, as in 1958 when 150 people crossed over from British Cameroon to 
settle in French Cameroon in search of a lower tax requirement.494  This movement was 
                                                          
491 The specificity and variation of these practices is explained in great detail by Seignobos, 153-170. He notes that 
inoculation was practiced only in some places, often not in a systematic way.  
 
492 Philip Burnham, “’Regroupement’ and Mobile Societies: Two Cameroon Cases,” The Journal of African 
History 16 no.4 (1975): 577-594. Burnam’s article focuses on the Gbaya and the pastoral Fulani of Adamawa. 
 
493 Burnham, 594.  
 
494 NAC 2AC 7117, Subdivision de Mokolo, Rapport Politique Trimestriel, 1er Trimestre 1958.  This report also 
notes the political uncertainty at this time about the fate of the British Cameroons.  Some people from that territory 
anticipated in 1958 that their territory would eventually be attached to that of French Cameroon with independence.  
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facilitated both by a lack of firm border control and the networks created by historical ties of 
trade, language and custom.495 One colonial administrator in northern Cameroon mused in 1958 
that the trucks and donkeys crossing the border moved, not only fabrics and kola nuts, but also 
ideas; that the movement of merchants and farmers maintained a tight network of information 
across the neighboring territories. He observed that in their ‘spirit,’ the towns of Mokolo and 
Mora had more in common with areas just across the border than with those in southern 
Cameroon.496  He observed that this cross-border unity might pose a potential challenge to 
future national unity within Cameroon.  
 Colonial health officials similarly worried that people could use the border to avoid 
vaccination.  In 1945, colonial officials corresponded about setting up a meeting between the 
Directors of Health in French Cameroon and Nigeria in order to coordinate vaccination 
campaigns, in the hopes that this would prevent people from crossing the border to escape 
vaccination.497  Yet despite some efforts at cross-border coordination, vaccination schedules and 
planning proceeded largely within the bounds of colonial territories.  Throughout the colonial 
period and through the 1960s, health officials in Cameroon in turn framed the problem of 
smallpox in the state largely as one of cases “imported” across the Nigerian border.498    
                                                          
This ended up being the case for the southern British Cameroons, but the northern territory became part of 
independent Nigeria.  
 
495 NAC 2AC 7117, Etat du Cameroun, Région du Margui-Wandala, Rapport Annuel 1958, 4.  This report 
observed that there was not efficient policing of customs procedure at the border of this region.  
 
496 NAC 2AC 7117, Etat du Cameroun, Région du Margui-Wandala, Rapport Annuel 1958, 4.  
 
497 NAC APA 10909/K. 
 
498 The idea of “imported case” points to a broader trend in colonial Africa. Schneider notes that colonial health 
reports across the European powers in Africa often described any smallpox epidemic in their colonies as 
originating from another colony, 206. The cases of smallpox that did appear in OCEAC countries during the 
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After independence in 1960, the Service des Grandes Endèmies in East Cameroon 
adopted a triennial schedule for smallpox vaccination, meaning that the goal would be for 
mobile teams to vaccinate the entire population over the course of every three years.499  The first 
major outbreak of smallpox occurred after independence in northern Cameroon in 1961-1962.  
The first smallpox cases appeared in 1961 in the northern British Cameroons, which would 
become part of independent Nigeria in that same year.500  People traveling from the area to the 
administrative department of Margui-Wandala in Cameroon spread the disease to several people 
there.  
French military doctor, André Delas, who oversaw the mobile health service around 
Maroua in the early 1960s during this epidemic, spoke about the frequent travel of people in the 
region as a source of difficulty in controlling the epidemic.501 Health officials attempted to 
implement prohibition against travel by the sick but cases nonetheless cropped up in Maroua 
and Kaélé. Medical officials reported that one person sick with smallpox had traveled to Kaélé 
by truck at night.502  Here, in direct contrast to the celebrated mobility of the vaccination teams, 
the mobility of individuals outside of the biomedical infrastructure was cast as a problem.  
                                                          
smallpox program from 1967-1969 were in turn almost always attributed to movement of people across the 
Nigerian border. Frank Fenner et al, Smallpox and its Eradication (Geneva: World Health Organization), 1988, 907 
499 Rapport Final de la Premier Conférence Technique de l’OCCGEAC Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965, 
Tome II, 263.  
 
500 People of the British Cameroons voted by referendum in 1961 about whether to become politically joined with 
Nigeria or with former French Cameroon.  The people of the northern British Cameroons voted to join Nigeria and 
those of the southern area to join the former French Cameroon in the creation of a Federal Republic.  
 
501 A. Delas and J. Roguet, « A Propos D’une Epidémie de Variole au Nord-Cameroun (1961-1962), » Médecine 
Tropicale : Revue du Corps de Santé Colonial Vol. 23, No. 1 (1963) : 114.  
 
501 Delas and Roguet, (1963), 115. 
 




Travel was just one of the actions blamed for the spread of smallpox.  Delas also 
attributed its spread to hostility to vaccination among the population, and among those who 
were vaccinated, the practice of rubbing the site of the vaccine with soil, lemon juice or 
tamarind to try to neutralize its effect.503  This practice extended to other areas of northern 
Cameroon.  When a smaller outbreak of smallpox occurred further south in Rey-Bouba around 
the same time, a national newspaper warned during the outbreak that individuals attempting this 
cleaning after the vaccine would face a “severe penalty” and that “naïve” reasons for refusing 
vaccination would not be tolerated by authorities.504 
During the epidemic, Delas and other medical officials realized, however, that a 
significant number of the smallpox cases were among people who had just recently been 
vaccinated.  After conducting an experiment in Maroua, vaccinating half of the people with the 
existing vaccine, supplied by the Institut Pasteur de Kindia (Guinea) and half with a vaccine 
supplied by the Institut Pourquier de Montpellier (France), Delas concluded that the efficacy of 
the vaccine from Kindia had been compromised, possibly due to problems with proper transport 
and storage.505  People living in northern Cameroon had thus been vaccinated against smallpox 
but then contracted the disease anyway, thereby greatly undermining health officials’ insistence 
on having a biomedical solution to the disease that should be fully embraced.  Over 500,000 
people had been vaccinated with a vaccine of questionable efficacy.   
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504 NAC La Presse du Cameroun, No. 3588 Vendredi 6 Avril 1962, « Epidémie de variole et disette dans le Rey-
Bouba, » 1.  
 




 This kind of occurrence could have repercussions for vaccination campaigns in 
communities for years to come.  In 1965 for example, a Cameroonian government official 
reported from Guider that a smallpox vaccination campaign had provoked a “massive exodus” 
in the administrative district of Douma.  He reported that, while local politics might have been 
at play, that the consequences of the fear that the population experienced in 1962 after a 
vaccination campaign that resulted in multiple deaths could not be discounted.506  
 After the main outbreak in the far north of Cameroon, however, the reported cases of 
smallpox in Cameroon remained very low, going from 1145 cases in 1961 to only 28 in 1965.507  
When American officials announced funding for the smallpox and measles program in West and 
Central Africa in 1965, health officials in Cameroon did not, therefore consider smallpox to be a 
top public health priority.  Other OCEAC member countries likewise did not face a large 
number of smallpox cases by the time of the start of the eradication program (Table 2). The 
disease still, however, represented a threat more broadly across West Africa.  Bordering 
Nigeria, for example, had almost three-fourths of the cases of the smallpox in the region in 
1965.508  In this context, the planning for the program ultimately raised fundamental questions 
about the role of the mobile teams in the first major disease eradication program after 
independence, the role of Americans showing up in Yaoundé with their own bold new ideas, 
and the salience of the OCEAC framework for regional health coordination.  
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Trimestriel, Janvier, Février, Mars, Avril, Jun 1965, 8.  
 
507 Frank Fenner et al. Smallpox and its Eradication (Geneva: World Health Organization. 1988): 907.  
 




OCEAC member states, number of reported cases of smallpox, 1961-1969 
Year Cameroon Central 
African 
Republic 
Chad  Congo Gabon 
1961 1145 0 502 23 0 
1962 743 57 769 1254 1 
1963 135 3 10 1476 111 
1964 88 0 5 198 49 
1965 28 0 73 89 1 
1966 2 0 0 0 0 
1967 119 0 86 0 0 
1968 37 0 5 0 0 
1969 3 0 0 0 0 
Source: Frank Fenner. et al. Smallpox and its Eradication (Geneva: World Health Organization), 1988, 907. 
 
Smallpox Eradication and OCEAC  
American officials attended the first technical conference of the Organisation de 
Coordination pour la lutte contre les Endèmies en Afrique Centrale (OCEAC) in Yaoundé in 
1965 to present the proposal for the smallpox eradication and measles control program in West 
and Central Africa.  Because planning for the program began at OCEAC’s first technical 
conference, it was not merely an outside program being pitched to a long-standing organization 
but was rather a formative event in OCEAC defining its work and positioning vis a-vis other 
health organizations.  In Yaoundé, the initiation of the smallpox eradication program created an 
opening for OCEAC to assert itself as a regional health actor as it navigated direct American 
engagement with the organization.  It also raise questions about what this new avenue of 
resources for vaccination meant for the functioning of the mobile health teams in OCEAC 
member states.   
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In their capacity of the leadership of OCEAC, Dr. Jean-Claude Happi of Cameroon509, 
acting President of the organization, and French Secretary General, Dr. René Labusquière, 
asserted the solidarity of OCEAC states in their health cooperation and the centrality of their 
operations to the smallpox program. By asserting OCEAC as a forum for interaction with the 
American CDC, Happi and other African officials upheld both their regional relationships and 
ties to France as a framework for their engagement with other international health programs. 
Labusquière and other French doctors meanwhile secured their ongoing place through OCEAC 
as brokers of international health programs operating in Cameroon and other OCEAC states.  
Finally, seen from the vantage point of OCEAC, the smallpox program represented an influx of 
resources that could revitalize the work of the mobile health teams in the member states.    
The original American proposal for the smallpox program challenged OCEAC’s 
regional framework for health coordination and thus set off immediate controversy.  The 
proposal raised fundamental questions about the purpose of OCEAC as a coordinating body of 
member states.  On December 9th, Dr. Clayton Curtis, Medical Director of the Africa Bureau of 
USAID510 presented the general proposal for the smallpox/measles program to the OCEAC 
conference.511  Curtis presented the US proposal for five years of aid starting in July 1966 “in 
                                                          
509 Happi had been named ‘Commissaire général à la santé publique et à la population’ of Cameroon in May 1965. 
Personnalités publiques de l’Afrique centrale 1968, (Paris : Ediafric, 1968). Numéro spécial de bulletin de 
l’Afrique noire.  
 
510 The other US representatives at this meeting were D.A. Henderson, Henry Gelfand of the CDC, and Dr. Warren 
Winkelstein, a CDC consultant. Rapport Final de la Première Conférence Technique de l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C., 
Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965, Tome I, 3.  In the report, the entire delegation is listed under the heading 
‘US/A.I.D.” Horace G. Ogden, CDC and the Smallpox Crusade (Atlanta, GA : U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Public Health Services, Centers for Disease Control, 1987), 26.  
 
511 Curtis first presented the program to the whole OCEAC conference and then to a smaller subcommittee. The 
smaller subcommittee meeting involved the directors of the national mobile health services (SGE) of the national 
health services, Dr. Loembe as representative of Congo-Brazzaveille, the French doctors of the Secretariat General 
of OCEAC, the USAID/CDC delegation to the meeting. Dr. Loembe was the ‘Directeur des Affaires Sociales’ for 
the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville and was attending the OCEAC conference, along with the Minister of Public 
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18 African countries, going from Mauritania to Gabon.”512  He offered the list of included 
countries, however, without commentary on the exclusion of a member state of OCEAC, 
Congo-Brazzaville, from the program.513  Driven by Cold War politics, the United States had 
suspended formal diplomatic ties with the country in August 1965.514 After the presentation of 
the proposal, Dr. Loembe of Congo-Brazzaville announced his ‘legitimate emotion’, as a 
representative of his government, at discovering that his country had been excluded from the 
proposal while the other states of OCEAC were included, given that the program was being 
presented in the forum of the organization.   
When the conference revisited the topic, Labusquière and Happi first struck a 
conciliatory tone, suggesting ways that the smallpox program could proceed and working to 
                                                          
Health, as part of the delegation for the country.  A representative of the mobile health team service for the country 
was notably not in attendance.  
 
512 Rapport Final de la Première Conférence Technique de l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C., Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965, 
Tome II, 330. Countries included: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta. 
Note : The remarks of Dr. Curtis were translated from English to French for inclusion in the report.  I am providing 
my own translations back into English here.  
 
513 Warren Winkelstein noted after the conference that this lack of explanation was a mistake “In retrospect it 
would appear that it would have been far better to include a brief statement of the reason for excluding the 
Republic of Congo when the program was presented by Dr. Curtiss. (sic) While this would not have avoided the 
objections of the Republic of Congo, it would have made our position much stronger since we would have 
acknowledged the real reason for excluding this country.  As it was, we were placed in the awkward position of 
insisting that the exclusion was based on financial and epidemiological reasons, which was obviously not the case.” 
The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, “Memorandum, Subject: 
O.C.C.G.E.A.C. Conference-Discussion of U.S. Smallpox Eradication/Measles Program at Final Session” To: D.A. 
Henderson and H. Gelfand, From: W. Winkelstein, Jr., Douala, Abidjan: 12 December 1965. 
 
514 An uprising in August 1963 overturned the regime of Congo’s first President, Fulbert Youlou.  Alphonse 
Massamba-Debat was elected president and a new Marxist-Leninist party, the Mouvement National de la 
Révolution was created. Elikia M’Bokolo, “Comparisons and contrasts in equatorial Africa: Gabon, Congo and the 
Central Africa Republic,” in History of Central Africa: the Contemporary Years Since 1960, ed. David 
Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin. (London: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998), 81-82. Diplomatic ties 
with the United States remained suspended from 1965-1977.  United States Department of State, Office of the 
Historian, “A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, 




define OCEAC’s newly created role.  In their comments, the doctors evoked images of OCEAC 
as both a geographic entity and one tied together by relational bonds.  Labusquière lamented 
that the US funding proposal “passed through the middle of OCEAC.” 515  Dr. Happi conceded 
that OCEAC could not support this position to exclude one member of the “fraternal 
organization.” 516  Yet both also sought to reconcile the controversy, with Labusquière 
suggesting that OCEAC could offer assistance to Congo-Brazzaville517 and Happi quickly 
suggesting that perhaps the program could be established on a bilateral basis with each state.518  
These suggestions—one positioned to strengthen and the other to weaken OCEAC’s regional 
coordinating role—marked a moment of uncertainty in how the organization would deal with 
new actors and Cold War politics.  
The representatives of Congo-Brazzaville, however, insisted upon the need for OCEAC 
to stand its ground against the US proposal.  Mr. Simon Gokana,519 Minister of Public Health 
for Congo, “expressed his discontent,” saying that “OCEAC not being a political organization, 
it is regrettable to see the United States bring a political feud into the heart of OCEAC and to 
see OCEAC accept this fact. If the member states of OCEAC accept the proposal of the United 
                                                          
515 Rapport Final de la Première Conférence Technique de l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C., Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965, 
Tome II, 566.  
 
516 The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, “Memorandum, Subject: 
O.C.C.G.E.A.C. Conference-Discussion of U.S. Smallpox Eradication/Measles Program at Final Session” To: D.A. 
Henderson and H. Gelfand, From: W. Winkelstein, Jr., Douala, Abijan: 12 December 1965.  
 
517 Rapport Final de la Première Conférence Technique de l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C., Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965, 
Tome II, 566.  
 
518 The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, “Memorandum, Subject: 
O.C.C.G.E.A.C. Conference-Discussion of U.S. Smallpox Eradication/Measles Program at Final Session” To: D.A. 
Henderson and H. Gelfand, From: W. Winkelstein, Jr., Douala, Abijan: 12 December 1965.  
 
519 Gokana was trained as a nurse and served as the Minister of Public Health, Population and Social Affairs from 
April 1965-January 1968: Personnalités publiques de l’Afrique Centrale. Numéro spécial de Bulletin de l’Afrique 




States, Congo will be forced to withdraw from the organization.”520 Dr. Loembe reiterated the 
need for pooling the efforts of the member states and that it was difficult to see that his country 
would be left out of a vaccination plan.  He insisted that OCEAC express its displeasure to 
USAID to see “discrimination done for punitive reasons.”  He warned of the danger of creating 
this precedent as a threat to the future of the organization.521   
This controversy thus became a defining moment in OCEAC negotiating the parameters 
and limits of the cooperation of member states, and its dealing with external organizations.  Dr. 
Aujoulat, attending the meeting with the French delegation522, pushed the issue, posing the 
question whether the best course of action would be for OCEAC to reject, as a group, the 
American aid if it did not extend to all of the member states, ‘the raison d’être of OCEAC being 
to affirm the total solidarity of the states who compose it.”523 This proposal notably would 
concern not just the smallpox campaign money being offered, but also aid that had already been 
extended to three countries for measles vaccinations.524 Minister Gokana added that he did not 
want the other states of OCEAC to refuse American aid for reasons concerning his country, but 
                                                          
520 Rapport Final de la Première Conférence Technique de l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C., Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965, 
Tome II, 567.  
 
521 Rapport Final de la Première Conférence Technique de l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C., Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965, 
Tome II, 567. 
 
522 Dr. Aujoulat’s position at this time was ‘Directeur du Centre National d’Éducation Sanitaire et Sociale, et de la 
Coopération Technique au Ministère de la Santé Publique’ for France.  The other member of the French delegation 
was Dr. Vernier, ‘Adjoint au Directeur de la Coopération Culturelle et Technique, Représentant du Ministère de la 
Coopération. »  
 
523 Rapport Final de la Première Conférence Technique de l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C., Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965, 
Tome II, 568.  
 
524 The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, “Memorandum, Subject: 
O.C.C.G.E.A.C. Conference-Discussion of U.S. Smallpox Eradication/Measles Program at Final Session” To: D.A. 
Henderson and H. Gelfand, From: W. Winkelstein, Jr., Douala, Abijan: 12 December 1965. This referred to 




that because OCEAC was not political and the American offer was being only partial, it should 
not have been negotiated here.  He requested that negotiations take place outside of OCEAC.  
Dr. Happi assured the Minister that “OCEAC had learned of the plans of USAID at the same 
time as everyone, and with as much surprise.  There were no previous negotiations on the 
subject.” 525  
The conference attendees concluded the issue by adopting a resolution calling for a 
deferment of the US-backed program until a solution could be found to ensure provision of 
vaccines for all of the member states of OCEAC and to ensure that all of the states would 
benefit from the plan.  The resolution called for OCEAC to pursue negotiations with USAID in 
order to sort out the issues raised at the conference.  The resolution further called, based on a 
request by Minister Gokana, for those member states already having finalized bilateral 
agreements with USAID, to continue to pursue those operations.526  Dr. Happi was charged with 
consulting on this recommendation with the ministers of health of the member states.527 In his 
remarks closing the conference, Dr. Happi asserted the formation of OCEAC as a bloc of states:  
We sincerely thank Doctor Curtis and his colleagues for the offer by their 
country and we ask them to relay the expression of our gratitude to their 
government.  But we would like them to take this opportunity to remind 
this government that OCEAC is constituted by five states fraternally united 
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Tome II, 568.  
 
526 Rapport Final de la Première Conférence Technique de l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C., Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965, 
Tome II, 575-576.  
 
527 The United States representatives spoke privately with Dr. Happi after the meeting ‘to express our regret that the 
U.S. proposal had introduced a discordant note in the first technical meeting’ of the organization.  They reported 
that Dr. Happi ‘did not seem particularly upset by the situation,’ nor did Dr. Labusquière.  But Happi turned his 
attention after the meeting to talking with Dr. Loembe to smooth over the situation.  According to the US delegate, 
‘Dr. Aujoulat’s action had been designed to ameliorate the entire situation. Furthermore, other delegates agree that 
while the matter was serious, it was unlikely to eventuate in the Republic of Congo actually withdrawing” from 
OCEAC. The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, “Memorandum, Subject: 
O.C.C.G.E.A.C. Conference-Discussion of U.S. Smallpox Eradication/Measles Program at Final Session” To: D.A. 




in the fight against major diseases and it hopes that the generous assistance 
plans may be extended, without distinction, to all of these five countries.  
If OCEAC was a mother, how would she accept that one of her children 
starve to death, while the other four eat their fill?  OCEAC would have a 
guilty conscience sponsoring such a division. It might be useful in order to 
guard the fundamental principle of cohesion of our organization to leave 
the backing of such aid to the states themselves.528   
 
This issue thus raised fundamental questions about the role of OCEAC as a regional health actor 
at a key moment of self-definition for the organization.  And it was through the arrangements 
created through the smallpox program that the organization most clearly carved out this role.  
Ultimately, it was OCEAC leadership that secured funding of the smallpox program for 
Congo-Brazzaville and it was the existence of the organization as an intermediary that made this 
arrangement politically possible for US agencies. American officials continued to negotiate this 
issue with Labusquière and Happi throughout the winter and spring of 1966. On January 4, 
1966, the United States Ambassador to Cameroon, Leland Barrows, sent a letter to Dr. Happi, 
relaying the willingness of the United States government to reach an agreement with OCEAC to 
include all the member states in the vaccination program.  The letter laid out a precondition for 
this agreement: “In the case where the personnel of the United States are not able to participate 
in the execution of the program, special technical and administrative arrangements for the 
running of the program must be assured by OCEAC.”529 This letter set OCEAC in motion 
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towards setting up a plan for a program in Congo-Brazzaville in order to be able to move 
forward on signing a direct agreement with the United States.530 
The importance of the position that OCEAC took on the subject appeared in the 
background diplomatic coordination being conducted by US officials.  Dr. George Lythcott, the 
Director of the CDC regional program office, met with Ambassador Barrows on February 18, 
1966 and discussed a plan put forth to make the Congo-Brazzaville program operational in 
Fiscal Year 1968, a one year lag from the other OCEAC countries.  The Ambassador make it 
clear that if Dr. Labusquière of OCEAC and Cameroonian officials accepted this plan that he 
would also support it, “however if either did not accept the arrangement, that he, too, would 
insist that all five countries becoming (sic) operation at the same time.”  Barrows had originally 
taken the position that Congo-Brazzaville should be added to the original 18 country plan.  
Lythcott subsequently met with Dr. Labusquière on March 2nd and the OCEAC Secretary 
General ultimately did insist that all five OCEAC countries become operational at the same 
time.531 Lythcott received word back from Dr. Curtis that USAID was willing to supply vaccine 
and equipment for Congo-Brazzaville only through OCEAC, and that any technical assistance 
would have to be provided by non-US staff, be it OCEAC or WHO.532  In the context of the 
Cold War and post-independence Central African politics, it was thus through the smallpox 
                                                          
530 The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, Yaoundé le 11 Janvier 1966, Le 
Médecin Lieutenant Colonel Labusquière Secrétaire Général de l’OCCGEAC à Monsieur le Docteur Henry M. 
Gelfand, Communicable Disease Center.  
 
531 The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, “Discussions with Ambassador 
Barrows (Cameroun)” To: Dr. D.A. Henderson, Dr. H.M. Gelfand, Dr. R.H. Henderson,  From: Dr. George 
Lythcott., Yaoundé, March 3, 1966. This memo also details Ambassador Barrow’s frustration at being ‘second-
guessed and ignored by Washington (AID and State) in decisions affecting his areas of responsibility,’ given his 
original position that Congo-Brazzaville need to be included in the program for Fiscal Year 1967.  
 
532 The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, Cablegram, Department of State, 





program that OCEAC, African health ministers, and the American CDC and USAID forged new 
operational relationships of international health.  
 As these negotiations continued, discussion also developed about how exactly the 
smallpox program would operate in OCEAC countries.  Dr. Happi and Dr. Labusquière both 
asserted in these planning stages that the smallpox program would not operate independently 
from the work of the mobile health teams of OCEAC member states, but would rather be folded 
into their regular work.  This conception of the program differed from that of the CDC, which 
advocated for the creation of special vaccination teams.533  Happi and Labusquière’s stance both 
asserted existing mobile health service infrastructure as a necessary point of entry for 
international disease campaigns and successfully leveraged the resources offered through the 
program, particularly that of vehicles, in service of the mobile teams.  
 Dr. Happi and Dr. Labusquière laid out these proposed operations to US representatives 
in February of 1966.  In a letter accompanying a proposed ‘Five-year plan of vaccination,’ Dr. 
Happi wrote to the USAID representative in Yaoundé, “We are in fact anxious that these 
vaccinations as is normal form a part of the usual multiple activity of the major Endemic 
Diseases Services without there being specialized teams for this or that vaccination.  This 
doubtless entails the necessity for more supplies since each team would need to be supplied, but 
on the other hand a saving in personnel and operating expenses.  And for the States..[OCEAC].. 
such an economy is of first importance.” 534 
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 The OCEAC vaccination plan also sought to coordinate aid from USAID, from the 
French Fund for Aid and Cooperation (FAC) and from UNICEF into one operational structure. 
The operations plan thereby sought to coordinate vaccinations against measles and smallpox, as 
well as against yellow fever and tuberculosis, arguing that “in this manner, the same vehicles 
and the same means of refrigeration will allow the transportation of different vaccines and the 
same equipment will be utilized simultaneously for the inoculation of vaccines from different 
sources.”535 In addition to the measles and smallpox vaccine provided by the US, OCEAC 
anticipated the provision of tuberculosis vaccine through the French Government and of yellow 
fever vaccine through UNICEF.  From the US, OCEAC also requested the provision for each 
mobile team with equipment comprising the Ped-O-jet536 for vaccination, a portable refrigerator 
for vaccine transport, a freezer for vaccine preservation at central points, and means of 
transportation for the teams.537  Each country submitted specific requests to OCEAC about the 
needs for these equipment from the US, which OCEAC then submitted as a comprehensive 
plan. OCEAC also requested materials, including Ped-O-Jets and freezers, for use in its training 
program for mobile health team personnel based in Yaoundé.538 OCEAC thus approached the 
initiation of the smallpox/measles program as a way to bolster the overall work of the mobile 
                                                          
535 The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, Memo, From: OCCGEAC, Subject: 
Operations plan for vaccination campaigns, February 28, 1966. The plan laid out different vaccination schedules 
for each OCEAC country, either on annual, biennial or triennial schedules.  Cameroon, for example, proposed a 
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536 The jet injector was a new means of vaccination developed in the 1960s and made it possible to vaccinate 
people much more quickly with fewer medical personnel. Ogden, 11.  
 
537 The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, Memo, From: OCCGEAC, Subject: 
Operations plan for vaccination campaigns, February 28, 1966. The plan called for freezers at each ‘sector base’ of 
the mobile health teams.  Each country was divided into administrative sectors for the organization of the mobile 
teams.  
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health teams by improving their equipment in the form of vehicles, freezers, and the provision 
of vaccines.  Dr. Happi characterized the aid provided through the smallpox program as “truly 
considerable” and as something that would enable the realization of the “vocation” of OCEAC 
through “une action mobile, sociale, preventive et simultanée dans tous les Etats Membres…”539  
OCEAC member states were ultimately the only countries in the US-funded West and Central 
African smallpox/measles program to fully incorporate the program into their existing medical 
services.540  
 Enthusiasm for the goal of smallpox eradication itself was muted among OCEAC 
leadership and members. Dr. Lythcott of the CDC reported in March 1966 that “preliminary 
discussion with Labusquière speaking for all OCEAC countries this morning strongly suggests 
he does not accept concept of smallpox eradication” and that the decision to not mount special 
vaccination teams for smallpox reflected this stance.541  Labusquière’s stance reflected a pride 
and defensiveness about the previous French-led efforts to control smallpox in the member 
states.  Leading up to the launch of the official smallpox program, he emphasized that the 
program would only “consolidate, thanks to material resources never equaled, the results 
                                                          
539 OCEAC Archives, Rapport Final de la Deuxième Conférence Technique de L’O.C.E.A.C. Yaoundé du 30 
Janvier au 3 Fevrier 1967 Tome I, 10. 
 
540 Fenner, F. et al. Smallpox and its Eradication (Geneva: World Health Organization), 1988, 866.  Table 17.3.  
Upper Volta used existing prospection teams for smallpox vaccination but created special teams for measles 
vaccination.  All other countries created special teams for smallpox and measles vaccination. On a more local level 
of experiencing this campaign, the lack of special teams and the combination of vaccination deserves note.  From 
this vantage point, the smallpox eradication program may have been nothing remarkable at all in many of its local 
iterations.  That is to say that particularly in places that had not seen smallpox cases in many years, the campaign 
would be carried out, not by foreigners, but by Cameroonians or Chadians, etc in mobile teams, which had been 
carrying out vaccinations for decades.  The visitation of mobile teams to rural communities for vaccination was 
therefore not of note in itself, although the histories of those interactions widely varied across and within OCEAC 
states. 
 
541 The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21(Cablegram?) Department of State, 




already obtained through many years of effort.”542  While the American CDC touted the 
promise of the Ped-O-Jet to facilitate eradication efforts, Labusquière insisted that eradication 
depended less on technique or the vaccine used and more on levels of absenteeism at 
vaccination sessions; he insisted that eradication was primarily an administrative or 
governmental question.543 In addition to doubting the feasibility of smallpox eradication, 
Labusquière approached the new incursion of Americans into OCEAC countries, and more 
broadly into medical work in Africa, with considerable skepticism.544  
 African health ministers and doctors of OCEAC framed the problem of smallpox, and 
their investment in the eradication program, as being related to an external rather than an 
internal problem.  Dr. Happi voiced support for the program in terms of controlling smallpox, 
but thought the goal of eradication and the ten-year timeline to do so proposed by the World 
Health Assembly might be “too hasty,” particularly in light of the failure of malaria 
eradication.545  He spoke instead about the factors necessary for smallpox control and 
characterized the problems that Cameroon faced in this regard as being due to re-introduction of 
the disease from neighboring countries.  Happi argued that coordination between countries 
                                                          
542 OCEAC Archives, Activité des Services des Grandes Endémies Des Etats-Membres, Synthèse Globale, Rapport 
Annuel 1966, O.C.E.A.C, 66.   
 
543 Rapport Final de la Première Conférence Technique de l’O.C.C.G.E.A.C., Yaoundé du 7 au 11 Décembre 1965, 
Tome II, 287.  
 
544 Sencer, David (Interviewer); CDC; Former Director of CDC, “Jeannie Lythcott Oral History ,” The Global 
Health Chronicles, accessed March 17, 2016, http://www.globalhealthchronicles.org/items/show/3493. Jeannie 
Lythcott, wife of George Lythcott, remembers Labusquiere as being ‘just puffed up with national pride.  Any 
notions that Americans were going to be coming to help them were just impossible.’ Other CDC officials made 
similar observations about their interactions with French doctors across West and Central Africa over the course of 
the program. See: Harden, Victoria (Interviewer), “Christopher D'Amanda Oral History,” The Global Health 
Chronicles, accessed March 16, 2016, http://www.globalhealthchronicles.org/items/show/3489. 
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would in turn be key to any eradication efforts and pointed to OCEAC positively as being in a 
position to coordinate vaccination programs.  He concluded that because of OCEAC, Cameroon 
would be protected completely along its eastern border but that a ‘threat’ still remained on the 
western border with Nigeria.546 Dr. Keita of Chad attributed smallpox in his country to 
‘imported’ cases and highlighted that the mobile health teams had been doing regular smallpox 
vaccination for over ten years.  He pointed to the need for coverage of vaccination along the 
borders of Chad, particularly given the passage through his country of people traveling from 
Nigeria and Francophone West Africa on their pilgrimage to Mecca.547 Dr. Beday-Ngaro of the 
Central African Republic characterized his country as a ‘fortunate exception’ among African 
countries south of the Sahara in regards to smallpox, due to the work of the mobile health teams.  
The Central African Republic should support the smallpox eradication program, he argued, 
because of its central position within Africa and length of its borders.548  Among the OCEAC 
countries, only Simon Gokana of Congo Brazzaville characterized smallpox within his country 
as arising from internal factors; he attributed outbreaks of the disease from 1962-1964 to people 
ceasing attendance at vaccination sessions after independence.549 Most of these doctors and 
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549 WHO AFR/RC 16/11 Rev. 1, World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa, Sixteenth Session of the 
WHO Regional Committee for Africa, Held in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo from 12 to 22 
September 1966, Final Report and Minutes of the Meetings, 130.  Gokana said the number of cases had fallen after 




health ministers instead characterized their investment in the smallpox program on the basis of 
addressing a problem that originated beyond their borders, both nationally and regionally 
conceived.  
On June 30, 1966, Dr. Happi and the US Ambassador to Cameroon signed a final grant 
agreement between OCEAC and the US for the smallpox/measles program.550 The grant 
agreement stated that no AID-financed materials could be provided to Congo-Brazzaville until 
OCEAC, USAID, and the CDC all agreed on a plan of operation for the country.551 OCEAC 
countries (excluding Congo-Brazzaville) subsequently signed additional bilateral agreements 
with the United States in the fall of 1966 and CDC officers began to arrive in-country.552 Two 
Americans would be based in Yaoundé: Dr. Arlan Rosenbloom as a Medical Officer and John 
McEnanay as an Operations Officer.  Discussion of the launch of the program continued 
through 1967, with the official program set to launch in the second half of the year.  The 
                                                          
550 WHO Rapport Final de la Troisième Conférence Ministérielle Inter Etats de l’O.C.E.A.C, Libreville le 20 et 21 
Juin 1967, 14. The first grant for the program allocated approximately 185 million CFA, or $735,000, divided 
among the five member states of OCEAC and $10,000 for OCEAC operating expenses.  The National Archives at 
Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, Cablegram, Department of State from American Embassy 
Yaoundé, Barrows, to RUEWC/SECSTATE WASHDC Priority YOAID 410. June 30, 1966. To: AID, From: 
Yaounde, Subject Measles-Smallpox Grant OCEAC, Drafted by Felix J. Lapinski.  Successive amendments would 
bring the total amount of US-AID funding to OCEAC states to $2,346,000 by 1970. World Health Organization 
Library, World Health Organization Regional Committee for Africa, 20th Session, “Surveillance and Co-ordination 
in the Control of Communicable Diseases in Africa,’ Report on a meeting convened by the Regional Office for 
Africa of the World Health Organization, Brazzaville 18-19 March 1970. AFRO 0053 AFR/CD/24, 29 May 1970.  
 
551 The National Archives at Atlanta, RG 442-CL-06-33-02, Box 3, Folder 21, Airgram, July 12, 1966. To: AID, 
From: Yaounde, Subject Measles-Smallpox Grant OCEAC, Drafted by Felix J. Lapinski.  
 
552 Statistics Unit (Author); Smallpox Eradication Program, “West Africa Smallpox Eradication/Measles Control 
Program Surveillance Report No. 2,” The Global Health Chronicles, accessed May 5, 2016, 
http://www.globalhealthchronicles.org/items/show/3040.  The agreements for OCEAC countries were signed as 
follows, Cameroon: October 15, 1966; Gabon: October 24, 1966; Chad: October 25, 1966, CAR: November 15, 
1966.  CDC officers and arrival dates: Cameroon: Medical Officer Arlan Rosenbloom (also covering Gabon) 
(arrival date unknown) and Operations Officer John McEnanay, arrived October 31, 1966; CAR: Operations 
Officer, Neal Ewen, arrived December 8, 1966; Chad: Medical Officer Bernard Lourie (also assigned to CAR), 
arrived November 10, 1966 and Operations Officer. Russell Charter, November 3, 1966; Gabon: Operations 
Officer, Mark LaPointe, November 4, 1966.  
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question of operations in Congo continued to be a point of negotiation.  In February 1967, 
OCEAC signed an amendment to the June 1966 agreement with the US that specified the 
amounts of vaccine and materials that would be sent to Congo and OCEAC, and noted that 
OCEAC representatives would act in place of American representatives in the campaign.553  
The campaign ultimately began in 1968 in Congo.554 
 This arrangement solidified the category of “OCEAC countries” within the US-financed 
regional smallpox program, a categorization reproduced throughout CDC reporting and 
correspondence, with Yaoundé as its center.  This arrangement thus imprinted the public health 
geography created through OCEAC’s inception onto the first major global health program 
occurring after independence in the African states.  The planning, negotiation and launch of the 
smallpox program with the coordinating involvement of OCEAC thus brought the assertion of 
the member states of constituting a health region into the heart of operations of this campaign.  
It moreover positioned Labusquière as a primary broker of these relationships.  Through the 
smallpox program, Labusquière and Happi both advanced an international politics of health for 
Cameroon deeply rooted in the ongoing power of France and a regional model for health 
coordination framed through the geography of French empire.   
 At the same time, Dr. Happi continued to cast the role of OCEAC as one that gave 
power to the member states in dealing with international agencies, particularly the Americans, 
as well as one that furthered public health goals.  Dr. Happi pointed to the outcome over Congo-
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Brazzaville as proving OCEAC’s utility.  In a 1967 OCEAC meeting, he noted that the Minister 
of Health of Congo sat ‘on the same benches’ as the US representatives as “proof that we have 
succeeded in breaking down certain regrettable barriers.”555  At the inter-ministerial conference 
of OCEAC in that same year, Happi again raised this example, saying that OCEAC was an 
organization that had allowed them to “grease the wheels of the machine” by being an 
intermediary to provide vaccines to Congo, concluding that this proved that “unity is 
strength.”556  OCEAC continued to paradoxically represent both the continuation of French 
dominance in aspects of the medical systems of African states as well as a platform for a vision 
of regional African integration.  With the smallpox eradication program, these two factors both 
gained great significance for the functioning of international public health.  
West Cameroon 
In the federated state of West Cameroon, like in much of East Cameroon, planning for 
the smallpox program raised new questions about the politics and logistics of coordinating this 
influx of international resources and the goal of eradication.  A crucial difference between West 
and East Cameroon, however, came in how health officials saw the potential links between 
existing medical infrastructure and the eradication program. OCEAC discussions of the 
planning of the program asserted that existing national mobile health teams, growing out of the 
infrastructure of French colonial administration, would form the basis of the program at national 
and regional levels.  But this discussion did not highlight the regional exception of Cameroon as 
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a federal republic, with the federated state of West Cameroon that had been under British 
colonial administration.557  How did the smallpox program operate in West Cameroon and what 
does this reveal about the relationships between international, regional and national politics of 
public health?  
As Chapter 3 describes, the initial push in the 1960s to extend the mobile health team 
model to West Cameroon was part of a broader negotiation between West and East 
Cameroonians about the fault lines of colonial legacy, medical infrastructure and training 
between the anglophone and francophone federated states. The smallpox eradication program 
brought new resources and forms of international connection into this discussion.  On one hand, 
these resources and the imperative of eradication facilitated aspects of the ‘harmonization’ of 
public health administration across the two states.  On the other hand, the program created new 
professional networks between health officials in West Cameroon and their East Cameroonian 
counterparts, with French doctors and American officials.   
In 1967, Dr. Thomas C. Nchinda, became the Deputy Director of Public Health to the 
Director of Medical Services for West Cameroon, with the responsibility to oversee the mobile 
and rural health service, the Service des Grandes Endémies et de la Médecine Rurale (SGEMR) 
for the federated state of West Cameroon.558  The Federal Ministry of Health in Yaoundé, led by 
Dr. Happi, gave Dr. Nchinda the task of aligning work in West Cameroon with that of the 
mobile health team service in East Cameroon. In this role, he thereby became the direct liaison 
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for the Ministry of Health on matters related to the SGEMR in West Cameroon.559 He also 
became the liaison for the Assistant Director of the SGEMR at that time, Dr. André Delas, a 
French military doctor.560   
It was ultimately through the influx of resources of the smallpox eradication program 
that Dr. Nchinda was able to pursue the goal of restructuring and revitalizing vaccination work 
in West Cameroon in standardization with the system in East Cameroon.561  Dr. Nchinda 
retrospectively described the organization of the program:  
I planned it almost military style going from village to village from 
Victoria (now Limbe) in the South through to Nkambe in the North 
with the assistance of the 2 USAID consultants to the project.  We 
ran a one week training session in Limbe prior to the start.  My Field 
Unit workers were brought down to Limbe from all over West 
Cameroon and trained to use the Ped-o-Jets brought in by the 
USAID team for use in the vaccinations.562 
The teams conducting the smallpox and measles vaccinations in West Cameroon largely drew 
on existing medical personnel, former Medical Field Unit staff and “Yaws Scouts.”563  In this 
way, the system of Cameroonian medical staff developed during the British administration of 
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560 NAC Buea. Sc/a/1968/15.  Correspondence between Delas and Nchinda about measles cases and vaccination.  
 
561 The smallpox and measles vaccination campaign launched in West Cameroon from April to September of 1967.  
OCEAC Archives, “Les Campagnes de Vaccination Associées Au Cameroun, » Par le Docteur André E. Delas, 
Rapport Final de la Troisième Conférence Technique de l’O.C.E.A.C., Yaoundé du 24 au 27 Janvier 1968, Tome 
II, 518.  The campaign included the smallpox vaccine for 56.1% of the total population of West Cameroon and the 
measles vaccine for 57% of the population of children aged 6 months to 6 years in West Cameroon.; Centre Pasteur 
du Cameroun, Activité des Services des Grandes Endemies des Etats-Membres, Synthese Globale, Rapport Annuel 
1967, O.C.E.A.C, 68. In total, 575,802 smallpox vaccines were given in West Cameroon in 1967.  
 
562 Email correspondence with Dr. Nchinda, February 13, 2014.  
 
563 Email correspondence with Dr. Nchinda, February 14, 2014.  Correspondence February 13, 2014 “In West 
Cameroon prior to Independence, control of Communicable diseases was handled by Medical Field Unit Teams 
and they handled, among other diseases, the Smallpox Vaccinations nationwide.  This team had in its ranks Yaws 
Scouts who searched for Yaws cases and these were treated with Penicilline by the Field Unit Teams.   
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West Cameroon became restructured to align with a mobile health team model forged through 
French colonialism, all in service of a major global health initiative funded here by the United 
States.  Moreover, a West Cameroonian doctor trained in Nigeria coordinated this program on 
the ground.  Few other arrangements show so clearly how the smallpox program in Cameroon 
intersected with the politics of public health in Cameroon, with its dual colonial legacy and 
status as a federal republic with ongoing ties to France.  The reorganization of mobile health 
work in West Cameroon was forged through the smallpox campaign, but this outcome was a 
product of both the effort from Yaoundé to harmonize public health administration across the 
federated states as it was the global eradication effort. In other words, the global goal provided 
the impetus and resources to more aggressively pursue national reforms.   
The smallpox program created the necessity of re-organizing vaccination teams in West 
Cameroon, but it also provided the resources to do so. Local health officials in Mamfe in West 
Cameroon reported that before the start of the smallpox/measles campaign in April 1967, “the 
activities of the M.F.U. [Medical Field Units] have been more or less at a standstill owing to 
lack of funds, transport and the necessary drugs.”564 In 1968, the mobile team in Mamfe 
reported doing most of its work with the Dodge lorry provided by the US through the smallpox 
program, facilitating the administration of over 27,000 vaccinations.565  Officials in the Wum 
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medical division reported a similar state of affairs.566 Dr. Delas marked 1967 as the turning 
point when the mobile service was seriously reorganized in West Cameroon.567 Delas noted, in 
fact, that health officials in Cameroon had directed a significant portion of the overall material 
coming in through the smallpox program had been put towards the campaign in West 
Cameroon, such that operations in the rest of the country were constricted.568 
As the smallpox program continued, Dr. Nchinda also saw an opportunity to try and 
address an ongoing issue of the flow of health resources from the capital in Yaoundé to the state 
of West Cameroon.  In an interview I conducted with him in 2014, Dr. Nchinda recalled that 
getting some of the supplies and equipment in Yaoundé to “trickle down” to West Cameroon 
was one of his “biggest headaches and challenges.” He “generally bargained very hard for 
anything” and had to prove himself in the Ministry of Health, “where there was always a lot of 
skepticism about things emanating from West Cameroon.”  He recalled setting out on the task 
of reorganizing the mobile health teams with “very limited means.” 569  As teams in West 
Cameroon continued to pursue smallpox and measles vaccination, Dr. Nchinda made a request 
to Dr. Rosenbloom from the CDC to assign an additional Operations Officer specifically for 
West Cameroon, in addition to John McEnaney in Yaoundé.570  He recalled this as a strategic 
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move, hoping that having an Operations Officer on site would allow for a greater visibility of 
the needs of the area and a more direct response to them.571  USAID/CDC did not ultimately 
fulfill the request for an Operations Officer, but Dr. Nchinda remembers things improving after 
taking Drs. Delas and Rosenbloom on a tour of rural health centers in West Cameroon.572  Dr. 
Delas subsequently sent a new vehicle for Dr. Nchinda’s professional use.573  The eradication 
program thus opened new avenues through which Cameroonian health officials worked to 
reorient health resources within the country.   
 Dr. Nchinda’s role as both a high-ranking English-speaking health official in Cameroon 
and medical official for the smallpox eradication program meanwhile opened new opportunities 
for him to participate in international health training and networks.  In the summer of 1968, he 
traveled to Atlanta as the sole representative from Cameroon to participate in a training course 
on epidemiology at the CDC.574  He attended OCEAC technical conferences in Yaoundé to 
represent the program in West Cameron and also attended meetings of the World Health 
Organization’s World Health Assembly as part of the Cameroonian delegation between 1966 
and 1972.575  While Drs. Labusquière and Happi asserted the francophone grouping of OCEAC 
as a framework for the smallpox eradication program from Yaoundé, Dr. Nchinda’s work 
simultaneously created other avenues of international medical connection—with East 
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Cameroonian, French and American doctors—that were a unique product of the eradication 
program.  These connections began Dr. Nchinda’s travel in international health circuits, which 
later culminated in his career at the World Health Organization in Geneva from 1983 through 
his retirement.  
Moreover, while health officials at OCEAC focused on medical cooperation with 
francophone states, questions arose in West Cameroon about other international orientations and 
cross-border politics, particularly about how the movement of people across the border with 
Nigeria would impact the spread of disease and the need for vaccination.  These concerns came 
amidst great upheaval caused by the Nigerian Civil War, with West Cameroon sharing a full 
border with the self-declared independent state of Biafra.576  Reports of measles cases in the 
West Cameroonian town of Victoria (present day Limbe) in March 1968 traced back to mostly 
unvaccinated individuals in a village outside of Victoria, ‘made up mainly Nigerians 
(particularly Biafrans).” As a result, two West Cameroonian medical personnel dispatched to 
the village to administer both smallpox and measles vaccinations.577  In June 1969, Dr. Nchinda 
responded to federal government officials with assurances about steps being taken to vaccinate 
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all Nigerians or other people crossing into Cameroon, and pointed to work by mobile health 
teams in the past year at key locations. 
The mobility of people across this border highlighted both the harsh conditions of the 
civil war occurring in Nigeria as well as the historical and contemporary ties between Eastern 
Nigeria and West Cameroon.  In West Cameroon, the OCEAC framing of francophone health 
cooperation through shared health problems and solutions appeared removed from the realities 
of both the movements of people and the history of health infrastructure.  The organization’s 
insistence on cooperation with its francophone neighbors obscured the historical ties of 
Cameroonian communities across the Nigerian border.  In contrast to the politics of the planning 
for the program in Yaoundé, in West Cameroon (Buea), the program planning reflected the very 
particular history of the state’s complicated former ties to Nigeria, the legacy of British colonial 
medical administration, and its position as a federated state of the Republic of Cameroon.   
Northern Cameroon and Eradication 
 The final push of the smallpox eradication program in Cameroon ultimately focused on 
mobility across the Nigerian border.  On one hand, French military doctors with the mobile 
health service shaped responses to the work in this region through their leadership of 
vaccination teams, investigation of cases, and broader shaping of the understanding of smallpox 
in the area.  On the other hand, this final stretch of the campaign highlighted the limitations of 
the OCEAC conception of the health region as a framework for disease eradication.  Oriented 
towards other francophone states sharing the history of French mobile health teams, this 
framework did not respond to the ongoing spread of smallpox across the Nigerian/Cameroonian 
border.  It was the absolutist goal of disease eradication that mobilized a new focus on 
eradicating smallpox in this area.  
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 In 1967, with the smallpox eradication program underway in Cameroon, the only 
identified cases of smallpox across OCEAC states were identified in northern Cameroon near 
the Nigerian border and in Chad.578 Most of the cases in Cameroon, in Fort-Foureau and in 
Mokolo, for example, were attributed to importation of the disease from Nigeria.579 Health 
officials similarly tracked cases in Chad to people traveling from Nigeria, some in transit to 
Mecca.580  OCEAC officials at the time surmised that there were more cases in Cameroon, but 
that the population notified health officials of cases only very late or when the situation had 
become very serious.581 
 The problem of smallpox in northern Cameroon in the final stretch of the eradication 
program reflected a longer history of the disease in the area, and French military doctors who 
had worked in the north became key intermediaries of the global program.  Dr. André Delas, 
who had overseen the mobile health service in the far north of Cameroon during the 1961 
epidemic, was serving in a national position as the Assistant Director of the Cameroonian 
mobile health service by the late 1960s. His particular experience of smallpox vaccination in 
northern Cameroon would thus help to shape how the problem of the disease and the 
problematizing of human movement took shape within the context of the global program.  
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When Delas presented a report in 1969 to a seminar in Lagos on the US-funded smallpox 
program, he highlighted the porousness of the Cameroonian/Nigerian border and its 
consequences:  
Control of the frontier between Cameroon and Nigeria is 
absolutely impossible.  Numerous mountain tracks are used in both 
directions, and villages and markets exist on the frontier itself.  
Surveillance of cases and an increase in the vaccination coverage 
in the two countries concerned are the only measures possible to 
achieve control of the disease.582 
Delas’s position more broadly illustrated how French doctors of the mobile health service 
positioned themselves as brokers of the smallpox program, as ‘local’ experts vis a vis 
international health through the program.   
 At the same time, the goal of eradication elevated the situation in northern Cameroon to 
one of global concern and catalyzed intensified attention.  This goal brought new attention to 
cross-border mobility as well as to people’s response to vaccination  This resistance to 
vaccination—emerging out of a history of biomedical intervention under colonial rule and its 
locally negligible reformulation after independence—thus now became something to be 
combatted with new resources, and with new foreigners. Two Cameroonian mobile teams 
responded to the 1967 outbreak, administering 60,000 vaccinations with an additional 
surveillance team performing control work.583  The mobile health team service in Mokolo 
reported during this time that the population there feared vaccination more than smallpox 
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itself.584  Dr. Arlan Rosenbloom and John P. McEnaney, the CDC officers based in Cameroon, 
worked with the mobile team service in Mokolo and focused on using market days to extend 
vaccination coverage.585  OCEAC officials attributed the successful response to the outbreak to 
all of the resources made available and to the direct assistance of the Americans, which 
permitted the vaccination of ‘a large part of the population of this mountainous region, 
particularly resistant to vaccination.” 586  The eradication program thus increased the stakes of 
this resistance, and the attention it merited, to one of global consequence.587 
 The eradication program would likewise make the mobility and the routes traveled by 
people across northern Cameroon and northern Nigeria a matter of global health concern. One 
of the outbreaks of smallpox in 1967 gives a particularly vivid example of the cross-border 
mobility at the heart of both the spread of smallpox and the response. On November 18, 1967, 
the French SGE physician based at Fort Foreau Cameroon, Dr. Genevois, heard about a 
potential outbreak of smallpox in the village of N’Game from the chef de Canton of the town of 
Afade.  A Cameroonian nurse traveled to N’Game and identified four cases of smallpox and on 
November 21st a mobile team subsequently vaccinated roughly four thousand people in and 
around the village.  After Dr. Genevois identified a new case of smallpox in the village that day, 
                                                          
584 Centre Pasteur du Cameroun, Activité des Services des Grandes Endémies des Etats-Membres, Synthèse 
Globale, Rapport Annuel 1967, O.C.E.A.C, 59.  
 
585 Ogden, 62.  
 
586 Centre Pasteur du Cameroun, Activité des Services des Grandes Endémies des Etats-Membres, Synthèse 
Globale, Rapport Annuel 1967, O.C.E.A.C, 101.  The CDC account of the smallpox campaign attributes success in 
vaccinating people during this outbreak to Rosenbloom and McEnaney’s tying of the vaccination schedule to local 
market days.  Ogden, 63.  
 
587 For a discussion of a contemporary example of local resistance to vaccination in the context of a disease 
eradication program, see: Elisha P. Renne, The Politics of Polio in Northern Nigeria (Bloomington: Indiana 




he reported the cases, in light of the geographic proximity, to the Director of the SGE in Chad, 
Dr. Pierre Zeigler.  Dr. Bernard Lourie, the CDC officer based in Chad, travelled into Cameroon 
with Dr. Zeigler to investigate the cases.588 The CDC history of the smallpox program mentions 
this outbreak and characterizes the travel of Dr. Lourie and Dr. Zeigler into Cameroon as ‘an 
excellent example of the intercountry cooperation made possible by the regional program.” I 
would argue that this particular cooperation and mobility, prompted by the communication 
between French physicians, was rooted in the history of the French colonial medical service and 
the framework of cooperation through OCEAC, more so than through the CDC conception of a 
regional program for West and Central Africa.   
 They ultimately traced the outbreak back to a one year old girl.  The CDC reports 
detailed: 
In late August or early September the vaccinated mother of case No. 1 went 
to Nigeria to visit some relatives, taking her non-vaccinated baby girl with 
her.  She took a public bus to the border town of Fotocol, and then walked 
some ten kilometers to the town of Gamerou where her relatives lived.  She 
stayed five days in Gamerou.  During this time she always kept her baby 
with her.  She denies that there was anybody sick in Gamerou at that time.  
She denies that anyone had any skin lesions.  After give days, she started 
back home, walking again to Fotocol and again taking the bus.  At N’blame 
the rain barriers were down and the bus could go no further.  She therefore 
walked about 25 kilometers (with the baby) until she reached her home in 
N’Game.  She made the entire trip from Gamerou to N’Came in less than 
one day.  She had needed no documents to cross the frontier.  Ten days after 
she got home, the baby developed a fever and a popular rash.  She states 
that on the third day of the rash she took the baby to the dispensary at 
AFADE for treatment (this point is being checked with the dispensary 
records). In any case the diagnosis of smallpox was not made.  All of the 
subsequent cases lived in the same compound.589 
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In March of 1967, CDC officials similarly tracked an outbreak of measles to the travel of a 
Nigerian woman from Mokoua with her infant.  They traveled from Mokoua through various 
Nigierian towns and eventually to Fort Foreau, Cameroon, stopping there for ten days and then 
crossing over into Chad by ferry.  They noted that she did not need to show any vaccination 
certificate to make any of these crossings.590   
These cases of women traveling across a border and producing no documentation in the 
process demonstrated a fluidity of movement at odds with the idea of a rigidly constructed 
political or meaningful medical border.   Categorizing ‘imported’ smallpox cases in this location 
within the context of a global eradication campaign was rather a tool to assign responsibility—
designating who should respond to a particular outbreak within a national context, but also 
designating that the source of that outbreak lay elsewhere.  On one hand, this categorization 
upheld the importance of the national border as a medical border signifying accountability.  On 
the other hand, it highlighted the ultimate irrelevance of these distinctions in the context of the 
broader goal of eradication.  Smallpox eradication would only be complete once it was truly 
global, but within that pursuit, health officials continued to work through smaller geographic 
units and to frame problems and approaches through these units.   
Health officials based in Mokolo in northern Cameroon recognized this fluidity and 
called for joint campaigns across the Nigerian/Cameroonian border, observing that people 
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wishing to escape vaccination could easily do so by crossing over the border.591 As more cases 
of smallpox cropped up in 1968 in northern Cameroon in the administrative departments of 
Margui-Wandala, Mayo Danaye, and Bénoué, Dr. Delas argued that the danger of smallpox in 
Cameroon would persist until immunization coverage was realized in northern Nigeria.592  And 
at his request, American officials began sharing weekly reports on smallpox cases in Nigeria.  
He echoed local officials in northern Cameroon, saying that what was really necessary was to 
know when vaccination was happening across the border in order to coordinate.593  
 If the movement of people across these geographic spaces, and thus the consequences 
for the spread of disease, was old, the level of concern by health officials about the outcome of 
this mobility was new in its urgency and was oriented towards the absolutist goal of smallpox 
eradication.  A globally oriented approach to disease still had to work through national health 
infrastructures and thereby at local levels, such as that of Mokolo, attention to the importance of 
national borders and their permeability in fact became more pronounced from a public health 
perspective. Health officials within Cameroon faced new urgency in the face of the eradication 
program to address cases of smallpox within its borders, even as the epidemiology of the 
disease grew from cross-border movement, in a location where the history and significance of 
that border as marking a political delineation was shifting and unstable.594  
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Notably, smallpox persisted across a transnational geographic space at odds with 
OCEAC’s proposed health region.  French and Central African health officials argued that this 
region grew naturally from the shared history of French colonial mobile health teams, a vision 
of continuing this system after independence, and of shared health problems.  OCEAC’s 
reliance on the trope of disease knowing no borders and insistence that its organization 
responded to this fundamental truth, did not, in fact, correspond to the movement of people 
across the Cameroonian/Nigerian border, movement rooted in a different, deeper, social and 
political history of the region.  Thus, while OCEAC, through a refashioned colonial medical 
infrastructure, became the basis for the operations of the smallpox campaign, it was the lived 
movement of Cameroonians outside of and across this space that set the final parameters of 
smallpox eradication in Cameroon.  
Conclusion 
 In 1969, the last ever recorded cases of smallpox within the five member states of 
OCEAC were reported in Cameroon.595  The US-funded regional program in West and Central 
Africa meanwhile produced wider success quickly.  The program began across most countries 
in 1967 and the last case of smallpox in the region was detected in 1970.596  This regional 
success bolstered the global eradication program, which proceeded under the umbrella of the 
WHO through the 1970s until the official pronouncement in 1980 that smallpox had been 
completely eradicated from the world.597  The US-funded vaccination program continued 
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formally through 1972, and at the end of this time, the second arm of the program had not 
achieved success; measles outbreaks continued to beset Cameroon and neighboring countries.598   
 The eradication program in Cameroon played a small part in the vast effort at global 
eradication, but the program began at a critical juncture for Cameroonian and French health 
officials in negotiating their internal and external working relationships and the formulation of 
national and regional health policy.   Through these negotiations, Central African health 
officials and doctors and the French doctors still working in these countries made mobile health 
teams, both in their on the ground local work and their regional conception through OCEAC, 
into the basis for the first major global health campaign after independence.  At the same time, 
the eradication program highlighted the margins of this medical framework within Cameroon—
of the need to extend the model in West Cameroon and of its limitations, both past and present, 
in Northern Cameroon.   
The program likewise forged new international medical connections, at both individual 
and institutional levels.  Drs. Happi and Nchinda of Cameroon each took on new roles in the 
negotiations of international health programs through national and regional structures. Drs. 
Labusquière and Delas meanwhile carved out new post-independence roles as French 
intermediaries of international health programs in Africa.  Connections between these health 
officials and Americans would continue in new institutionalized ways: the CDC placed senior 
epidemiologists at both OCEAC in Yaoundé and the West African Organization de 
Coordination et de Coopération pour la Lutte contre les Grandes Endémies (OCCGE) after the 
termination of the program as a way to maintain involvement in the health work of the member 
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countries.599 In the early 1970s, USAID provided funding for new small-scale programs in 
Maternal and Child health coordinated through OCEAC and for the building of a training center 
at OCEAC headquarters.600  Through these connections, Yaoundé’s identity as a central site for 
international health work within Central Africa became greatly strengthened through the 
smallpox program.   
The smallpox program was also, in many ways, a culmination of the work of the mobile 
health teams, as they had previously existed, in independent Cameroon.  During the program’s 
operations, Cameroonian health officials were simultaneously engaged in work in coordination 
with the World Health Organization to alter the structure and role of the teams within the 
country’s overall public health system.601  Moreover, the conclusion of the smallpox program 
within Western and Central Africa prompted health officials-both from within and outside of 
Africa- to call for the creation of an ‘Inter-Country Coordination Committee on Communicable 
Diseases for West and Central Africa,’ citing the ‘vacuum’ of coordination that could occur 
with the end of the smallpox program.  Dr. Happi and other OCEAC health ministers advanced 
this recommendation for discussion in the WHO Africa office, a recommendation that in many 
ways recognized some of the limitations of their own organization as a coordinating body on 
health.602  The period of the smallpox eradication program in Cameroon thus encapsulated a 
very particular moment in the country’s establishment of its public health policies, at once 
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marking a further consolidation of national health policy, a reformulation of medical 
coordination with France and with African neighbors, and the shaping of international health 



















Chapter 5: From Mobile Health Teams to Basic Health Services 
 The Smallpox Eradication Program represented the height of, and by far the greatest 
success, of the convergence between the mobile health team service in Cameroon and postwar 
global disease eradication programs.  It was thus after independence that the successful 
convergence of the colonial mobile health team model as an implementer of global disease 
eradication programs seemed most clear.  The smallpox campaign took place, however, at the 
same time as broader shifts in the focus of the World Health Organization and its relationship to 
the work of Cameroon’s Ministry of Health.   
 As the failures of the global Malaria Eradication Program in many countries became 
clear, the WHO began to turn its attention over the course of the 1960s to the need of countries 
to invest in basic health services.603  Although the most decisive changes to the WHO’s focus on 
primary health care did not occur until the 1970s, this shift had roots in the late 1960s, when the 
WHO substantially increased the number of projects around the world focused on basic health 
services.  In 1965, the WHO supported 85 such projects worldwide and by 1971, this number 
nearly doubled to 156.604 These projects focused on developing permanent health systems that 
could reach whole populations.  
 Over the course of the 1960s, the Cameroonian Ministry of Health embraced WHO 
recommendations and began to develop reforms to the national health administration.  The 
reforms marked a turn away from the campaign-style approach to health intervention in rural 
areas developed by the mobile health service through the colonial period and into the 1960s 
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through the organization of the Service des Grandes Endémies (SGE).  The program pursued by 
the Cameroonian government, upon advice of the WHO, to reorient rural health care around 
newly formed rural health centers and diminish the role of mobile teams represented a new 
vision for public health in the country. As a result, a conflict developed between the French 
military doctors of the SGE, WHO representatives, and Cameroonian health officials over the 
future of the mobile health team service and of rural health services more generally. 
Cameroonian health officials took steps to reform the national health system in line with WHO 
recommendations in a manner that French military doctors considered to be too rapid and also a 
direct attack on the mobile health team model.  Through this program, Cameroonian health 
officials in turn began to carve out a new relationship to the WHO, less heavily marked by the 
intermediary of the French military doctors of the SGE.  I assert in this chapter that, catalyzed 
by the WHO, these debates over rural health in Cameroon thus in large part centered on the 
place of the colonial model of the mobile health teams and French Service des Grandes 
Endémies (SGE) doctors in the independent state.   
 These debates in Cameroon reflected the larger issue of both France and the WHO 
working to assert influence over health in independent African countries, with each developing 
different visions of rural health reform in the 1960s.  Because the WHO offered primarily 
technical assistance, and not long-term operational financial support, in this realm, some French 
officials saw the WHO as spurring reform in African countries that its government would in 
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turn have to help finance.605  In 1965, the French Ministry of Cooperation thus put forth its own 
recommendations for the reorganization of rural health in African countries.606 
 While recognizing this broader debate, my focus in this chapter is on how the ongoing 
negotiation by Cameroonian officials of the convergence of colonial and international models of 
health intervention continued to shape national health administration through the late 1960s and 
into the early 1970s. Debates about this new path for the Cameroonian health administration 
happened both through national meetings for planning focused on rural medicine as well as at 
OCEAC meetings. The conflicts in these meetings became explicit, as OCEAC Secretary 
General Rene Labusquière clashed with WHO representatives.  Cameroonian officials, 
particularly Commissioner General of Health Jean-Claude Happi, sought to reconcile these 
positions while also moving forward with the plan for the creation of a new rural health system 
in Cameroon.  Although Happi had asserted the primacy of the French mobile health team 
model through the inauguration of OCEAC and through the smallpox eradication campaign, he 
also paradoxically became a vocal advocate of a departure from this model through closer 
collaboration with the WHO.  I argue that by simultaneously affirming the maintenance of 
French systems and their reform through the WHO, Happi and other Cameroonian officials 
sought to maximize international assistance for the Cameroonian health system while also 
responding to new political imperatives within the country. These officials asserted that the 
health situation, in terms of both disease burden and needs of the population was changing, and 
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they made a case for leveraging multiple avenues of technical assistance to address these 
changing circumstances.  Cameroonian officials did not, however, frame these changes in terms 
of an overt break with the colonial past.  They both adopted a discourse that celebrated the 
French colonial legacy of medicine and pushed for adaptation of this model to new international 
norms represented by the WHO.    
 This stance by Cameroonian health officials in turn forced a new position for the French 
military doctors involved with running the Service des Grandes Endémies, who explicitly took 
issue with these reforms but ultimately had to work within them in the context of an 
independent Cameroonian government.  OCEAC presented a distinct forum in that it created a 
space for French doctors to assert authority outside of a purely national context, while still 
claiming to speak in the interest of independent countries. As the technical leader of OCEAC, 
Labusquière used his platform to vigorously debate these reforms with the WHO.  Labusquière 
and other French doctors moreover continued to assert their authority, relative to the WHO, of 
knowledge of local conditions of Cameroon and realities on the ground.  The decision by 
Cameroonian officials to work more closely with the WHO, however, diminished the weight of 
these claims to singular authority. 
Following primarily legislative reform in the mid-1960s, the Cameroonian government 
began in the late 1960s to develop new models for rural health intervention at the level of pilot 
projects. The reforms thus remained geographically limited in the 1960s, but their pursuit by the 
Cameroonian government marked new arrangements of international health.  Notably, the 
government also pursued a new plan for medical training in the country in line with WHO 
recommendations and away from French models of medical education. It was thus ultimately 
not the moment of political independence, but rather the response of Cameroonian health 
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officials to shifting international health priorities, that catalyzed experimentation with moving 
away from the French mobile health team model.  Cameroonian officials sought to maintain 
strong ties to France but also to optimize other avenues of international health resources, even 
when those avenues challenged the seeming French-Cameroonian consensus about the value of 
the mobile health teams.  
Independence and Pre-Eradication 
The reforms to rural health that the WHO advised and the Cameroonian government 
adopted grew out of perspectives from the failures of malaria eradication efforts in Cameroon, 
more broadly in Africa, and across the world.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the originally hopeful 
results of interrupting malaria transmission in southern Cameroon by the end of the 1950s were 
followed by a powerful resurgence of the disease.  Other sites in Africa showed a similar 
resurgence of malaria transmission following the cessation of the pilot projects.607  In light of 
these failures both in and beyond Cameroon, and just as Cameroon gained political 
independence, the WHO began developing new frameworks for addressing malaria. 
 As the WHO began to propose new malaria strategies, the independent Cameroonian 
government in turn faced new decisions about how to coordinate multiple sources of funding 
and influence in relation to health and medicine.  As shown in the previous chapters, France’s 
broader heavy-handed ongoing involvement in Cameroon both extended to, and took on 
particular form, in the area of medicine and international health.  In the early 1960s, 
Cameroonian health officials closely guarded and solidified the place of the SGE in the national 
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administration and, in turn, its role in international health.  The creation of OCEAC in 1963 and 
the role of the organization in the Smallpox Eradication Program exemplified these connections.  
 Early changes to WHO policy on malaria in the 1960s and the embrace by the 
Cameroonian government of these changes show, however, how the new circumstances of 
dealing directly with the WHO as an independent nation opened complexities that would grow 
over the course of the decade.  In the case of malaria, Cameroonian health officials developed 
agreements with both the WHO and with the French Fonds d’Aide et de Coopération (FAC) to 
garner as much technical assistance and funding as possible.  They developed these agreements 
with the WHO at times without coordination with FAC, and thus began to exert a distinct 
working relationship to the WHO.  With Dr. Simon-Pierre Tchoungui, a proud product of the 
French medical system and early driver of OCEAC’s creation, at the helm of the Cameroonian 
Ministry of Health in the early 1960s, this was not a move to exert independence from French 
influence as much as it was to capitalize on sources of external assistance in bureaucratically 
expeditious ways.  The embrace of WHO recommendations by Tchoungui, however, opened up 
a significant avenue of influence on the formation of the national health administration in 
Cameroon, which would later grow into direct conflict between these recommendations and the 
French doctors of the SGE. 
Following the failures of the malaria pilot zone in southern Cameroon, French, WHO 
and Cameroonian health officials entered into a period of uncertainty over how to move forward 
on malaria efforts.  In 1961, the Cameroonian government created a National Malaria 
Eradication Service (Service National d’Éradication du Paludisme), as a health service distinct 
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from the SGE.608  Although a French military doctor briefly led the new service, by October 
1961 it was led by Cameroonian Dr. Samuel Abane Mbomo.609  In December 1961, French 
representatives of the Fonds d’Aide et de Coopération informed Minister of Health Dr. Simon-
Pierre Tchoungui that France would no longer support the malaria program in Cameroon as it 
existed, given the distant and unpredictable results. FAC would support the functioning of the 
newly created National Malaria Eradication Service in the short term until the creation of new 
accords between the Cameroonian government and FAC planned for 1963. FAC meanwhile 
funded the work of a malaria specialist, Médecin Général Bernard, to work in the country and 
help formulate a new malaria strategy.610   
At the same time, the WHO began to develop new recommendations for malaria work in 
African countries, which officials presented during the Third African Malaria Conference, held 
in July 1962 in Cameroon’s capital city of Yaoundé. One of the institutional lessons that the 
WHO identified from the failures of malaria eradication programs was “the need for a 
previously well-established and functioning public health infrastructure.”611  The WHO thus 
advised that countries should develop this infrastructure in preparation to eventually pursue full-
scale malaria eradication.  The organization characterized this strategy as “pre-eradication.”  
The organization defined the main purpose of a malaria pre-eradication program “to promote 
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and contribute to the building up of those “necessary basic foundations,” which comprise two 
main components, or objectives: (a) the national malaria services; and (b) the public health 
infrastructure.”612   
At the Yaoundé conference, Cameroonian officials, while expressing support for the 
WHO’s global strategy and Cameroon’s place in it, above all emphasized the imperatives of 
continuing with malaria efforts in a national context.  Cameroonian President Ahidjo opened the 
conference and emphasized that, despite the failure of the eradication pilot program in southern 
Cameroon, people had experienced a “considerable decrease in infant mortality” over the course 
of the campaign and thus had new expectations for ongoing efforts: 
So, in the course of my travels around the country, I find that prefects, 
parliamentarians and the local population are greatly disturbed by the 
discontinuance of insecticide spraying, of which they have learnt the value, 
and they ask me for chloroquine for their children. How can I explain to 
them that our country has not yet reached the stage of ‘operational maturity’ 
and that a pre-eradication programme, probably stretching over many years, 
must precede any eradication plan?  What the people are worrying about is 
the fact that the number of malaria cases, as well as infant mortality, are 
increasing.  Consequently, Gentlemen, the authorities in this country are 
wondering whether it is possible to wait for eradication to be effected on a 
world scale, and whether there are not grounds for taking measures at the 
national level straight away.613 
Ahidjo’s comments indicate that he saw political imperatives in continuing with malaria efforts 
in Cameroon, regardless of how they related to larger global goals.  More importantly, the idea 
of a globally-oriented timeline of “pre-eradication” presented potential obstacles to these 
national political imperatives.  
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 In the following months, Minister of Health Dr. Simon-Pierre Tchoungui similarly wrote 
that, while Cameroonian officials supported the WHO program outlined in the conference, 
eradication was still a “distant goal” and that malaria posed a serious public health problem in 
the country.  He noted that “malaria morbidity was far more formidable than that of other 
conditions such as: leprosy, tuberculosis and treponematoses for which Cameroon benefits from 
bilateral and international assistance.”614 Cameroonian officials thus staked their involvement 
with WHO programs going forward primarily in terms of the public health problems and 
politics of the nation.   
The Cameroonian government in turn developed accords with the WHO based on the 
new strategy of malaria pre-eradication.  Following the malaria conference in Yaoundé, the 
Cameroonian government signed a bilateral agreement with the WHO in December 1962.   
Most other independent African countries, by contrast, did not agree to adopt the pre-eradication 
programs for malaria advocated by the WHO.615  The new plans for Cameroon focused on 
resumed DDT spraying in the former pilot zone around Yaoundé, provision of antimalarial 
drugs, and development of the public health infrastructure.616  As part of planning for a new 
program of investment in basic health services in the Cameroon, the WHO sent a representative, 
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Dr. M.E. Torfs, to Yaoundé in March of 1963 to conduct a country-wide survey of existing 
medical facilities.617 
Through planning for a malaria pre-eradication program, Cameroonian officials dealt 
directly with the WHO and at times did not coordinate this work with the French fund for 
bilateral assistance, FAC.  Minister of Health Tchoungui requested additional funding from 
FAC to support the malaria plan developed with the WHO, while recognizing that the lack of 
coordination: 
Obviously it seems regrettable that the Executive Committee of FAC was 
not briefed on WHO’s intentions in due course, but it was difficult for the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon to report on the 
negotiations (always long to finalize with the WHO) before they had been 
submitted. 618 
Despite the outsized role of French aid on the Cameroonian health administration in the early 
1960s, these direct negotiations between the Cameroonian government and an international 
institution began to multiply the factors at play in shaping the health policy of Cameroon as a 
country, and its place in international health programs. The French meanwhile developed 
separate accords to support malaria work in Cameroon.  In 1964, FAC funded a program for the 
distribution of anti-malarial drugs in schools in northern and southern Cameroon, as well as in 
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Yaoundé.619 Torfs, the WHO representative, reported that the coordination in Cameroon 
between this French bilateral aid and the WHO was “practically inexistent.”620  
Restructuring of the SGE and Rural Health 
 The Cameroonian government first began to implement broader structural changes to the 
health administration, in line with WHO recommendations, through legislation in 1963. These 
changes to the structure of the health administration focused on fusing the curative and 
preventive medical services of Cameroon.  The WHO called this nature of reform that it 
advocated “integration,” a term that became a flashpoint of conflict over the structuring of the 
health administration in Cameroon.  According to the 1962 agreement between the WHO and 
Cameroon, a primary goal was to develop a network of rural health posts capable of providing 
adequate malaria screening and treatment in the ultimate pursuit of eradication.621  
 This plan called for a reorienting of the state medical resources of Cameroon in which 
most of the more highly-trained medical personnel, including both doctors and nurses, were 
concentrated in urban health centers.622 In 1964, an equal number of state-employed doctors 
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were available on one hand for the roughly 6% of the Cameroonian population living in the 
main cities of Yaoundé and Doula and on the other hand for the 94% of the population living 
outside these cities.623  Auxiliary medical staff with less training and workers without any 
medical training primarily worked in rural areas, between dispensaries and the mobile teams.624  
Torfs of the WHO reported in his assessment of medical facilities in Cameroon that the sub-
skilled personnel in these rural dispensaries rarely benefited from suitable supervision by a 
doctor, given the demands of those charged with this responsibility.625  Moreover, the vast 
majority of medical personnel in the country worked in a capacity that the government 
characterized as “curative medicine” as opposed to “preventive medicine.”626  Rural 
dispensaries thus provided very basic curative care, as opposed to preventive work done by the 
SGE of disease screening and prevention (such as vaccination), or sometimes treatment of 
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transmissible diseases. The SGE in turn followed circuits of work within its prescribed sectors 
that overlapped with areas where there were rural dispensaries, but it rarely worked in 
coordination with these facilities.627 
 The Cameroonian government thus began pursuing reforms to create closer coordination 
between curative and preventive measures in rural areas, which entailed a re-envisioning of the 
place of the mobile teams in the overall work of the public health administration.  These reforms 
began only on a more conceptual level in the early 1960s, but they catalyzed a debate over their 
merits within Cameroon over the course of the decade.  In 1963, the Cameroonian government 
began initiating reforms to create a new section of the health administration, Le Service des 
Grandes Endèmies et de la Médecine Rurale, aiming to ultimately integrate the work of rural 
dispensaries and the SGE.628 A cornerstone of this change would be SGE doctors, the heads of 
SGE sectors, taking over responsibility for the oversight of rural dispensaries.  Dr. Happi, the 
Director of Health in 1963, reasoned that SGE doctors were in the best position to provide 
oversight of these dispensaries, given their existing work in touring areas through their 
oversight of mobile health teams.629   
Dr. Happi, Dr. Torfs of the WHO, and SGE doctors working in Cameroon met in August 
of 1964 to discuss the implications of these changes, and this gathering became an annual 
occurrence to discuss changes to the rural health administration. In this meeting, Dr. Happi and 
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Dr. Torfs stood in the position of explaining these changes to the French military SGE doctors, 
and advocating for the vision of this new arrangement.  Happi specifically began in this meeting 
to develop a position as a mediator between the WHO and SGE doctors, a role that he would 
continue to play at points throughout the 1960s.  
Although some SGE doctors pointed to few potential benefits to this new plan, many 
cast the intended reforms as a fundamental reordering of the purpose and work of the mobile 
health team service as it existed.  Dr. Sébastien Garrigue, Deputy Director the SGE, asked 
pointedly, “Can we now conclude that the specific action of the Service des Grandes Endémies 
is at an end?”  He warned that if the service was eliminated or altered, it would likely have to be 
reconstituted in the future to confront new disease threats. 630 
Happi expressed surprise at the pushback for the SGE doctors to the plan for 
“integration” and asserted the necessities of making changes to the existing system.631 
Although, Happi in other forums celebrated upholding the legacy of Jamot, here he also insisted 
upon the need for reform in light of changing circumstances within Cameroon. 
.. the current SGE must assume the role we expect of it. It is not a question 
of retaining the same principle that JAMOT had instituted in the 
SHMP…There were epidemics at that time that were absolutely necessary 
to be controlled by mobile circuits. Today, these epidemics no longer exist 
with the same intensity, but these epidemics have become endemic. To 
treat bilharzia, smallpox or trypanosomiasis, do we need a mobile team? 
Can not one radiate from fixed bases? And cannot these fixed bases be 
dispensaries? 632 
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 As Happi asserted this new framework, the meeting highlighted the delicate 
arrangements of authority produced through the combination of Cameroonian political 
independence and the ongoing hold of French military doctors on the mobile health service.  
Garrigue asserted that doctors should have been consulted before these changes were made, but 
he also expressed the bottom-line subordination of the SGE doctors to work within the 
framework of the Cameroonian government, given that the changes were already legislatively 
instituted.  He concluded, “There is absolutely no question and there has been no question of us 
fighting it; we are the ‘executants.’”633  This meeting also highlighted new working dynamics 
that these changes created between Cameroonian health officials, SGE doctors and the WHO.  
Dr. Happi presented a united cause with Dr. Torfs in reforming the Cameroonian health system, 
and while recognizing the French SGE doctors as those who would be the front line of this 
change, he asserted that the French doctors would need to adapt in the coming years to a new 
health plan.  
 The Cameroonian government further institutionalized these reforms through legislation 
in 1965. This legislation charged the Service des Grandes Endémies et de la médecine rurale 
with both curative and preventative medicine through rural health centers and the surrounding 
areas.634  The mandate of this service would extend behind the detection and prevention of 
transmissible diseases to also include responsibility for preventive health aimed specifically at 
mothers and children in rural areas, at sanitation, and health education.635  These plans for 
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reform of the health system moreover became enshrined in Cameroon’s second development 
plan, for 1966-1971, with Dr. Torf’s study of the existing health facilities in Cameroon deeply 
shaped the framing of health issues in this report. 
 The plans for basic health services called for further restructuring of the administrative 
organization of the SGE and of preventive health work.  In 1964, the SGE in East Cameroon 
worked through a division of the federated state into 14 sectors, each encompassing a main 
town that the SGE used as a base.  Each sector came under the direction of a medical officer, 
which at this time still were still primarily French military doctors.  This medical officer in turn 
oversaw the work of mobile teams to travel circuits for screening, prevention and treatment 
across the villages of the sector.636  By contrast, the administration of hospital and dispensaries 
worked through the administrative unit of the Division, with the Divisional Director of Public 
Health in charge.637 
In 1967, the Cameroonian government designated new administrative units for rural 
health, dividing the country into 24 sectors of Grandes Endémies et de la Médecine Rurale, 
marking a change from the previous 14 sectors of the SGE structure.638  The plans to reform the 
health system revolved around the creation of Departmental Centers of Preventive Medicine 
(Centre départemental de médecine preventive, CDMP) headed by a doctor.  The former SGE 
sector base would become the “Centre Départemental de Médecine Préventive,” a headquarters 
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of sorts for all the rural health work in the area.  Each CDMP would include a mobile team for 
disease screening and vaccination, however the new structure focused primarily on a new model 
of mobile health work.  Under the umbrella of this center fell health facilities, including existing 
dispensaries, which would be classified as either “Centres de santé développés” and “Centres de 
santé élémentaire.”  Each center would be headed by a nurse and serve as a base for “mobile” 
personnel charged with going directly to peoples’ homes in the area of the Centre de santé.  This 
thus marked a change from the mobile health team model of assembling people at a specific 
time for all forms of preventive intervention.  In addition to the explicitly mobile personnel, the 
idea was that all personnel who previously worked only in dispensaries would also have a 
mobile aspect to their responsibilities.639  This plan thus did not diminish the need for “mobile” 
health intervention in Cameroon, but reordered the focus, staffing and supervision of this kind 
of work.  Most importantly, it structurally integrated this work in the functioning of ‘static’ 
health posts.  
In theory, each of these rural health sectors would be led by a doctor who would work 
alongside another doctor in charge of the larger hospitals and health structures in the area.  At 
the time of the change, however, Cameroon did not have enough doctors to fill all of these 
positions.  Only 10 sectors in East Cameroon, designated as ‘type A’ could be equipped with the 
two head doctors.  Nine of the sectors had only one doctor to oversee both the hospital and rural 
health affairs.640  Dr. André Delas of the SGE characterized the success of the reforms as largely 
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based in this organization of personnel; where there were two head doctors, the work was 
progressing, but where there was one he saw an almost total failure of reforms.  He painted a 
picture of a surgeon, uninterested in public health, being in the positon of overseeing preventive 
medicine and being simply unable or unwilling to fulfill the role. 641   
 In the sectors that were more fully functioning, some key operational changes occurred.  
For one, dispensaries (now called health centers) were inspected frequently.  The method of 
treating leprosy also was shifted from being mobile health team work to the job of a nurse 
connected to the health center who would travel around the area by bike. Another important 
change involved increasing state oversight and standardization of medication and equipment for 
dispensaries.642  The mobile teams of the SGE remained in place, with the plan that they would 
remain so for disease screening and vaccinations, until “total coverage” was achieved with the 
new rural health system.643  
This reorganization could not happen en masse, and the Cameroonian government 
worked with the WHO to focus on implementing these changes first in discreet pilot zones 
within the country, called Zone de Demonstration d’Action de Santé Publique (DASP).  The 
government ultimately designed six DASP zones representing different geographic, ecological, 
and social conditions within the countries.644  The first DASP zone of Nyong et Kellé launched 
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Services de Santé de Base » 11 juillet 1968, AFR/MAL/94 ; AFR/PHA/42, 8.  The six zones were in the following 
areas. 1) Nyong et Kellé, 2) Haut-Nkam, 3)Guider, 4) Ngoundere, 5) Kadei and 6) Bamenda. 
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in January 1967 and the second of Haut-Nkam in July 1967.645  The first two DASP zones 
began operation with a doctor in charge of each zone and aided by a head nurse. UNICEF 
furnished each with a vehicle for their work.646  
 
Map of DASP zones. WHO Archives, CAE-SHE-001 Jkt 1-Development of Basic Health Services, 1967-1969. 
                                                          
645 WHO AFRO MAL 1968, Dr. M.E. Torfs, « Programme de Prééradication du Paludisme—Développement des 
Services de Santé de Base » 11 juillet 1968, AFR/MAL/94 ; AFR/PHA/42, 8. 
 
646 WHO AFRO MAL 1968, Dr. M.E. Torfs, « Programme de Prééradication du Paludisme—Développement des 
Services de Santé de Base » 11 juillet 1968, AFR/MAL/94 ; AFR/PHA/42, 12.  While updating its bilateral 
agreements with the WHO in 1965 and 1967, the Cameroonian government also signed a tripartite agreement with 
the WHO and UNICEF in august 1966 for the development of basic health services. 
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One of the first goals in the zones was to retrain existing medical personnel for “itinerant 
duties” surrounding existing dispensaries.647  Thirteen mobile workers were posted in DASP 
zone 1 and six in DASP zone 2.648 The mobile agents would be charged with home visits 
focused on tasks including malaria screening, leprosy treatment and health education.649 The 
training of these first mobile agents concluded in October 1967, and Dr. Happi held a ceremony 
in Yaoundé with the trainees and with WHO officials marking its conclusion, characterizing this 
new approach as something never before attempted in Equatorial Africa.650  The goal was to 
launch all of the six DASP zones by 1970, thereby covering roughly a tenth of the territory and 
a seventh of the population. These methods would then be extended out from the DASP zones 
based on experiences gathered.   
In a report that Torfs prepared on the rural health reforms, he articulated what he saw as 
the place of the mobile health teams in this new schema: 
The author believes that despite the integration of static and mobile 
medicine through the introduction of mobile agents (itinerants) in 
health centers' areas of influence, mobile teams, although in very 
small numbers, should be maintained at least at the scale of the 
region. It is difficult to imagine, before long, that the mass 
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648 WHO AFRO MAL 1968, Dr. M.E. Torfs, « Programme de Prééradication du Paludisme—Développement des 
Services de Santé de Base » 11 juillet 1968, AFR/MAL/94 ; AFR/PHA/42, 13.  The suggested plans for the DASP 
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649 WHO AFRO MAL 1968, Dr. M.E. Torfs, « Programme de Prééradication du Paludisme—Développement des 
Services de Santé de Base » 11 juillet 1968, AFR/MAL/94 ; AFR/PHA/42, 13.  Other tasks would include 
screening for transmissible diseases and direction of cases to departmental hospitals, basic emergency care (such as 
snake bites), and collection of demographic statistics such as births and deaths.  
 
650 National Archives of Cameroon, Yaoundé. L’Agence Camerounaise de Presse, « Cérémonie de Clôture du 
Stage de Formation des Itinerants des Zones de Démonstration d’Action en Sante Publique, » No. 244 du Mercredi 




campaigns (emergency prospecting and vaccinations) can be carried 
out by mobile agents. 
Torfs reasoned that the mobile agents still had to be recruited in the years to come and would be 
not be equipped to maintain the material needed for mass vaccination campaigns. Moreover, he 
saw the mobile agents as playing a role in preparing for mass vaccination campaigns by 
informing people and ensuring cooperation.651  The plans for basic health services thus did not 
call for an immediate end to the mobile health teams.  
 This plan did call, however, for a major increase of the Cameroonian health budget, 
which became another source of contention among SGE doctors who characterized these 
increases as unrealistic.  The Cameroonian government estimated that the investment in basic 
health services from 1966-1971 would require a near doubling of the operating health budget, 
and a reorientation of greater resources towards preventive health.652  In addition to plans for an 
increase in operating budget, the government oversaw a substantial investment in building up 
the health infrastructure of the country during this period.653  Behind operational claims about 
what was needed or possible among Cameroonian, French and WHO officials, however was 
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652 In 1964/1965 the public health budget of Cameroon amounted to 1,922 million CFA, roughly 10.4% of the 
Federal budget.  Moreover, hospitals in Yaoundé and Douala took up roughly the same amount of funds as all of 
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time that public health budgets should constitute 15% of an overall national budget.  The projected costs for the 
investment in basic health services would raise the public health budget to 4,000 million CFA by 1970. Ministère 
des affaires économiques, Plan quinquennel de développement économique et social : 2e, juillet 1966-juin 
1971/Five-year plan of economic and social development, 2nd, July 1966-June 1971.  
 
653 The health investment program for 1966-1971 totaled 3,765 million CFA.  The largest external contributor to 
this program was the European Development Fund, wth a grant of 1,942 million CFA.  An additional 450 million 
derived from other international sources. 1087 million of this investment was allocated for preventive and rural 
medicine establishments.  The rest of the money would go towards hospitals. Ministère des affaires économiques, 
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also a fundamental debate over expertise and authority over the landscape of rural health in 
independent Cameroon.  
OCEAC and Basic Health Services 
 These debates over integration continued in the following years and became a significant 
point of controversy. In the forum of OCEAC, Secretary General Rene Labusquière became a 
vehement critic of the WHO-led reforms, arguing that they were unrealistic and would upend 
the necessary role of the mobile health teams.  Moreover, through OCEAC meetings, the issue 
moved beyond one of concern for the Cameroonian national administration to being a broader 
issue about the role of the WHO in Africa and the legacy of systems already in place in former 
French colonies.  Through OCEAC, Labusquière asserted a claim to be the guardian of 
preventative medicine, and of rural health in Cameroon and other OCEAC countries, based on 
his long career with the mobile health team service dating to the colonial period.  
 Dr. Happi, in his role as both the Commissioner General of Health of Cameroon and the 
first President of OCEAC starting in 1965 adopted a role of negotiator, seeking to 
simultaneously affirm the work of both the French SGE doctors and the WHO in Cameroon.  In 
OCEAC meetings throughout the late 1960s, he argued that these reforms were not meant to 
dismantle, but rather to adapt and revitalize, the work of the mobile health teams.  In so doing, 
he thus sought to reconcile the financial, material and technical assistance from France and the 
WHO to Cameroon, even when these visions of assistance were in disaccord.   
Other Cameroonian health officials similarly bolstered the position of the WHO on 
reform for Cameroon’s health system.  Dr. Samuel Abane, head of the National Malaria 
Eradication Service in Cameroon, also advocated for WHO-led reforms to rural health in the 
first technical meeting of OCEAC in 1965.  Noting that Cameroon was the only OCEAC 
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member country to have adopted a pre-eradication program in conjunction with the WHO, he 
urged the other member countries to “come out of their lethargy and commit resolutely to this 
long-term undertaking.”654   
The claims of Cameroonian, French and WHO representatives to influence over the 
Cameroonian health system continued to present a politically charged situation.  In these 
OCEAC meetings, French military doctors struck a particular tone of being vocal critics of the 
WHO, while emphasizing their subordinate role in the decisions of the Cameroonian 
government.  The OCEAC meetings thus created a forum for a performance of honoring 
Cameroon’s sovereignty, while French military doctors at the same time sought to exert major 
influence on the development of international health programming in the country and other 
OCEAC member states.  Dr. Garrigue, head of the SGE in Cameroon, expressed these 
sentiments, which Dr. Aujoulat, in his role as a delegate of the French Ministry of Health 
confirmed this position:  
We are not responsible for the health policy of these countries, we 
are simply at the service of this policy, which is the integral 
responsibility of the states, and our role consequently is to be the 
instigators…the servants of the health policy the most suitable and 
the most easily achievable in Africa.655 
 
That said, Labusquière framed the reforms as an ongoing threat to the future of the 
mobile health team service and defended the service as upholding a privileged knowledge of 
health needs in Africa.  Labusquière moreover placed the creation of the new system for rural 
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medicine as but a new development in a long history of opposition to the mobile health service.  
Echoing debates about the 1950s about the autonomy of the mobile health team service, he 
pointed to a history of opposition to the service among French doctors of the colonial medical 
service.  The specific threats he saw to the existing system similarly echoed the concerns of the 
1950s about the “balkanization” of the service; Labusquière here pointed to the danger of 
“departmentalization” of the SGE sectors.656    
Labusquière also contrasted the work of the SGE doctors with African doctors who 
focused primarily on curative medicine.657  In defending a particular professional ethos of the 
SGE, Labusquière thereby undermined the authority of African doctors and health officials over 
knowledge of the terrain.  He claimed a specific kind of expertise garnered through the work of 
the mobile health teams, a claim which relatively few doctors could make in the medical 
administration.  He expressed total mystification as to the reason for this opposition, and rooted 
this confusion in the image of the rugged SGE doctor working tirelessly, and alone, in the 
“bush”:  
Let us say that those who have worked there for years…who know 
that in the bush they are the only ones, absolutely the only ones to 
do something…this systematic denigration, is more than 
discouraging, more than sickening, it is incomprehensible.658 
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 Labusquière reserved a particular ire for the “most important” opposition to the SGE 
represented by the WHO.  He characterized the WHO’s opposition to the SGE as “doctrinal, on 
principle, irreducible: the Service des Grandes Endémies must disappear.”659  Labusquière 
framed the conflict between the WHO and the SGE as one of idealism versus the reality “on the 
ground.”  His colorful language describing the WHO illustrated this central complaint: 
The WHO is a great lady who is not in a hurry. She does not have the day-
to-day responsibility to heal, on the ground, all those who are suffering.  
Dispensing advice, she does not have to face every day the almost insoluble 
problems faced by bush doctors: being everywhere at the same time and 
caring for people without having the means. ….It is only this ideal solution 
that interests her… To judge her way of acting, allow me a picture. I picture 
to myself this great lady WHO on the shore of a river. In this river a man 
drowns. Instead of rushing to her aid, this great lady immediately sets in 
motion all her immense influence to create swimming schools everywhere, 
in order to no longer be faced with the distressing spectacle of a drowning 
man. And to the astonished witnesses, she adds, ‘what is the point of 
drawing this man to shore, so long as he may find venomous serpents, which 
you must at once try to destroy everywhere. ...’ It is up to us, who are on the 
ground, to understand this point of view and not want to immediately put 
into practice what the WHO is planning for a still distant future. If we 
understand this, we will no longer struggle with the WHO and we will avoid 
errors due to poorly understood haste.660 
Labusquière argued that, without adequate resources and personnel to fully realize the rural 
health reforms, the result would be that curative medicine establishments would absorb the 
resources intended for preventive medicine.661  Moreover, he held that it was impossible for one 
person to oversee both the “santé de masse” and individual medical cases.  He argued that these 
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changes could only be made very slowly, in places where the resources were available. But 
before these changes became fully realizable, he saw the SGE as the only way to assure 
preventive medicine.662  Moreover, Labusquière argued that the WHO sought to reform the 
SGE, not because of the outcomes of the service, but because of its origins in the colonial 
period.  Labusquière did not frame the methods of the teams as ‘colonial’ in nature, but rather 
argued that the fact that they had originated under colonial rule made them a target of reform.663 
  Reports from some areas of Cameroon, however, indicated that people vastly preferred 
visiting nearby dispensaries to the visit of a mobile health team.  A SGE sector head reported on 
work of the teams in Foumban in 1967: 
Increasing enthusiasm for health centers and refusal by the 
population of systematic visits. Everyone, even the sick, on the day 
of prospecting or vaccination/consultation often prefers to go to the 
nearest health center ...664 
A mobile team also attempted to undertake a disease screening in the area of Foyum, which also 
had a Centre de Santé.  The team reported that whereas people arrived en masse to be 
vaccinated when the team arrived, only 19.6% of people accepted being examined for disease, 
and the rest of the people fled.665   The uneven reforms to rural medicine, which facilitated both 
the development of new rural health centers and the ongoing work of mobile teams thus created 
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new opportunities through which Cameroonians could show how and in what fashion they 
preferred biomedical intervention  
 Happi, in response to these critiques by Labusquière, sought to chart a conciliatory path 
based all at once in the recognition of a new political moment in Cameroon, and an affirmation 
of both the SGE and the WHO in this moment.  Happi’s comments in OCEAC meetings reveal 
that he saw the growth of health centers as central to a new sense of assurance of well-being for 
Cameroonians.  He argued that it was the network of dispensaries, the presence of a nurse, that 
“brought to our population moral security…which was indispensable to a happy life.”666   
Notably, however, Happi did not frame this advocacy of health centers as rooted in a break with 
the colonial past or with the SGE.  In the early stages of these OCEAC debates, Happi rather 
emphasized the centrality of the SGE to these reforms.  He argued that the plan for rural 
medicine in Cameroon “was only a question of giving new life to the Service des Grandes 
Endémies, which remained the base of all reform.”667  
At the same time, Happi worked to assure present WHO representatives of their 
welcome presence in Cameroon and in OCEAC.  Opening the OCEAC technical conference in 
1968, Happi referred to Labusquière’s comments about the WHO being a “great lady” and 
assured its representatives that the organization was “precious and dear” to Cameroon.668  By 
1969, Happi sharpened his tone, warning that if OCEAC wanted to remain an “avant-garde” 
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organization, it would have to contribute to this development of rural medicine in order to 
advance the economic development of Africa.669   
 OCEAC ultimately advocated a counter-plan to that of the WHO, asserting that CDMP 
posts only be set up when two fully-trained doctors were available to head them, with seniority 
given to the doctor in charge of preventive medicine.670  OCEAC thus offered a particular forum 
for French SGE doctors to challenge WHO reform and to propose counter-reforms at a regional 
scale.671  These recommendations did not fundamentally alter the direction of reforms pursued 
by the Cameroonian Ministry of Health, but they did create a space of debate beyond the 
bilateral relationships of health assistance between Cameroon and France, and that of Cameroon 
and the WHO.  It was in this space that French SGE doctors took their sharpest aims at the 
influence of the WHO in Cameroon and in other OCEAC member countries.  
 This conflict between Cameroonian officials, French SGE doctors and WHO 
representatives had not resolved by the late 1960s.672  The most dramatic attempts to reform the 
Cameroonian health system, however, remained limited to the demonstration pilot zones and the 
mobile health teams still played a central role in vaccination work in the country.  The focus on 
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rural medicine and its reconceptualization by WHO and Cameroonian health officials also, 
however, opened new avenues of medical training within the country that sought to advance the 
goals of rural health. 
A New Age of Medical Education 
 The reconceptualization of the rural health system in Cameroon raised questions about 
how to properly train medical personnel to work in this system.  In the late 1960s, the 
Cameroonian government instituted new programs to train medical staff through the DASP 
zones, to implement public health training in existing schools, and to develop an entirely new 
medical and public health training center in Yaoundé.  The reforms represented some of the 
most concrete and powerful changes to emerge from the WHO focus on basic health services.  
 First, the government created plans to focus on preventive and public health training for 
existing medical workers and students.  For example, all doctors would undergo a seven day 
public health orientation “on the basis of experience gained through DASPS” while para-
medical personal would receive a ten day public health training in the DASPS themselves.  In 
1970, for example, the town of Eséka in DASP zone 1 served as the site of training for doctors 
and nurses serving as departmental heads for the Service des grandes endémies et de la 
médecine rurale.673 Meanwhile, public health training would be incorporated into the 
curriculum of the six para-medical training schools in Cameroon for the first time from 1966 
forward.674 As Cameroonian doctors began to serve as the heads of zones of Service des 
                                                          
673 NAC, L’Agence Camerounaise de Presse, « Stages des Médecins et Chefs des Zones de Démonstration et 
d’action de Santé Publique » No. 118 du jeudi 28 mai 1970.  The training took place from May 11-16 1970.  
 
674 NAC Buea. Sc/a/1964/9. 3 December 1965. Memo. To: Africa Desk, Programme Division, New York. From: 
UNICEF Representative, Brazzaville. Subject: Explanatory note of the recommendation to the Executive Board in 
May 1966-Basic Health Services-Cameroun. These institutions included the 1) Centre d’Instruction Médicale, 
Ayos. 2) Government School of Nursing and Midwifery, Victoria and Bamenda, 3) Ecole Catholique d’Infirmières, 
280 
 
grandes endémies et de la médecine rurale, such as Dr. Théodore Botétéme in Nyong et Kellé 
in 1970, these trainings created a new professional milieu rooted in the basic health services 
reform.675   
The WHO also advocated for the Cameroonian government to create a new medical 
school in Yaoundé, which would train workers for a focus on public health and for rural health.  
The WHO ultimately influenced the Cameroonian government to develop this new model, 
rather than create a medical school according to French models similar to that in place in Dakar, 
Senegal.676  The Centre Universitaire des Services de la Santé (CUSS)/the University Center for 
Health Sciences would prepare students to work in Cameroon, in line with the resources and 
needs of the country.  The school would thus seek to train both doctors and paramedical 
professionals equipped to advance the basic health services model.  For example, the curriculum 
would focus not on training specialists, but on general practitioners.  Moreover, it would focus 
on teaching on “African” health problems, and move more quickly through health problems 
found in more “developed” countries.677  The first students began at the new school built on the 
campus of the Federal University in Yaoundé in 1969.  
 The establishment of CUSS, particularly in its break with French educational models, 
also created new openings to bridge the medical systems of East and West Cameroon.  The 
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school created new needs in the country for medical professors, and anglophone Cameroonian 
doctors ultimately played a powerful role in shaping the institution in its infancy.  This central 
cohort of doctors who helped shaped CUSS completed their medical training in Nigeria, and 
some were still based in Nigeria or other locations abroad when they were recruited to come 
work back in Cameroon.  Dr. Victor Ngu, a native of Buea, was serving as head of the 
Department of Surgery in Ibadan, Nigeria before joining the CUSS faculty in 1971.678  Dr. 
Gottlieb Monekosso, who completed his medical training in the UK and Nigeria, became the 
founding director of CUSS in 1969.679  Dr. Thomas Nchinda joined the faculty in 1975.680 
Another founding faculty member, Dr. Daniel Lantum who had also completed his medical 
training in Ibadan, remembered the concentration of anglophone doctors at CUSS as a reflection 
of the different medical educational opportunities available to Cameroonians through the British 
and French systems:   
President Ahidjo decided to bring some people from Nigeria to establish the 
first medical school here.  Professor Monekossa was the first dean.  
Professor Victor Ngu was professor of surgery, and then myself and many 
others who were on the faculty, we were from Nigeria.  So it means that 
Ahidjo realized the quality of education that Nigeria had at that time.  When 
we came we found a few doctors, so called Cameroonian doctors, who were 
educated in Dakar in Senegal.  The French had not established a very solid 
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system of education…and Ahidjo gave us the privilege to give that 
leadership.”681   
Anglophone Cameroonian doctors thus carved out a new role of medical authority within the 
country through the creation of the first medical school in the country. 
Conclusion 
The development of the DASP zones, on one hand, demonstrated continuation of the 
WHO’s reliance on “pilot zones” as a framework for health intervention, a form begun with 
malaria eradication in the 1950s and evidenced in Cameroon by the development of two pilot 
zones.682   On the other hand, these developments represented an early turn towards investing in 
more comprehensive health services and away from the single-disease focused campaigns of the 
eradication era, a change heralding the broader the shift to an international focus on primary 
care in the 1970s.  But in Cameroon, these shifts also entailed a reassessment of the French 
mobile health team model, and the embrace by Cameroonian health officials of the deep 
influence of the World Health Organization on the formulation of national policy.  It was in 
part, paradoxically, the failure of this organization’s vision for malaria eradication that drove 
these changes.  This change moreover did not coincide with independence, but became a long 
negotiation over the course of the 1960s, punctuated as well by the vital role of the mobile 
health teams in the Smallpox Eradication Program.  The mobile health teams had thus played an 
absolutely central role in the “eradication era” in Cameroon, both in their colonial and 
postcolonial iterations. Moreover, the negotiation between Cameroonian, French and 
international health officials over the work of the mobile teams became the key framework 
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through which these officials debated questions of authority over the operation of rural health 





















This project has shown how two central preoccupations of French colonial medical 
administration and of international health organizations, mobile health teams and disease 
eradication programs, became deeply intertwined in the postwar period and played a powerful 
force in shaping the Cameroonian health administration in the first decade of independence.  
The issues that Cameroonian, French and international health officials sought to fundamentally 
answer through negotiations over the mobile health teams—about the politics and provision of 
rural health in the face of low resources and personnel shortages— remained broached but never 
fully resolved.  A brief overview of post-1970 developments will demonstrate that these 
questions took on new urgency, and became shaped by a multitude of new actors, in the face of 
economic crisis and epidemic outbreak. 
 In the 1970s, competing visions of investment in rural health centers and an ongoing 
reliance on mobile health teams continued to produce discord among the WHO, OCEAC and 
Cameroonian officials.  Ongoing debates about basic health services in Cameroon in the 1970s 
took place in the context of the broader growth of an international movement promoting 
primary health care.  In 1978, three thousand delegates from around the world met for the 
WHO-sponsored conference on primary health care at Alma-Ata.  The ensuing Alma-Ata 
Declaration called for countries to work towards providing primary health care for all citizens.  
Marking a bold move away from postwar international health frameworks, the declaration 
called for community participation, and attention to the social and economic development as 
key determinants of health.683  
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 Part of the WHO focus on primary health care included expanding immunization 
coverage as a key component of maternal and child health services.684 This program sought to 
create more ongoing immunization services beyond the model of vaccination campaigns, in 
particular to respond to the failure to control measles in the course of the smallpox eradication 
program.685  In 1975, Cameroon launched an expanded immunization program in Yaoundé 
through coordination with both OCEAC and the American CDC, and a country-wide program 
led by the WHO in 1977.686 As the WHO called for this expanded immunization program to 
operate primarily through the personnel of fixed health centers, the ongoing French military 
leadership of OCEAC again pushed back against these recommendations, calling for continuing 
use of mobile teams.687 Moreover, tensions developed between health personnel at local levels 
about shifting realms of responsibility between curative and preventive medicine.688 
 These fundamental problems of addressing rural health continued, but the 1980s marked 
a decisive turn in the capacity of the Cameroonian state to provide for any of these visions of 
rural health. The economic crisis of the late 1970s and the slashing of the health budget in the 
1980s transformed the state health system.  These national changes reflected a much broader 
international political and economic context of a turn towards neoliberal policies.  In Africa, the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund implemented structural adjustment program and 
                                                          
assistance model of health, this also marked a return to approaches temporarily favored by international health 
organizations in the 1930s,  
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austerity measures, which forced the reduction of state health budgets and the privatization of 
health services.689 This period greatly undermined the building up of the system of rural health 
centers begun in the 1960s.690  The state budget was also no longer able to support the kind of 
experimental work and training being done in the DASP zones.691 
 Following this time of economic crisis, austerity and privatization, the involvement of 
international organizations and charities in the health sector in Cameroon multiplied.  The 
Cameroonian state faced severe limitations in centralizing or coordinating these diverse 
programs, or in setting health agendas autonomously.692  The stakes of this coordination became 
greatly heightened in the face of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  With the outbreak of the AIDS 
epidemic and the failures of rural health provision in this context, the question of the 
relationship between hospital and mobile-based medical intervention gained new traction and 
urgency.693 
The vestiges of the French mobile health teams and their postcolonial reorganization are 
still visible today in Cameroon.  In terms of institutions, OCEAC still exists today in Yaoundé 
at the site of its original headquarters.  The organization revised its objectives in 1983 and 
moved away from an emphasis on coordinating disease campaigns to a greater focus on being a 
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central source of scientific and public health expertise to member states, as well as supporting 
the training of public health personnel.  It is now an agency of CEMAC (Communauté 
Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale), which expanded in the 1980s to include 
Equatorial Guinea.  Much of the programming through OCEAC today focuses on the fight 
against malaria and against HIV/AIDS.694 
 
OCEAC Headquarters. Author's photograph. July, 2011. Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
 
The mobile health teams may, however, have also shaped the present day issues of 
public health in tragic ways both in Cameroon and beyond.  Recent scientific research suggests 
that the mass campaigns conducted by the mobile health teams in Cameroon and French 
Equatorial Africa, particularly against yaws, syphilis and sleeping sickness, between 1910 and 
                                                          




1960 may have been one of the factors that amplified the early spread of HIV among human 
populations.695 In this sense, these campaigns may have indeed shaped the current landscape of 
global health and the disease burden faced by people of Equatorial Africa in profound ways.   
This burden is seen not only through the disease of HIV/AIDS itself, but also the way in which 
the mobile team model, fortified by the pursuit of disease eradication, historically perpetuated 
“campaign style” public health, a model cast as being at odds with the development of a more 
stable health infrastructure, one with potentially greater capacity to respond to the emergence of 
new diseases and public health crises. 
At the local level within Cameroon, some have moreover argued that the colonial mobile 
health teams created “a popular imaginary of medicine privileging injections and pills,” and in 
turn contributed to the contemporary proliferation of unregulated “street medicine.” 696  
Although the memories of the mobile health teams certainly form part of the landscape of 
memories of older Cameroonians, this claim gives perhaps undue power to these older 
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experiences in forming contemporary subjectivities, giving them equal weight to the profound 
structural factors rooted in the weakening of state medical budgets, which limit Cameroonians’ 
experience of and access to biomedicine in the settings of hospitals, clinics and pharmacies.  In 
contemporary Cameroon, just as in many other African states, “your pocket is what cures you,” 
meaning that the ability to pay or not pay for medical consultation or medicines becomes a stark 
dividing line in access to biomedical care.697  Where this claim offers insight, however, is in 
placing the mobile health team service in a longer history of biomedical encounters outside of 
the hospital setting, and outside of the framework of a doctor-patient interaction. In this longer 
arc, the experience of biomedicine becomes marked by its own particular framework of 
medicine disconnected from individualized care and its implementation justified by conditions 
of limited resources.  Here, we might see the mobile health teams as a formative stage in a 
politics of biomedical care for the majority of people as framed by urgency and scarcity. 
 On a more global scale, the goal of the global eradication of single diseases, an idea that 
for a time fell into disrepute, has gained a powerful new advocates.  After many in the 
international health community discredited the idea of malaria eradication due to the major 
failings of the postwar program, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation announced in 2007 that 
its goal for malaria work was eradication.698  The Gates Foundation has also been a major player 
in an ongoing polio eradication program, first approved by the WHO in the late 1980s.699  In 
Cameroon, the issue of polio spread continues to be framed through familiar geographic 
pathways.  Cameroon remains a “key at risk” country for the global polio eradication campaign 
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due to Nigeria being one of only three countries in the world that still suffers from endemic 
polio.  In 2016, Cameroon declared a regional public health emergency following an outbreak 
of the disease in northeastern Nigeria.700 The sources of funding and influence for these new 
programs, shaped by new private philanthropies such as the Gates Foundation, at the same time 
represent a vastly transformed landscape of global health from the field of international health 
in the 1960s.  
 Tensions of global ambitions for disease eradication, the challenges of rural health 
intervention, and the sometimes opposing forces of medical and population movement, thus 
continue to shape many of the questions of public health in Cameroon today, albeit in new 
ways.  As this project has shown, it was in the postwar period and the first decade of 
independence that these fundamental problems became reformulated, through the mobile health 
teams, from questions of colonial governance to ones of the independent state, and this process 
took place in an inherently international context.   Yet, if this period of state-centered 
development ultimately culminated in a turn away from the framework of disease eradication, 
and a more serious investment in permanent public health infrastructure, the ensuing decades of 
economic crisis and the new imperatives of contemporary global health have recycled old 
questions for new times.   
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Table 3: Medical and para-medical personnel in Cameroon 1964/1965 701 
Qualification East Cameroon West Cameroon Total Federation 
 Public Private Total Public Private Total Public  Private Total 
Docteurs en médicine, 
Médecins Africains * 
/Doctors, “African 
Doctors” 
112 52 164 15 17 32 127 69 196 
Infirmiers diplômes 




179 114 293 107 54 161 286 168 454 
Sages-Femmes 
diplômées d’Etat/ State 
registered Mid-Wives 




468 6 474 71 -- 71 539 6 545 
Infirmiers à diplôme 
non reconnu/ Non-
certified nurses 
1886 405 2291 67 24 91 1953 429 2382 
Non diplomes-
Auxiliaries/ Auxiliaries 




1565 174 1739 227 256 483 1792 430 2222 
Total 4738 1461 6199 515 602 1117 5253 2063 7316 
 
*These numbers include French personnel.  
                                                          
701 BNF. Cameroun, Ministère des affaires économiques, Plan quinquennal de développement économique et 






Table 4: Medical Establishments in Cameroon 1964/1965702 










-- -- 310 310 
Private 22 7 192 221 




Public Health 7 -- -- 7 
Native Local 
Councils 
-- -- 40 40 
Private 11 2 51 64 
Total 18 2 91 111 
Federation medical 
establishments 
Public Health 38 29 138 205 
Communes, 
Native Auth. 
-- -- 350 350 
Private 
 
33 9 243 285 




                                                          
702 BNF. Cameroun. Ministère des affaires économiques, Plan quinquennal de développement économique et 
social : 2e, juillet 1966-juin 1971/Five-year plan of economic and social development, 2nd, July 1966-June 1971, 
424. 
 
